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So why did we write this book? In short, we wanted to have a book
that covers Smart Grid privacy more thoroughly than the others that
were available. Additionally, we wanted to provide a book that also 
represents two different approaches on the topic, one from a Smart 
Grid sector expert and one from a privacy expert. We also wanted to
show how the convergence of the two results in not only more effec­
tive privacy actions, but also more proactive business decisions. We
each had different, but in many ways similar, motivations and goals. 
Rebecca Herold 
I became interested in the privacy issues of the Smart Grid after I 
led the very first ever Smart Grid privacy impact assessment (PIA).
I’ve been addressing privacy within business since 1994, when I was 
given the responsibility of establishing privacy requirements for one 
of the very first online banks. This was in addition to my responsibil­
ity of creating the information security requirements. There were no
privacy laws at that time, so the lawyers in the large organization
where I worked said they were not obligated to determine privacy 
requirements when I asked them if they could get involved. However,
I strongly believed it was important, so I convinced my senior vice 













XII  PREFACE 
I’ve welcomed the opportunity to identify privacy risks in new tech­
nologies and practices, in the absence of any laws or regulations, in a 
wide range of industries.
I firmly believe that if you wait until there are laws in place to protect 
privacy for specific types of technologies, information, etc., that can 
reveal information about people’s lives, you will be too late in being as
effective as you can be to help prevent privacy problems. In my experi­
ence, I’ve seen that data protection laws always lag behind technology
advances by many years. I’ve been gratified to see this trend changing
in some areas, though. For example, laws are being established more 
closely to the launch of new technologies in the Smart Grid in part by 
the work of my NIST SGIP SGCC Privacy Group. This is evidenced,
as one example, by California being the first state to implement smart 
meter privacy law just several months, instead of years, after my
group released to the public the first version of NISTIR 7628 Rev. 1:
Guidelines for the Smart Grid Cybersecurity: Volume 2–Privacy and 
the Smart Grid as a draft in 2010. The law closely mirrors many of the 
recommendations from NISTIR 7628 Rev. 1. 
Since 2009, my NIST SGIP SGCC Privacy Group has created a 
lot of really valuable work products, not only both versions of NISTIR 
7628 Rev. 1, but also additional work products that those who will be
working in the Smart Grid environment need to know about so they
can use them to help support their privacy efforts. I am happy to have 
a chance within this book to point to them.
I met Christine when she led the privacy use cases subteam 
within the NIST SGIP Privacy Group, and I had the opportunity 
to work closely with her as a member of that team. When Christine 
approached me with the idea to write a book about Smart Grid pri­
vacy, I looked at the other books available on this topic. There weren’t 
many at that time. However, those that did have both Smart Grid and
privacy in the title had very little actual privacy discussion beyond the 
mention of encryption within the text! And none of them mentioned
privacy principles to use, or privacy impact assessments that could be 
performed. They were, instead, overwhelmingly about cyber security
controls, a great injustice to the readers who actually expected pri­
vacy to be discussed in detail, and comprehensively. Our book looks 
at the Smart Grid, and describes in detail how practitioners and those 














I also have been increasingly frustrated by those who claim that
addressing privacy (and information security for that matter) is bad 
because it prevents innovations. Poppycock! I agree that the Smart 
Grid holds great promise for inspiring significant innovations,
improving upon all sectors of organizations, and bringing true ben­
efit to individuals in possibly unlimited ways. However, organizations 
that are part of the Smart Grid, including those that create devices 
and software for use within it, must determine the associated privacy 
and information security impacts before they actually put software 
and hardware into use. By doing so, you are actually improving upon
innovation, because the resulting products will have the privacy baked 
in, which is much more effective than trying to latch something on to
an existing product later.
I want this book to be read by three primary audiences: (1) those 
building and architecting the many different components of the Smart 
Grid, to help them to build in effective privacy controls; (2) those who 
are or will be using smart meters, smart appliances, and generally liv­
ing within the Smart Grid in one or more ways, so they know the true 
privacy risks, and also the ways in which those risks can be mitigated; 
and (3) those who are interested in knowing more about the Smart 
Grid and privacy and want to get objective, factual information. I 
am concerned about privacy, and I am interested in identifying and 
mitigating privacy risks within Smart Grid technologies to the extent
possible. While most in the energy industry want to identify privacy 
risks and mitigate them appropriately, I know from direct experience
that there are still a few who do not want to have privacy discussed 
for stated fear that it will harm consumer adoption or “thwart innova­
tion.” I want to provide the facts without having the risks downplayed 
to meet the interests of those few who want to only provide positive 
information about the Smart Grid. There are also groups, some of
whom have contacted me directly, who want to scare consumers into
not using smart meters for a very wide variety of reasons. I want to
provide the facts and analysis about Smart Grid privacy that can be 
used to allow readers and consumers to recognize when sensational, 
exaggerated warnings are made about privacy that are not based upon
any research or facts.
We address the legal issues without getting into legal jargon. We







technical details. We point out the privacy topics without providing 
the information in an academic research paper type of narrative. In 
short, we are striving to make this book usable by anyone concerned 
about privacy within the Smart Grid and who wants to know the 
facts, in addition to providing practical privacy safeguards and guid­
ance for those entities within the Smart Grid. 
Christine Hertzog 
The Smart Grid is a convenient term that describes the collection of
technologies, policies, and financial innovations that are spurring the 
modernization of our electrical, natural gas, and water infrastructures. 
The Smart Grid consists of multiple machine-to-machine (M2M) 
applications that are characteristic of the Internet of Things (IOT).
The Smart Grid produces significant amounts of data and can also 
create new types of data. Data can be created in timescales that range
from milliseconds to hours to days, and it can also be event driven.
Smart meters are one of the most visible M2M applications for 
many consumers, but hardly the only one in the Smart Grid sector. 
While the focus of this book is on the Smart Grid, it also addresses 
the data generated at its periphery—such as in the connected home 
and in automobiles (and not just the electric ones). Every business sec­
tor is deploying technologies that are capable of collecting and com­
municating new and more data about performance, use, and status.
My focus on privacy came about from my work as the team leader 
for the NIST SGIP SGCC Privacy Group’s work on privacy use cases 
and the results we published in NISTIR 7628 Rev. 1. Ongoing obser­
vations about the quality and level of discussion about what is actually 
transmitted as data by different Smart Grid technologies and applica­
tions prompted this book. The word convergence is often used in refer­
ence to Smart Grid topics. It was only logical to apply that practice to
writing this book to leverage the knowledge of two different experts.
Intelligent investments in Smart Grid infrastructure are best made 
with accurate information. The same can be said for development of
policy and law. This book offers a clear and concise explanation of the 
Smart Grid and provides a solid foundation to understand the prob­
lems being addressed and proposed solutions. It describes the most 






transformation to a modern grid will have on stakeholders like con­
sumers, utilities, regulators, and lawmakers, and businesses that sell
grid-related products and services to stakeholders. Most importantly,
it addresses these topics through the lens of data privacy and the con­
siderations for privacy of individuals and organizations.
This book educates readers about data that is created by the Smart 
Grid and Smart Grid technologies, as well as some other M2M appli­
cations. My objective is to help educate readers to develop informed
opinions and meaningful contributions to legislation, policy, and 
hardware and software technologies to preserve and protect privacy
for individuals and entities. In other words, let’s generate light instead 
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THE SMART  GRID
AND  PRIVACY 
What Is the Smart Grid? 
The Smart Grid is a convenient term to describe the modernization of
electric, natural gas, and water grid infrastructures. The term encap­
sulates the convergence of remote monitoring and control technolo­
gies with communications technologies, renewables generation, and 
analytics capabilities so that previously noncommunicative infrastruc­
tures like electricity grids can provide time-sensitive status updates 
and deliver situational awareness. 
While initially and mostly focused on electricity, many of the 
same technologies, particularly in information and communications 
technologies (ICTs), apply to natural gas and water grids. This book 
addresses privacy in all three of these consumables, but electricity 
occupies a unique place by virtue of the fact that we can produce it as
well as consume it. In addition, existing technologies make it easier 
to get many more measurements about electricity than gas or water.
These two unique qualities about electricity have very interesting 
ramifications for privacy, and therefore this book will refer to electric­
ity and electricity use cases because they provide the best framework
for discussion of this important topic. 
Changes from Traditional Energy Delivery 
One of the other critical ramifications of the Smart Grid is that it
changes the supply chain. The traditional view is that electricity, gas, 
or water is supplied by a utility to consumers, and on a periodic basis, 
your consumption is metered and you pay a bill for the amount you 


















2 DATA PRIVACY FOR THE SMART GRID 
now make consumption a new point in the supply chain, and when it
comes to electricity, new technologies make it a value chain. Electricity 
has a special distinction in the Smart Grid.* Consumers can become
prosumers—producing consumers—of electricity. We can generate
electricity on our rooftops or backyards and sell kilowatts back to a 
utility or use it ourselves to reduce the amount we buy from a utility.
We can also participate in programs that encourage us to reduce our 
electricity use, thereby generating negawatts, or watts of energy saved 
through a reduction in energy use or increase in energy efficiency.† 
We don’t have the same range of possibilities to create water or nat­
ural gas, which is why electricity occupies the unique status of elevat­
ing us to prosumers. Water and gas meters are much simpler in design
and metrology (what is measured) than electricity too. However,
Smart Grid technologies definitely change what can be determined
about our consumption of electricity, natural gas, and water. Think
about it this way. Suppose you went to a grocery store and just walked 
out of the store with a reusable canvas bag full of items every day. At 
the end of the month, you received a bill with a single-line descriptor
for “groceries” and a total amount of money owed. That’s it. No iden­
tification of how many quarts of milk, pounds of bananas, or boxes
of cereal that you consumed that month. That’s how we currently get 
electricity, gas, and water bills. 
Smart Grid Possibilities 
Now consider the possibilities with Smart Grid technologies. This is 
a new situation. We’re accustomed to significant reporting of our lives 
in other aspects—we get detailed bank information identifying dates
and times of deposits and withdrawals from specific accounts. We
* 	 Definition from the Smart Grid Dictionary (http://www.smartgridlibrary.com/shop­
smart-grid-library-books/smart-griddictionary_new/): “Bi-directional electric grids
and communication networks that improve the reliability, security, and efficiency
of the electric system for small- to large-scale generation, transmission, distribu­
tion, storage, and consumption. It includes software and hardware applications for 
dynamic, integrated, and interoperable optimization of electric system operations,
maintenance, and planning; distributed energy resources interconnection and inte­

















3 THE SMART GRID AND PRIVACY 
get detailed credit card summaries every month listing business, date, 
time, and total of each purchase. And with the introduction of many
Smart Grid technologies, we have the opportunity to have similarly 
granular, time-stamped data about our use of electricity, gas, or water,
in addition to information about the devices using such items from
those device vendors. In the special case of electricity, that data can 
include our generation of electricity from solar panels on our rooftops, 
kitchen appliance usage, or location and duration of charging electric
vehicles (EVs), just to name a few.
Not every Smart Grid technology that is deployed in an electricity 
grid creates, monitors, transmits, or stores data about individual con­
sumption of electricity (or gas or water). And sometimes, the entity
collecting data is not a utility or affiliated with a utility. This book 
focuses on those technologies that do have impacts on personal pri­
vacy. Chapter by chapter, we’ll describe these technologies, existing 
policies and practices, and areas that require careful consideration
for policy makers, privacy officers in utilities and the companies that
provide solutions, and citizens. Our identification of these technolo­
gies and their associated privacy risks is not a condemnation of them. 
We see these technologies as very useful tools. But any tool, used 
incorrectly, can be dangerous. Recognizing the privacy implications
surrounding the new data that is created, collected, aggregated, ana­
lyzed, reported, or anonymized is key to building the solutions, poli­
cies, and processes that deliver generally accepted levels of privacy. 
Business Model Transformations 
But there’s another angle to this discussion, and it’s about transforma­
tion of business models. It’s likely that businesses other than utilities
may manage electricity-generating assets or water conservation equip­
ment. Depending on regulatory environments, businesses other than
utilities might even sell electricity, or collect energy usage* or energy
* 	 Energy usage data is data that shows how much energy is used at the consumer’s
location, such as by the consumer’s computers, mobile devices running smart energy
apps, third-party energy management services, smart appliances, and other types
of devices associated with that consumer. The data may also include the associated














4 DATA PRIVACY FOR THE SMART GRID 
production* data directly from consumers. Utilities may also get into
new services outside of their traditional areas of business activity. 
Indeed, a recent publication titled Reforming the Energy Vision from
the New York Department of Public Service,† the state regulatory 
agency responsible for oversight of investor-owned electric utilities, 
makes this point. The report describes the evolution of today’s utility 
business model from a linear supply chain of centralized electricity 
generation from a few players with unidirectional electricity transac­
tions to multiple consumers. The future utility business model will
accommodate decentralized electricity generation and bidirectional
electricity transactions between prosumers (producing consum­
ers), multiple energy service providers, and utilities. Smart energy
device manufacturers and vendors may also be brought in to the mix.
Businesses may form new and different collaborations to exploit data 
about consumption or use. However, these transformations will some­
times blur the lines of responsibility for privacy protection. This book 
will highlight a few of those boundary-bending trends to help readers 
develop plans and policies to incorporate the appropriate actions to
protect and maintain personal privacy. 
Emerging Privacy Risks 
Easy and quick access to energy consumption, energy usage, and 
energy production data has potential for benefiting consumers and 
utilities, just to name a few, to help conserve energy, keep costs as low 
as possible, and discover more ways to make energy delivery more effi­
cient. Along with these benefits come risks related to how that energy
* 	 Energy production data is data that identifies the flow of electricity for a device that 
generates or discharges electricity. 
† 	This report was produced by the New York State Public Service Commission and is
part of an initiative that will “lead to regulatory changes that promote more efficient 
use of energy, deeper penetration of renewable energy resources such as wind and
solar, wider deployment of ‘distributed’ energy resources, such as micro grids, on-
site power supplies, and storage. It will also promote greater use of advanced energy
management products to enhance demand elasticity and efficiencies. These changes,
in turn, will empower customers by allowing them more choice in how they man­




















5 THE SMART GRID AND PRIVACY 
usage data, and the information associated with it, are used, shared, 
stored, and otherwise accessed. 
Utilities, consumers, Smart Grid vendors, and other types of orga­
nizations using Smart Grid devices, applications, systems, and other 
types of technologies need to be aware of these new privacy risks, as
well as those that will inevitably emerge as the Smart Grid matures.
Interconnected networks and devices (for example, smart phones with
apps that can control energy settings within the home from remote loca­
tions) expand the scope for privacy risks within the Smart Grid. Many
of these risks are not unique to the Smart Grid, but they introduce new
types of threats and vulnerabilities to address within the Smart Grid.
As new and emerging technologies and activities are deployed, they will
likely introduce even more, and different, privacy challenges. Privacy
risks, and ways to mitigate them, are covered in Chapter 7. 
The Need for Privacy Policies 
Organizations need to establish internal privacy policies and support­
ing procedures for their personnel to follow to provide direction on how
to effectively and consistently protect consumer and energy usage data,
energy consumption data, and energy production data. Such policies
should span a comprehensive set of topics, such as how the information
should be retained, distributed internally, shared with third parties, and
secured against breach. There must also be not only online training and
awareness policies and procedures, but also regular employee training
and ongoing awareness communications sent to employees to help keep
them aware of privacy risks and how to mitigate them.
Similarly, Smart Grid services and products recipients should be 
provided with a privacy notice that describes the information the
organization is collecting and how that information will be used,
shared, and secured. 
Privacy policies and notices are described in detail in Chapter 7. 
Privacy Laws, Regulations, and Standards 
Privacy laws and regulations vary greatly throughout the world. There 
are generally four approaches in the United States to protecting pri­
vacy by law: 
6 DATA PRIVACY FOR THE SMART GRID 
• 	 Constitutional protections and issues. These are general protec­
tions provided by the First (freedom of speech), Fourth (search 
and seizure), and Fourteenth (equal protection) Amendments, 
which cover personal communications and activities. 
• 	Statutory, regulatory, and case law, at both the federal and 
state levels. There are growing numbers of Smart Grid privacy 
laws at the state level. The first Smart Grid privacy law was 
issued on July 29, 2011, when the California Public Utilities 
Commission (CPUC) established new rules* to protect infor­
mation about consumer use of smart meter energy provision­
ing services. The California rule established Fair Information 
Practice (FIP) requirements, including a consumer right of 
access and control, data minimization requirements, use and 
disclosure limitations, and data quality and integrity require­
ments. Electric utilities and their contractors, as well as third 
parties who receive electricity usage data from utilities, must 
comply with these rules. 
•	  Data-specific or technology-specific protections, including 
direct regulation of public utilities by state public utility com­
missions. These protect specific information items such as 
credit card numbers and social security numbers (SSNs), or 
specific technologies such as phones or computers used for 
data storage or communication, or customer-specific billing 
and energy usage information used by public utilities to pro­
vide utility services. Other federal or state laws or regulations 
also exist that provide privacy protections to information 
within specific industries (e.g., Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act,†  
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act,‡ etc.). 
• 	Contractual and agreement-related protections and issues: 
specific protections. These are protections specifically out­
lined within a wide range of business contracts, such as those 
between consumers and businesses, businesses and their 
* 	 See the full text of the California rules at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/WORD_PDF/
FINAL_DECISION/140369.pdf. 
† 	See the regulatory text at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/
combined/hipaa-simplification-201303.pdf. 
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contracted vendors, etc. The privacy risks within the Smart 
Grid will necessitate such contracts for all entities that have 
access in some way to the associated customer and energy
usage data. 
Privacy-Enhancing Technologies 
A wide range of existing privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) can
be engineered within the many technologies of the Smart Grid to 
support privacy protections. A few examples of PETs* include: 
• 	Encryption: Encryption is a cryptographic process used to 
encode (scramble) data in such a way that only authorized 
parties can read it. 
• 	 Steganography: Steganography is a method used to conceal a 
message, image, or file within another message, image, or file.
• Aggregation† methodologies: Within the energy industry, data 
aggregation refers to methodologies that remove personally 
identifiable information from collections of energy usage data. 
(Other industries and groups define this term differently.)
• De-identification‡ methodologies: These are methodologies 
that remove all data necessary to keep the data from being 
analyzed to identify individuals. 
• 	Access control systems: These are technical, administrative, 
and physical controls implemented to ensure only those indi­
viduals with a business need can gain access to confidential 
information or restricted areas. 
• 	Privacy seals for websites: These are third-party validations 
that a specific scope of the associated business has been 
reviewed and determined to meet appropriate levels of pri­
vacy protections. 
* 	 Taken from Rebecca Herold, Managing an Information Security and Privacy Awareness 
and Training Program, 2nd edition, CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL, 2010. http://www.
crcpress.com/product/isbn/9781439815458. 
† This will be covered in detail in Chapter 7. 
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• 	 Spam filters: A spam filter is a program that is used to detect 
unsolicited and malicious email, such as phishing messages
that can collect personal information, or keystroke loggers,
which can capture all information types and prevent those 
messages from getting to a user’s inbox. 
New Privacy Challenges 
A variety of Smart Grid technologies are making more data avail­
able to utilities today. But beyond electric, gas, and water operations,
many other business sectors are impacted by the same technologies.
Sensors gathering more and new types of data, inexpensive data
storage making it possible to keep data indefinitely, the increasing
use of mobile devices, as well as smart devices,* for data collection 
and use, and the growth of reliable and robust communications
networks—mostly wireless—contribute to business opportunities 
in machine-to-machine (M2M) applications and the Internet of
Things (IOT).† 
IOT 
The Internet of Things (IOT) generally means the computing devices
and gadgets to generate data, and then to be connected to other gadgets
to share and use that data. Such devices include smart phones, laptops,
and tablets. Also included are increasingly computerized things that
can generate data, take actions based upon automatic analysis of that
data, and automatically store data. The possibilities are endless. Already
there are computer-enabled cars, wearable technologies, smart ther­
mostats, medical devices, kitchen appliances, water treatments, baby
* 	 As defined in the Q2 2014 issue of Protecting Information Journal (http://hipaapri­
vacy.org/product/protecting-information-journal/), “smart devices, are items that
typically have existed for a very long time with no computing capabilities that are 
now being created with data collection, transmission, and/or processing capabilities
built into them. All connect, in some manner, to the Internet to enable sharing of 
that data.” 
† 	As defined in the Q2 2014 issue of Protecting Information Journal (http://hipaapri­
vacy.org/product/protecting-information-journal/), “the Internet of Things (IoT) 
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monitors, clothing items, trash cans, stoplights, and the list goes on.
Such computerized gadgets are typically referenced as “smart” devices.
Just a few examples of some smart devices in the Smart Grid include: 
• Electric vehicle charging stations 
• In-home energy management displays 
• Load control switches 
• Wi-Fi range extenders
• Thermostats 
• Smart meters 
• Voltage regulators
• Smart phone apps
• Data concentrators 
Big Data 
All the data collected from the Smart Grid and the Internet of Things 
can become “big data” and characterized by the four Vs: volume, vari­
ety, velocity, and veracity. We can install sensors that remotely moni­
tor and control devices that previously did not have these capabilities. 
That leads to increasing volumes of data. In many cases, sensors are 
providing new types or varieties of data. For example, wearable devices 
offer a wealth of data that weren’t available before—new variety.
Communications networks make data available for real-time or near-
real-time consumption—increasing its velocity. Veracity addresses 
the accuracy of data. Inaccurate data can be benign or have serious 
impacts. Just ask anyone who had inaccurate financial data down­
grade a credit score—the impacts can mean more expensive capital for 
everything from credit cards to mortgages.
However, big data offers a tremendous amount of potential
and positive impacts for families, communities, business, govern­
ments, and everyone as inhabitants on planet Earth. In May 2014,
Dr. Ernest Moniz, the secretary of the Department of Energy
(DOE), spoke at the White House Energy Datapalooza* and stated
that “freely available government data about energy is a national
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and improve electric grid resiliency. There are many interesting ini­
tiatives to make data open and accessible, all the while acknowl­
edging the need to maintain privacy of data. However, as with any
beneficial new technology, big data also brings with it privacy risks* 
that must be mitigated. 
* See a summary of 10 common big data privacy risks at http://privacyguidance.com/
blog/10-big-data-analytics-privacy-problems/. 
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WHAT IS THE  SMART  GRID? 
Before launching into the Smart Grid and considerations of privacy,
it is helpful to understand the traditional electricity grid structure in
the United States and what makes the Smart Grid different from the 
existing grid. The electric sector is best described from regulatory, 
market, and technology perspectives. Our discussion scope is focused 
on the United States since regulatory and market structures, and even 
privacy legislation, differ by nation. However, the grid technologies
are applicable everywhere. 
Market and Regulatory Overview 
Traditional Electricity Business Sector 
The traditional electricity business sector consists of power gen­
erators and transmission and distribution operators, as illustrated in
Figure 2.1. Depending on the region of the United States, all of these 
functions may be performed by one company—known as a vertically 
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integrated utility. In other regions, generation, transmission, and dis­
tribution may be operated by different companies, reflecting different 
approaches to deregulation of the electric utility sector. From a sup­
ply chain perspective electricity is supplied by centralized, large, or
utility-scale generation and delivered via high-voltage (69 kV and up) 
transmission lines connecting to low-voltage (4 to 35 kV) distribution
lines or grids. 
The Electricity Open Market 
Historically, electric utilities typically have had a monopoly status at
the distribution grid level—there’s only one wire that connects to a
meter attached to a building or other end point, not multiple lines 
from competing suppliers.
Many regions of the United States have entities called independent
system operators (ISOs) or regional transmission operators (RTOs).* 
They ensure that all qualified power sellers (generators) have oppor­
tunities to get their electricity to buyers (utilities) by coordinating
regional transmission. In the past, generation meant the creation 
of megawatts or kilowatts of power. There is growing interest in
leveraging negawatts† as equal market participants. The Smart Grid
can help enable more negawatts to be created and managed at the 
bulk market level. Later in this chapter there will be discussion of how
the Smart Grid can help facilitate a market for generation of kilowatts 
and negawatts at the retail or distribution grid level. 
* 	 The Smart Grid Dictionary definition of an RTO is: “An independent, federally-
regulated (U.S. or Canada) entity established to coordinate regional transmission 
in a non-discriminatory manner and ensure the safety and reliability of the elec­
tric system. These organizations monitor system loads and voltage profiles, operate 
transmission facilities and direct generation, define operating limits, develop con­
tingency plans, and implement emergency procedures. ISOs also have authority over
transmission expansion projects. This coordination, control, and monitoring of the 
electrical power system may be within a single U.S. state or across multiple states. 
There are currently 10 ISOs and RTOs (Regional Transmission Organizations) in
North America.” 
† 	From the Smart Grid Dictionary: “Watts of energy reduced on a temporary basis in
response to a market signal—usually price. It is the outcome of Demand Response
programs that aggregate a number of these actions to represent reductions of energy
use from kilowatts to megawatts. A permanent negawatt reduction is achieved
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At a federal level, there is oversight of the bulk or wholesale power 
market to ensure grid reliability. The North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (NERC) is “an independent, self-regulatory,
not-for-profit organization whose mission is to ensure the reliability of
the bulk power system in North America. It monitors the bulk power 
system; develops and enforces reliability standards; assesses future 
adequacy of electricity; audits owners, operators, and users for pre­
paredness; and educates and trains industry personnel.”* The critical 
importance of its responsibilities received international attention after
the August 2003 Northeast blackout that affected 50 million people
in the United States and Canada.† 
Classifications of Utilities 
There are over 3,000 electric utilities in the United States. These fall
into one of four classifications: 
• 	Federal utilities like Bonneville Power Administration or
Tennessee Valley Authority 
• 	Investor-owned utilities (IOUs), which have shares bought
and sold in stock exchanges and have operating territories that
can be intra- or interstate. Examples include Duke, ComEd,
or Southern California Edison. 
• 	Municipal (munis) utilities, which are owned by local
communities and their governing agencies and operate
in those jurisdictions’ boundaries. Examples include LA
Department of Water and Power or the Electric Power
Board of Chattanooga. 
• 	Cooperative (coops) utilities, which are member-owned 
nonprofit utilities that typically serve rural areas. Examples
include Bluebonnet Electric Cooperative and Sawnee Electric
Membership Cooperative. 
* Definition from the Smart Grid Dictionary. 
† http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/2003-blackout-five-years-later/. 
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IOUs operate as monopolies and are regulated by state agencies.* 
In the United States, that translates into 50 regulatory commissions
plus agencies for the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands. These commissions oversee electric, gas, and water 
utilities as well as telecommunications. At a high level, regulators are 
responsible for ensuring that the consumers they represent are receiv­
ing services (electric, gas, and water) at fair, just, and reasonable rates.
Munis and coops are generally not regulated by state regulatory
agencies. However, these utilities track regulatory policy trends and
rulings, and their operations and future plans may be influenced by
these decisions. As businesses, they are bound by laws enacted in
their home states, which can have important ramifications for pri­
vacy topics. 
Rate-Making Processes 
Ensuring fair, just, and reasonable rates in a monopoly environment 
has resulted in regulators and utilities relying on tariff or rate-making 
processes that guarantee a rate of return or profits to utilities to cover 
their fixed and variable costs. Figure 2.2† breaks down a complex pro­
cess that varies by state and utility into its simplest factors. 
Figure 2.2 Simple breakdown of tariff-setting process. (Courtesy of Chris Kotting, ckotting.com.) 
* 	 Common names include public utility commissions, commerce commissions, cor­
poration commissions, and public service commissions. In some cases, regulators are 
appointed by governors; in other states, regulators are elected representatives. 
† 	Tariff-setting processes are very complex and vary by jurisdiction, but this graphic 
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Today’s tariffs are fixed fees for electricity. While that provides pre­
dictability for the average consumer to budget his or her electricity 
use, it also shields consumers from the fact that electricity is traded 
like a commodity. Just like coffee, gold, or natural gas futures rise and 
fall, so too do electricity prices. Electricity prices can vary based on
time and type of generation source. Electricity purchased during a 
period of high demand costs more than electricity purchased during 
a lull in needs. 
Electricity Consumers 
Consumers fall into categories that are typically organized as resi­
dential, commercial, industrial, and agricultural. Depending on the 
utility, there may be other specialized distinctions or subgroupings
based on type of business or amount of electricity purchased. These
consumer groups typically have some sort of representation with
regulatory agencies and utilities. For instance, the California Public
Utilities Commission has an Office of Ratepayer Advocates (ORA) 
with a statutory mission to “obtain the lowest possible rate for service 
consistent with reliable and safe service levels. In fulfilling this goal, 
ORA also advocates for customer and environmental protections.”* 
Regardless of the type of utility, for decades the business model 
has been consistent—there is one provider of electricity to consumers. 
At the time of this writing, 16 states, such as Texas and Pennsylvania 
plus the District of Columbia, have deregulated the market at the 
distribution grid level. This is often referred to as the retail electricity 
market or level, in contrast to the bulk or wholesale markets addressed 
by ISOs and RTOs. Residential (or in some cases, commercial) con­
sumers in these states may choose their retail electricity provider. 
There is still just one wire and meter (smart or traditional) that con­
nects a consumer to the distribution grid, but there are multiple com­
panies competing for consumer business based on price of electricity 
plus additional services. Twenty-two states have deregulated gas.
This utility business model will continue to change, and deregula­
tion policies are in some ways a minor influence compared to some
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the astonishing growth of solar photovoltaic (PV) systems on residen­
tial and commercial rooftops and the proliferation of financial tools 
that reduce the cost of capital to deploy these systems.* The end result
is that electricity revenues, the main source of funding for utilities, are 
slowing and even decreasing. We’ll examine this in more detail later 
in this chapter. 
Electricity Technology Overview 
Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell were contemporaries
in the late 1800s and celebrated for their respective inventions that
became the electrical grid and the telecommunications network. Mr. 
Bell would not recognize today’s telecom operations because equip­
ment has undergone multiple evolutions and upgrade iterations. 
Today’s smart phone is radically different from the fixed devices that
he invented. However, Mr. Edison would recognize many elements of
an electric utility substation. There have been updates and upgrades, 
but many utilities have been encouraged to operate in a “run to fail­
ure” mindset and only replace equipment once it is past repair. There 
have not been any significant, industry-wide technology migration
initiatives until the Smart Grid. 
The power grid we enjoy today is a complex and marvelous 
machine, but it is definitely replete with aging infrastructure. Many of
the transformers in the distribution grid are past their manufacturer-
warranted lifetime. According to the Galvin Electricity Initiative, 
the average transformer age is 42 years on equipment designed for 
a 40-year life span. Some utilities still have operating infrastructure 
that was installed during Edison’s lifetime. For instance, a senior
executive for National Grid noted at a recent industry event that the 
utility had a line in upstate New York that was installed by Thomas 
Edison. Imagine a stretch of road lasting that long—it would be in
need of significant overhauls and upgrades too.
This power grid operates as a just-in-time supply chain. What this
basically means is that Americans have been conditioned to expect as
much power as they need whenever they need it. There’s no advance 
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scheduling or reservation of kilowatts to coincide with usage changes.
System operators at the ISO and utility planners carefully project elec­
tricity needs and then schedule for that, with room to spare. When 
they don’t match supply to demand, the results are voltage sags or
surges that can have very serious consequences for sensitive electron­
ics equipment, especially for commercial and industrial operations 
that require steady power quality. Even worse, a mismatch of supply 
and demand can cause blackouts. In 2000–2001, California experi­
enced “rolling blackouts”* that were found to be the result of illegal
market manipulations in the wholesale power grid. 
Electricity Supply Chain Vulnerabilities 
This supply chain is extremely fragile. While the California roll­
ing blackouts were caused by criminals manipulating markets, other 
regions of the country experienced severe power disruptions from
extreme weather events, which will become more common as a result
of climate change. The supply chain of centralized generation—trans­
mission at long distances to substations that then convert the power 
to lower voltages suitable for movement along the distribution grid
to consumers—lacks resiliency to quickly recover from these types of
incidents. There is significant concern expressed within utilities and
at the highest levels of government that the grid is also exposed to
attacks. These attacks can be physical† or cyber based.‡ The electricity 
supply chain’s weakest links are in its transmission and distribution
grids. There are 200,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines§ and
2.2 million miles of lines in the distribution grids. Most of these assets 
consist of overhead wires and equipment, not underground facilities. 
* 	 http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/blackout/california/timeline.
html. 
† 	PG&E announced a $250,000 reward for information leading to the arrest and 
conviction of the perpetrator(s) who fired gunshots that caused extensive damage to 
its Metcalf transmission substation near San Jose in 2013. 
‡ 	In May 2014 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) noted that an unidenti­
fied utility’s control system network had been penetrated and compromised via an
Internet connection and a weak password system. 
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The costs of electric service disruptions are staggering. Estimates of
the damage done to the U.S. economy range from $104 billion to $164
billion annually.* Service disruptions also have enormous impacts on
our quality of life as well as our essential health and safety. There are 
no substitutes for electricity.
Magnifying these vulnerabilities caused by inherent supply chain
fragility, traditional grids provide very little information to their util­
ity operators about their status. For the most part, the grid has been 
uncommunicative about what is going on within its lines and equip­
ment. How does the typical electric utility learn about a power out­
age? When you call to complain about your lack of service. Then,
the utility narrows down suspected failure locations based on the 
addresses of complaints. Finally, repair teams are dispatched to search 
out the failure point, and hopefully have the right training and right 
equipment to repair the failure and restore service.
The situation is only slightly better in the traditional transmission
grid. The 2003 blackout started with transmission lines sagging in the 
heat of an August day and touching tree branches. What should have
been an outage limited to one utility became a multistate problem 
because of human error and a lack of situational awareness. Existing 
technologies provided status updates every 4 seconds. That may sound 
like a reasonable rate of data, but electrons move much faster than
that. We don’t recommend that you experiment with this illustration
of the problem, but think of it in terms of driving a nonautonomous 
car on a highway. Can you imagine how much you miss if you close 
your eyes for 4 seconds as you’re hurtling along at 65 miles per hour, 
briefly open them, and then shut them for another 4 seconds? That’s 
how we managed the high-voltage transmission grid. 
The Smart Grid 
The Smart Grid promises significant changes to every facet or domain
of the electricity grid sector. The simplest distinction is that the Smart 
Grid delivers bidirectional energy and information, in contrast to the
single directional flow of electricity and minimal flow of information
* 	 Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), The Cost of Power Disturbances to 
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that exists today. Smart Grid technologies can deliver significant
amounts of data to create extraordinary situational awareness at every 
stage of the supply chain.
There are a couple of game-changing technologies that appear
in the Smart Grid—primarily in renewable energy generation and 
energy storage. However, many Smart Grid technologies are merely
deployments of established telecommunications and data analytics 
technologies that are already in use in other business sectors, like
finance, consumer goods, and healthcare. They may be new to the 
utility sector, but they are not new technologies.
Some Smart Grid technologies are directly visible to consumers. 
You can see the smart meter that is installed on the side of a building. 
But many of the technologies adopted by utilities to modernize their 
grids are invisible to consumers. Again, that’s no different from how 
our wireless carriers, our banks, or our stores upgrade the infrastruc­
ture that helps them improve the delivery of whatever service they
are providing to consumers. But unlike those sectors, the consumer-
utility relationship will undergo dramatic disruptions. Consumers 
will have many of their own energy usage, production, and manage­
ment devices on their premises, some of which may connect to utility
meters, and others that may connect to the Internet. In some situa­
tions, the disruptions caused by adoption of Smart Grid technologies
will be driven by consumers rather than utilities or regulators. It will
be extremely important to understand privacy impacts as a result of
consumer-utility relationship changes. 
Market Changes in the Smart Grid 
Figure  2.3 is a graphic visualization of the Smart Grid. Here, the 
traditional supply chain of generation, transmission, and distribu­
tion is fully and securely connected, and most importantly from a 
privacy perspective, the consumer is now a full participant in that
supply chain. Consumers transform into prosumers,* or producing
* 	 From the Smart Grid Dictionary: “A term coined by Alvin Toffler to describe a pro­
ducing consumer. From a Smart Grid perspective, it would apply to distributed 
energy resource situations in which the owner of electricity production or storage 
assets may also have a consumer relationship with a utility, aggregator, or other 
energy services provider.” 
Figure 2.3 The new electricity value chain. Consumption becomes prosumption. (Courtesy of 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).) 
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consumers, who can create electricity (typically from clean renewables 
such as solar PV, wind generators, etc.) to sell back to the grid, or con­
sume their self-generated electricity and only draw power from the 
grid if needed, or produce negawatts through reductions in electricity 
use that are sold back to the grid.
We see the first instances of this in states that have net metering*  
tariffs and feed-in tariffs† (FiTs). These tariffs either credit the solar 
PV or wind generator asset owner for electricity generated (an avoid­
ance of electricity otherwise sold by the utility) or publish a price at 
which excess electricity is sold back to the utility. 
* 	 From the Smart Grid Dictionary: “The capability for residential and C&I (Commercial 
and Industrial) customers to generate electricity and sell back excess power to the 
utility, essentially offsetting their future purchases of utility power. Net metering uses 
either a single, bi-directional electric meter or two meters to separately measure in and 
out electricity flows at a customer’s location. Net metering is currently implemented on 
a state-by-state basis with significant variation between states.” 
† 	From the Smart Grid Dictionary: “An energy supply policy that encourages new 
renewable power generation and attempts to provide investor certainty with guaran­
tees of payments in dollars per kWh for the full output of the system for a guaran­
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Prosumer Evolution 
This early prosumer example will evolve and repeat over time as more 
technologies like energy storage become commercially available or
as electric vehicles (EVs) can support smart charging applications in
which they can charge and discharge power with the grid. Prosumers 
will have a variety of energy services providers (ESPs) to choose from.
ESPs offer solutions that typically incorporate some management of
a prosumer’s consumption or production of electricity. For instance, 
Solar City and Tesla are collaborating to offer a bundled solar PV 
generation and energy storage solution for residential prosumers. 
They will offer third-party ownership and management of the solu­
tion on the prosumer’s behalf. Other ESPs aimed at the residen­
tial consumer market include AT&T, Comcast, and many smaller 
companies with products and services that bundle home security and
home energy management with broadband communications. There 
are entire ecosystems of different ESPs that target their products and 
services to the commercial, industrial, and agricultural market seg­
ments. ESPs have the potential to intermediate the traditional direct
relationship that consumers have with utilities. As the intermediary
between the electricity consumer and the electric utility, ESPs could 
own the consumer relationship. Intermediation has very interesting 
implications for privacy. 
Other Relevant Market Changes 
There are other relevant market changes that can only occur as Smart 
Grid technologies are deployed by utilities, ESPs, or prosumers. Some
state regulatory agencies and their regulated utilities are planning to
convert today’s fixed residential tariffs to time of use* (TOU) elec­
tricity rates in the future, which would reflect the price changes in 
electricity over a 24-hour time period. Prices for watts of electricity 
purchased during periods of peak demand would be higher than the 
* 	 From the Smart Grid Dictionary: “A rate structure with different unit prices for elec­
tricity use in a 24-hour time frame, generally to encourage use during periods of 
lower demand. This phrase applies to a time of use price, rate, or tariff and is a 
dynamic price scheme typically used with non-dispatchable demand response pro­
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prices for those same watts purchased at off-peak times. For TOU to
work most effectively, consumers and prosumers benefit from Smart 
Grid technologies that help them manage production or consumption
of electricity to “buy low and sell high” instead of operating within
an artificially fixed and static market construct. It’s a step toward the 
transactive energy market that is described later in this chapter.
A Smart Grid, with its ubiquitous and reliable communications 
capabilities, can enable electricity consumption based on price sig­
nals. Consumers can better manage their electricity consumption 
with Smart Grid technologies, and thus have better control over their 
electricity bills. But there’s an existential threat here for utilities. Their
revenues from electricity sales can flatline or shrink. That’s already 
happening, as charted in Figure 2.4.
Simultaneously, utilities need to upgrade aging infrastructure and 
modernize into the Smart Grid, so their costs are increasing. These 
dual trends exert significant pressure on the existing business model.
There’s a colorful term for it—the utility death spiral. The death spiral
goes as follows. Regulated utilities will receive decreasing electricity 
sales revenues as more consumers become prosumers. Some prosum­
ers may completely disconnect from the utility’s grid, but will main­
tain a connection as insurance in case their self-generation and energy
storage equipment fails. Utilities are mandated to deliver electricity to
everyone, and will have to maintain these connections and ensure that
they have purchased adequate megawatts of power in the bulk market 
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just in case it is needed for these occasions. Their costs are fixed regard­
less of the number of electricity buyers. In turn, the utility increases 
rates on the remaining consumers still buying electricity in order to
cover these costs. Those price increases motivate even more consumers 
to defect to self-generation, and the revenues shrink even more.
A 2014 report titled “Reforming the Energy Vision,” released by 
the New York Department of Public Service, the state regulatory 
agency responsible for IOU oversight, is a policy game changer.* The 
report describes the evolution of today’s utility business model from
that linear supply chain of centralized electricity generation sold by a 
few players in unidirectional electricity transactions to multiple pro­
sumers participating in a reorganized electricity market. This report
envisions a future utility business model with decentralized, renew­
able electricity generation and bidirectional electricity transactions 
between prosumers, multiple energy service providers, and utilities. 
This new business model addresses the utility death spiral by pro­
posing new service opportunities for utilities to survive and thrive in
more open and intermediated scenarios. 
Buildings as Prosumers 
Intermediation is already happening and is most evident in the com­
mercial consumer sector, focused on buildings. Buildings use 40% 
of the nation’s energy. From an energy efficiency perspective, the
National Academy of Sciences noted in a study† that the “full deploy­
ment of cost-effective energy efficiency technologies in buildings alone 
could eliminate the need to construct any new electricity-generating 
plants in the United States” until 2030.
A building operating as an electricity prosumer goes well beyond
energy efficiency reductions. Energy efficiency is a passive tactic that
delivers permanent energy reductions in electricity or gas. While build­
ing owners can justify investment decisions on energy savings as well
as sustainability values, there are two other opportunities for building
* 	 Download the report at http://www3.dps.ny.gov/W/PSCWeb.nsf/All/26BE8A939
67E604785257CC40066B91A?OpenDocument. 
† 	Report of the Building Energy Efficiency Subcommittee to the Secretary of Energy 
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owners to invest in technologies that reduce energy use and deliver self-
sufficiency to temporarily reduce consumption or produce their own
electricity. The first reason involves demand response (DR) programs.* 
The most common manifestations of today’s DR programs are vol­
untary reductions in energy use within commercial buildings, often
accomplished by modulating heating, ventilation, air conditioning
(HVAC) temperatures, or interior lighting. These reductions are 
spurred by requests from utilities or ESPs that aggregate the actions
of multiple DR participants to address times of peak demand for
electricity. These situations are usually seasonal and predictable—
often happening during the hottest or coldest times of the year. 
Upon receipt of a request, a building manager may manually adjust 
thermostats or take other measures to reduce electricity use (produce
negawatts) for the requested durations of time. One of the authors 
participates in a residential demand response program offered by a 
utility and enjoys a year-round rate reduction in exchange for volun­
tary electricity reductions on selected days that correspond to heat
waves in the region. Other programs offer payments based on the 
total amount of electricity reduced.
Industrial and agricultural businesses are also potential participants 
in DR programs. Their participation hinges on the type of operations
and the flexibility to reduce electricity use at times when an ESP or a 
utility requests it.
The advent of more embedded intelligence and Smart Grid tech­
nologies in the forms of sensors and actuators with remote commu­
nications can create more opportunities for participation from greater 
numbers of buildings. Automated demand response (ADR) tech­
nologies enable buildings (commercial, industrial, agricultural, and 
* 	 From the Smart Grid Dictionary: “Utility programs designed to change on-site
demand for energy through changes in prices, load control signals, or other incen­
tives to customers. The programs are activated at times of peak usage or when system 
reliability is jeopardized. Demand response programs fall into two general categories
known as price-based programs or capacity-based programs. Price-based programs
include dynamic pricing/tariffs, price-responsive demand bidding, and critical peak
pricing structures that let users voluntarily reduce their electricity use. Capacity-
based programs include contractually obligated reductions and direct load control/
cycling. Utilities use these programs to address system reliability, asset use effi­
ciency, and market conditions; and avoid investments in new T&D (Transmission 
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residential) to produce negawatts on an as-needed basis without the 
need for human intervention. The eventual goal is that equipment or
the systems that manage buildings will respond automatically to price 
signals, not just special requests to reduce energy use. Smart Grid
technologies make it feasible for DR programs to work with energy
storage to firm renewable energy like solar and wind, which are inter­
mittent by nature. 
Automated Demand Response and the OpenADR Initiative 
Automated demand response (ADR) applies remote monitoring and 
control technologies to automatically modulate the HVAC, lighting, 
or other systems where it is deployed. This convenience factor is very
important to the success of ADR. This factor is sometimes called “set 
and forget,” and it eliminates the need to individually contact each 
DR participant with requests to make a change to a thermostat set­
ting or another manually operated control.
For building owners and managers, DR program participation
delivers payments for reductions in electricity use or lower rates 
throughout the year—nice impacts to their operating costs. Another 
potential benefit is to offer Leadership in Energy and Environmental
Design (LEED) credits for participation in ADR, which means that 
buildings will receive sustainability recognition too. For utilities, DR 
benefits include the ability to avoid purchasing peak power, which is 
generally the highest priced electricity. Of course, it helps if a utility
is decoupled,* but there are other reasons to embrace DR. It does have 
significant potential to help integrate intermittent renewables into
the grid without impacts to reliability or power quality. For consum­
ers, utility avoidance of purchases of the most expensive electricity or
* 	 From the Smart Grid Dictionary: “A regulatory and market strategy that allows
utilities to invest in and profit from efficiency-based capacity by assuring them a 
return that is equivalent to sales of electricity. This policy decouples utility fixed-
costs recovery from electricity sales. Utilities collect revenues based on the amount
determined by their local regulatory agencies, usually calculated on a per-customer
basis. Periodically, revenues are reviewed for rate adjustments to ensure the pre­
determined revenue requirement. This strategy is deployed in 17 states at the current 
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avoidance of investments in new grid capacity helps keep electricity 
tariffs from increasing. The growth of DR programs will almost cer­
tainly trigger new business opportunities for ESPs to develop services
that appeal to specific verticals within consumer segments. These 
ESPs may intermediate the direct relationship that currently exists
between the consumer and the utility. That means that parties other 
than a utility may be working with a consumer’s energy data. 
The OpenADR* initiative is focused on standardizing, automat­
ing, and simplifying demand response programs and technologies. It’s
the most comprehensive and widely used Internet Protocol (IP)-based 
communications standard for electricity providers and system opera­
tors to exchange DR signals with facilities and equipment within
buildings.
As noted earlier, buildings and industrial and agricultural operations
can play important roles as prosumers for two reasons. The first reason
is participation in demand response programs. The second reason is to
address the increasing vulnerability of the electrical grid to momentary
and sustained power outages to both natural and human causes. 
Microgrids 
Buildings and their occupants as well as industrial and agricultural
operations are impacted by power outages. The negative impacts 
range from reduced work productivity and decreased occupant safety
and health to reductions in lifestyle standards. Just like real estate
values are higher for green buildings with LEED recognition, in the 
future, buildings that are self-sufficient from an energy perspective 
may command premium prices because they preserve delivery of ser­
vices regardless of the status of the electric grid. Buildings that incor­
porate energy resiliency into their infrastructure will be increasingly
popular over time. Would you rather live in a high-rise apartment 
building that guaranteed it could generate or store enough power dur­
ing outages to run elevators and water, or one that couldn’t deliver on
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Microgrids* are receiving significant attention from consumers 
ranging from the military and industrial operations to commercial
property managers and individual homeowners who want full or par­
tial functionality during grid outages. The Smart Grid offers oppor­
tunities to build microgrids that can operate independently of the grid
as well as integrate to it. San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E) has 
demonstrated that a microgrid can be used to energize the primary 
distribution system. Using microgrids as energy sources to return 
power to the utility distribution grid points to new possibilities to
engineer more resiliency into electric grids, and requires innovative
new services that have interesting financial implications.
Buildings and industrial/agricultural operations that deploy
microgrids are operating as prosumers and will have profound impacts 
on utility business models and market structures. Microgrid owners
(residential, commercial and industrial (C&I), and agricultural) will
accelerate the shift of power from concentration in the hands of utili­
ties as the sole generators/distributors of electricity to prosumers on a 
distributed and decentralized basis. 
The Smart Grid enables compelling new value propositions for pro­
sumers. It also enables new market participation roles for residential, 
commercial, industrial, and agricultural consumers. But new market 
participation can only occur when the traditional power market struc­
ture has evolved to accommodate more sources of kilowatts and nega­
watts from many more prosumers. Microgrids will also bring with
them unique privacy issues that must be addressed. This is discussed
in Chapter 7. 
* 	 From the Smart Grid Dictionary. A small power system that integrates self-con­
tained generation, distribution, sensors, energy storage, and energy management
software with a seamless and synchronized connection to a utility power system, 
and can operate independently as an island from that system. Generation includes
renewable energy sources and the ability to sell back excess capacity to a utility.
On-site microgrid management software includes controls for the power genera­
tion, utility connect/disconnect, distribution, and energy storage equipment along 
with building energy management applications for industrial, commercial, or home 
use. CERTS (Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology Solutions) has docu­
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The Future Smart Grid 
The Smart Grid of the future will support a vast marketplace that
operates like a stock market where any participant can buy or sell
electricity with confidence that transactions are managed through 
enforceable rules that apply to all. This market structure is called 
transactive energy. Transactive energy enables an active prosumer 
market, where prosumers include buildings, EVs, wind generators, 
distributed energy resource (DER)* assets, or microgrids owned by 
the consumer segments named above. Simply put, the current market 
that exists at the wholesale or bulk electricity level will be mirrored 
downstream at the distribution grid. It is a significant change from
today’s electricity markets, which are only available to qualified sup­
pliers able to trade in large quantities (megawatts and negawatts) of
electricity. But it will take time for the market to restructure into a 
transactive energy format.
What happens in the meantime? There’s no one-size-fits-all sce­
nario that perfectly addresses all the possible model and market 
transformation alternatives in the United States, where we have a 
balkanized regulatory structure. It is easier to track the technology
trends and make some predictions. 
Technology Changes 
The Smart Grid has three innovation drivers: technology, policy, and 
money. There’s been no shortage of technology innovations, which
sometimes means that grid modernization isn’t an evolution, but a 
revolution. That’s particularly true regarding generation. Generation
shifts from highly centralized to highly decentralized or distributed.
It moves from large-scale production to mid- and small-scale produc­
tion that is suitable for the voltages commonly found in distribution
grids. Generation ownership transforms too, and this is primarily due 
to the rapid advances in renewable energy technologies.
These technologies—particularly solar PV or wind deployments 
in the low-voltage or distribution grid—are game changers for the 
* 	 From the Smart Grid Dictionary: “Grid-connected or stand-alone generation, energy
storage, or negawatt assets that are deployed in the distribution grid. DER assets can 
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electric grid. Utilities and independent power producers have focused 
on large-scale solar and wind generation projects that resulted in
2,847 MW of PV and 410 MW of concentrating solar power (CSP) 
deployed in 2013*—usually sited for high-voltage transmission. 
Commercial and residential building owners have enjoyed falling 
costs, increasing choices, inexpensive financing, and new third-party 
ownership options for rooftop PV installations that are sited in the 
distribution grid. Consider these two trends. From 2007 to 2013, 
the costs of solar panels dropped from $3.40/watt to 80 cents/watt, 
and PV deployments in the United States increased from 735 MW
to 7,200 MW. Solar generation is intermittent—the sun obviously 
isn’t around at night, and weather can impact its generation abilities. 
However, advanced data analytics solutions hold promise to improve 
forecasts of solar availability and management, and Smart Grid tech­
nologies improve distribution grid operations to manage the voltage 
fluctuations on a real-time basis. 
Energy Storage 
Energy storage is another game-changing collection of technologies
involving different chemistries and uses.† Affordable and scalable
solutions are considered by some to be the holy grail of the Smart 
Grid. We predict that fast iterative innovations in technologies and 
financing options will create the same trends that continue the rapid 
expansion of solar PV systems. Energy storage has intriguing syn­
ergies with intermittent renewable generation too. The SDG&E
microgrid demonstration project referenced earlier included energy
storage to firm the intermittency exhibited by large numbers of roof­
top solar PV systems. Energy storage performed very well in dealing 
with rapid fluctuations in power. As energy storage evolves, related 
privacy issues will also be created. Some of those possibilities are dis­
cussed in Chapter 7.
Generation and storage comprise two of the three categories of
distributed energy resources (DERs). The third category addresses 
* Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA). 
† 	Examples include backup power and grid stabilization, which require different types
of batteries. 
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negawatt production through participation in DR programs. One of 
the most interesting plays in DER is the use of bundled solutions that 
combine solar generation with energy storage. For instance, an eleva­
tor company just introduced the first solar-powered elevator system—
one that can operate even during grid blackouts. It includes battery 
storage, so it operates at night too.
A recent poll* of utility executives identified that the strong growth 
of distributed generation or DER would result in grid integration 
issues and represent the top challenge to utilities in the next 5 years. 
DER is relatively new, and there will be a range of possibilities for dif­
ferent ownership and service models. Here are a few options: 
• 	DER assets may be owned and managed by individuals or 
businesses. 
• 	DER assets may be leased by individuals or businesses but 
owned and managed by another entity. 
• 	DER assets may be owned by one party, leased to another, 
and managed by still another entity. 
DER management includes services that maintain the optimal 
performance of equipment and services that monitor bidirectional 
payment transactions. While the most popular ownership and service 
models have to be identified, it’s clear that there will be new data   
about energy production, probably new data about energy consump­
tion, and data regarding financial transactions that will be created as a 
result of DER assets. Some of this data may be personally identifiable 
information or have other sensitivities, such as financial data. There 
are limited guidelines regarding energy data, and those that exist 
primarily define how regulated utilities must treat energy data from 
consumers and prosumers. We’ll discuss data ownership relationships 
later in this chapter and drill down into the technologies that are most 
likely to touch data that merit privacy protections. 
Transmission Grids 
From the revolutions occurring in generation, we follow the supply 
chain into transmission. Here the word is evolution. The transmission
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grids in many regions are deploying advanced sensor networks 
through participation in an initiative called the North American
SynchroPhasor Initiative (NASPI).* While there are other tech­
nologies that increase voltages and reduce line losses, the significant
modernization effort leverages sophisticated sensors and high-speed 
communications. The NASPInet effort and other investments in pha­
sor technologies offer unprecedented monitoring and control capabili­
ties for our electric superhighways. There are massive amounts of new 
data produced from these technologies, but they are not in need of
privacy protections.
Why do we make this statement? These advanced sensor networks
deliver wide-area situational awareness of grid stability.† The pha­
sor technologies convert the standard three-phase analog signal of
voltage or current into time-tagged measurements that result in real-
time snapshots of the transmission system. The data that is collected 
includes location, time, frequency, current, voltage, and phase angle 
relative to some known reference point on the grid at a frequency of 30
times per second (hence the volumes and velocity of data are massive)
to offer early warning of any disturbances in system conditions for 
immediate corrective actions. Remember the 2003 Northeast black­
out mentioned earlier in this chapter? That grid catastrophe could 
have been avoided with these monitoring and control devices. The 
data is also valuable for diagnostic analyses to understand problem
causes and develop better protocols to avoid future operational issues
in the high-voltage transmission grid. 
* 	 From the Smart Grid Dictionary: “A collaborative initiative between the DOE 
(Department of Energy), NERC (North American Electric Reliability Corporation),
and electric utilities, vendors, consultants, and researchers. It receives funding from 
the DOE, NERC, and industry. Its mission is to improve power system reliabil­
ity and visibility through wide-area measurement and control, using the precise,
synchronized measurements of Synchrophasor technology as a diagnostic tool. 
Synchrophasor measurements will assist in wide-area monitoring, real-time opera­
tions, power system planning, and forensic analysis of grid disturbances. Phasor 
technology is expected to help integrate renewable and intermittent resources, auto­
mate controls for transmission and demand response, increase transmission system
throughput, and improve system modeling and planning. The DOE has several 
grant programs for large-scale prototypes, regional demonstrations, and Smart
Grid/PMU (Phasor Measurement Unit) deployments.” 
† 	The North American SynchroPhasor Initiative offers additional explanation about 
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There’s another reason that there are no privacy concerns regard­
ing this data. Phasors measure sinusoidal waveforms, which are com­
prised of streams of electrons. Electrons are not tagged with unique 
identifiers to indicate that they originated at your solar panel or are 
heading to my meter.
The distribution grid is undergoing multiple upgrades, but it is a 
much needed evolution with Smart Grid technologies, instead of a 
revolution in this part of the supply chain. The traditional distribu­
tion grid, according to some industry experts, has been the laggard 
in investments and grid modernization. The American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009,* commonly called the Stimulus
Act,† spurred significant investments in distribution grid technologies.
There are many technologies that improve distribution grid operations. 
The most visible of these technologies to consumers that are provided 
by utilities is the smart meter. This technology will be discussed in
detail in Chapter 4. At a high level, a smart meter is a specialized 
measurement device that includes wired or wireless communications 
capabilities, and just like any phone, it relies on a network to transmit
or receive data. These bidirectional networks are part of the advanced 
metering infrastructure (AMI).‡ 
Data Volumes within the Smart Grid 
There is a tremendous amount of new data and, in some cases, increas­
ing volumes of traditional data. Most of this data helps grid operators
monitor and react to real-time grid conditions, improving overall ser­
vice reliability to consumers. In other situations, analysis of histori­
cal data reveals previously hidden information about equipment that
is trending to failure. Smart Grid technologies—primarily sensors
* See http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr1enr/pdf/BILLS-111hr1enr.pdf. 
† 	See more about the Stimulus Act activities at http://www.recovery.gov/Pages/default.
aspx. For information specific to the Smart Grid, see http://www.recovery.gov/arra/
News/featured/Pages/Nation%E2%80%99s-Electric-Grid-Gets-Smart.aspx. 
‡ 	From the Smart Grid Dictionary: “Electricity meters, bi-directional communications 
network hardware and software, and associated system and data management soft­
ware that measures and records usage data at set intervals, and provides usage data to 
consumers, utilities, and other parties at set intervals. The set intervals are specified 
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gathering data; robust and reliable communications networks, usually 
wireless; and back-end data analytics—are essential to help integrate 
renewables into the distribution grid. Smart Grid technologies help
manage intermittent renewable energy sources and maintain stable, 
reliable, and safe delivery of electricity. Smart meter data has signifi­
cant implications to privacy, because this data can become informa­
tion about consumption patterns and behaviors of occupants within
specific locations via data analytics. We’ll explore smart meter data in
more detail in Chapter 4.
The Smart Grid revolutionizes consumption. Consumers become
prosumers and have a range of innovative solutions that help them man­
age energy consumption, generate their own electricity, or schedule when
their EV battery should be charged. Before we launch into an overview
of some important Smart Grid technologies in the consumption part
of the electricity supply chain, it is useful to review the roles of data
owners, data custodians, and data managers because the proliferation of
companies that have a solution that impacts consumption can make it
confusing to understand what role each company plays. The topic of data
ownership is also hotly debated and lends itself to privacy as it relates to
consumers being able to control the data that applies to them. 
Data Owners, Data Custodians, and Data Managers 
The concepts discussed here are framed in energy usage, consump­
tion, and production data, but could have equal relevance to data cre­
ated for other purposes, such as vehicle telematics or personal health
monitoring. These concepts are focused on data ownership, data cus­
todianship, and data management.
Data ownership identifies the owner of data, the entity that has 
ultimate control and decision-making authority over the data. In 
California, for example, customers own their energy consumption
data derived from smart meters.* This is a critically important des­
ignation and bears repeating. In some states, utility customers are 
explicitly identified as the owners of their energy consumption data. 
* 	 This is the published final decision of the CPUC that outlines, among other findings,
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However, with regard to energy usage data, from such things as smart
devices (smart refrigerators, home energy management tools, and 
apps running on the smart devices), the answer has not been explicitly 
stated at the time of this writing. The ownership of energy production
data also has not been explicitly determined by any laws at the time
of this writing. California has often set precedents for privacy law.
Appendix B contains a list of significant legislative and regulatory
agency privacy decisions with impacts on energy usage data in the 
state of California. 
The investor-owned utilities (IOUs) that are regulated by the 
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) are designated as
data custodians. Custodians are charged with ensuring the secure 
transmission, handling, and storage of data. Data managers* can be 
data owners or data custodians. Utilities function as both custodians 
and managers in their roles of collecting consumption data and billing 
customers based on that data. Data managers can also be third-party 
companies† that are authorized by the data owner to have one-time or
ongoing access to that owner’s energy consumption measurements. 
Data managers typically manipulate data into information. That could
be as simple as a visual display or graphic about home energy use, or
a more sophisticated analysis of energy use data combined with other 
outside sources of data. 
Data owners have many good reasons to voluntarily share their 
energy consumption data with data managers. However, and this
is a big caveat, once data leaves the custodianship of a utility, the 
data is at the risk of the third party’s safeguards and practices. For 
example, the legal responsibilities of the utility for security incidents
and privacy breaches that occur within their contracted vendors 
will depend upon the utility’s published privacy notice (also often
called privacy policy). If the utility makes commitments to protect 
data, then it may be held liable for any harm that occurs to the data, 
* 	 These are also known as third parties or energy service providers (ESPs). We use the 
term data manager to clarify data relationships. 
† 	Third-party companies are the entities contracted by the custodians or the data own­
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and associated individuals, as a result of the vendors it contracts.* 
However, if consumers are passing their energy usage data directly 
on to other entities themselves, then they are at the mercy of the
safeguards and practices of that entity. Call it the data equivalent of
caveat emptor (buyer beware). Data owners who value their privacy as
it relates to energy usage data will need to exercise caution by carefully
reading the privacy policies of the third parties they authorize to be 
data managers or custodians of that data.
Here’s another caveat. The description above about data owners, cus­
todians, and managers applies to the state of California. The United
States has a fragmented regulatory structure for energy, and each state
has responsibility for developing any privacy requirements for any
energy data on behalf of its citizens. At the time of this writing, some
states had not elaborated a policy or position about privacy for energy
consumption, production, or usage data.† 
Energy Consumption 
Let’s look at some of the revolutions occurring in the electricity sup­
ply chain’s final destination—consumption at an end point. Utilities
traditionally supplied electricity to a meter and owned all the equip­
ment leading to that device, including the meter. The other side of
the meter—the breaker box, the interior electrical wiring, and all the 
devices plugged into a residential or commercial building—is outside
* 	 This is the explicit case in some industries, such as healthcare under the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). However, the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC), which has broad consumer oversight across all indus­
tries, has made many statements that businesses and other types of organizations 
will bear some responsibility for ensuring the security and privacy of data they out­
source to other entities. State Attorneys General offices also have interest and have
taken action to hold organizations accountable for breaches that occur in their out­
sourced vendors. As one representative example, per legal analysis from Microsoft
(accessed from http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/hh994647.aspx on
June 27 2014): “In the United States, both federal and state government agencies
such as the FTC and various attorneys general have made enterprises accountable 
for the actions of their subcontractors. This has been replicated elsewhere, such as in
the EU with the data protection agencies.” 
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of the utility’s jurisdiction. Very little was known about consumption. 
A meter was read by physically going to the meter once a month, 
or sometimes with less frequency, so it was virtually impossible* to
tweeze out when, why, or what was consuming electricity. This is 
another lack of situational awareness. The Smart Grid completely 
revolutionizes the ability for consumers to acquire detailed knowl­
edge about electricity consumption, as well as energy usage data that
could reveal performance of their other types of smart devices, such
as a smart refrigerator. This ability to acquire detailed knowledge is a 
significant privacy concern; to be able to protect privacy, there need to
be controls on the entities that have access to this data that can reveal
such detailed knowledge about the associated individuals. This is dis­
cussed in more detail in Chapters 4 to 7. 
Smart Grid Privacy Risk Examples 
We will explain in more detail privacy risks throughout the remainder 
of this book. However, here is a sampling of a few of the most appar­
ent areas where privacy risks exist within the Smart Grid. 
1. Energy management systems and area networks for build­
ings. More granular energy consumption data, along with the 
related metadata, such as the GPS, date, and time,† from smart
meters can be useful for many entities beyond the data owner 
for a number of reasons, but the nature of usage or consump­
tion data can reveal much more about what happens inside 
the walls of a home or office building. Two of the enabling 
technologies to collect, analyze, and communicate electricity 
* 	 Elias Leake Quinn detailed in his report “Smart Metering and Privacy: Existing Law 
and Competing Policies” (Spring 2009, p. 3) how he had set up surveillance to con­
tinuously monitor a traditional meter to determine activities. However, this would 
require a separate monitoring device to accomplish the insights that he obtained. 
Read more about this at http://www.dora.state.co.us/puc/DocketsDecisions/
DocketFilings/09I-593EG/09I-593EG_Spring2009Report-Smart GridPrivacy. 
pdf. Note: A hob heater is a top-of-stove cooking surface. 
† 	Metadata describes other data. It provides information about a certain data item’s 
content. For example, energy usage data from a smart device may also have accom­
panying it metadata that indicates the time, date, and location for when the energy
usage occurred, along with other types of data associated with the energy usage. 
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consumption data are home energy management systems 
(HEMSs) and home area networks (HANs). A HAN is on 
“the other side of the meter” and serves as a communications 
network within the walls of a house, apartment, or other type 
of residence. HEMSs are software products that gather/ana­
lyze/display information about a home’s energy consumption 
and sometimes provide control capabilities for devices man­
aged by them. Many solutions in this category are using apps 
loaded on smart phones and tablets as the primary display and 
control device, but there are also dedicated devices being used 
as well. This is a meaningful distinction, because that means 
that energy data has crossed the boundaries from utility cus­
todianship and is now managed by another entity, most likely 
not bound by the same regulatory or other legal requirements.
  Commercial and industrial consumers have similar solutions 
that are tailored to their unique needs. There’s more maturity 
to this market segment, with a number of well-known vendors 
that include Honeywell, Johnson Controls, Siemens, and IBM 
offering solutions to help commercial facility managers and 
occupants monitor and control energy consumption for heat­
ing, ventilation, air conditioning (HVAC), lighting, and other 
plug loads. Privacy concerns exist here too, but differ from 
residential ones. Consumption data is generally aggregated 
or grouped together for purposes of improving building man­
agement, reducing costs, or improving occupant comfort and 
safety. Data owners are building or property managers work­
ing in conjunction with authorized data custodians such as 
ESPs. Data owners are typically more concerned about pro­
tecting their energy consumption data from a competitive dif­
ferentiator perspective than a privacy perspective.
  The associated risks, and possible risk mitigation actions, 
for HEMSs, HANs, and commercial and industrial build­
ings will be discussed further in Chapter 7.
 2. Electric	 vehicles and charging stations. The Smart Grid  
enables a proliferation of data about electric vehicles (EVs), 
particularly when charging stations are involved. The conver­
gence of location-based information, electricity consumption, 
times, dates, and personal identity in vehicles creates a wide 
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range of fascinating privacy considerations and challenges. 
EV charging stations are immature products, but the trends 
are clear—businesses that make charging station manage­
ment software have the most to gain or lose in privacy rules, 
which in some cases may be established by the public utility 
commissions that regulate electric utilities or state lawmakers. 
We’ll discuss this more in Chapters 6 and 7.
 3. Smart appliances. The smart or connected home and the 
Smart Grid intersect in smart appliances. Like smart meters, 
a smart appliance has communications capabilities so that it 
can interact with other devices, directly to vendors, such as 
Whirlpool’s 6th Sense Live, the electric grid, and the Internet. 
Some of the new devices data reports energy usage or con­
sumption data, but other new data can conceivably commu­
nicate status about device performance, including how and 
when it was used.* There are many beneficial possibilities for 
consumers with this new data, but careful attention will have 
to be given to clearly identify ownership of this data. We’ll 
discuss this further in Chapters 5 and 7.
 4. Consumer to prosumer transformation. We previously described 
the revolution in energy generation at the start of our supply 
chain discussion. That same revolution exists at the termination 
point—consumption. Renewable generation options—particu­
larly rooftop PV—are proliferating for all electricity consumer 
categories. But there’s more to being a prosumer than produc­
tion of kilowatts via solar, wind or other power. In the future 
EV owners may sell excess energy stored in a battery back to 
the grid, making EVs earn money for owners. This setup has 
already been successfully tested in a small pilot.
  The ability to reduce electricity use by participation in DR 
programs is a form of negawatt generation, and transforms a 
consumer into a prosumer. Smart appliances or HEMSs may be 
instructed to automatically operate based on price signals, and 
thus shift operations. The bottom line is that these Smart Grid 
* 	 There are smart phones and other types of mobile smart devices that indicate GPS 
locations. However, for the typical smart appliance that was in use at the time this 
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technologies revolutionize consumption. These technologies also
create new data that assists in energy management and financial
transactions. There may be many intermediaries between a con­
sumer or prosumer and a utility, and that “chain of data custody”* 
needs to be understood at each transaction point to ensure that
desired or required levels of privacy are maintained. 
Energy Regulation 
Every discussion about privacy in the Smart Grid is complicated by 
the United States regulatory ecosystem. States have regulated monop­
olies or investor-owned utilities (IOUs) that are governed by public 
utility commissions (PUCs). There are also publicly owned utilities
or municipal utilities and cooperatives that are not as highly regu­
lated as IOUs, but often align to the policies enacted for IOUs. What
this means is that there is no one-size-fits-all policy for privacy in
the Smart Grid. You might find consensus around some statements, 
such as “consumption data is owned by the customer,” or not. Since
the Smart Grid offers some early examples of machine-to-machine
(M2M) applications, the government policies that are devised for 
regulated utilities could be copied for unregulated businesses, or then 
again, perhaps they won’t be adopted outside of this unique category
of businesses. There are huge implications to this statement, and gov­
ernment policy makers are well advised to consider how their deci­
sions about using consumption data impacts consumer privacy, and 
could or should be applied to products and services focused in vehicle 
telematics, digital health, or wearable sensors. 
Smart Grid, Smart Infrastructure 
Just as there is much excitement about how communications tech­
nologies are revolutionizing utility operations and creating new prod­
uct and service opportunities, the same interest levels exist in Smart 
* 	 The chain of data custody or chain of custody borrows from the justice system’s
procedures to document each transfer of evidence. For privacy purposes, it docu­
ments each transfer point where data has privacy sensitivities and notes the privacy 
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Infrastructure. Government agencies, businesses, and consumers are 
realizing that Smart Grid technologies can have broader applications 
in all sorts of infrastructure with significant beneficial impacts.
Some favor the term Smart City, but that artificially limits the 
thinking to urban scenarios. We use the term Smart Infrastructure to
describe the bigger picture. Infrastructure is inclusive to urban, sub­
urban, and rural settings. For instance, the technologies that make
the electric grid smart have proven benefits to rural distribution grids. 
Remote monitoring and control capabilities offer new capabilities for 
utilities to predict equipment wear and tear and proactively repair or
replace failing assets, thus avoiding a service disruption. Even when 
lightning strikes, Smart Grid technologies can result in faster services
restoration to far-flung communities and consumers.
From a Smart Infrastructure perspective, many utilities own the
streetlights in cities and towns. These streetlights consume a consid­
erable amount of electricity, and over the years, utilities have been
converting to more energy efficient lamps to save money. But smart 
streetlights go one step further—they are starting to function as com­
munications antennas and relay stations to convey wireless signals for 
a variety of public and private uses.
Traffic lights and cameras can now be networked with streetlights, 
and use motion sensors to detect the presence of moving vehicles 
or people. One of the most interesting applications concerns smart 
parking. Some estimates claim that 30%* of the traffic in any city is 
focused on finding a parking spot. If empty spots could communicate 
their status to nearby vehicles and reduce time to park, that would 
reduce street congestion and avoid emissions produced in searches for 
elusive parking spots. What if cash-strapped municipalities could do
a better job of finding the parked cars that overstayed their welcome 
at parking meters? These scenarios are not far-fetched future possibili­
ties—the technologies are being deployed now, and all rely on data. 
The bottom line is that a city can’t really be smart without a Smart 
Grid, and a Smart Grid can enhance, and be enhanced by, a city that
intelligently manages its consumption of energy and water. All these 
beneficial possibilities must address the associated privacy risks that
exist as a result of collecting and analyzing all this data. 
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Smart Grid technologies, policies, and financial innovations are dis­
rupters to the energy status quo. Disruptions are nothing new to busi­
ness and society—until it happens to your chosen business sector or
consumer group. The telephone disrupted the telegraph. The automo­
bile disrupted horse and buggy services. But for every loser, there can be
multiple winners. Sometimes innovations create new value where none
existed before. That’s one of the overlooked aspects to the Smart Grid.
The modernization and transformation of the electricity infrastructure
to integrate renewables resulted in significant job growth for solar panel
sales, design, and installation. Designing privacy controls into these
devices from the initial design stage will be more cost effective than
trying to retrofit privacy within a device that is already deployed.
The bottom line is that we now have technologies—renewables 
coupled with energy storage, inexpensive sensors coupled with wire­
less networks, and analytics coupled with cost-effective data stor­
age—to convert a fragile grid into an agile grid. An agile grid relies
on highly distributed energy assets (generation, demand response,
energy efficiency, and storage) with highly distributed intelligence. 
We all win when our energy infrastructure is safe, reliable, resilient,
cost-effective, and based on clean power. However, to be successful 
and have the public embrace such technologies, the entities using 
these components, as well as the agencies governing the various por­
tions of the Smart Grid, must demonstrate that privacy risks have 
been identified and appropriately and effectively addressed. 
Key Points for Smart Grid Technologies 
The Smart Grid relies on communications and data. Here are three 
main takeaways about data that are generated by Smart Grid tech­
nologies and the associated policies that utilities, regulators and legis­
lators, product and service vendors, and ESPs should consider: 
1. There will be new data about transactive market participants 
as consumers and prosumers, and some of this data will have 
sensitivities that require secure transport and storage as well 
as privacy protections.
2. There will be new relationships beyond the traditional con­
sumer-utility relationship. New intermediaries that negotiate 
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on the consumer’s behalf may not be bound by the same pri­
vacy requirements that are in place for utilities—if indeed 
those exist. All entities involved with collecting and using 
energy data must address privacy to mitigate risks appropri­
ately, even in the absence of legal requirements.
 3. If the question about who owns the consumer’s data that is 
generated by Smart Grid technologies, applications, and ser­
vice providers has not been answered, it must be, and soon, to 
protect privacy. However, this is a hotly debated topic, and we 








WHAT IS  PRIVACY? 
What Is Privacy? 
The term privacy is a subjective term. There is not a single, universal 
definition for privacy. Let’s consider some modern history of the word. 
In the 1890 issue of the Harvard Law Review an essay entitled “The 
Right to Privacy” by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis defined pri­
vacy as “the right to be let alone.” What inspired Warren and Brandeis 
to write such an essay? They were concerned about a new-fangled 
technology/gadget—the Brownie camera—a new technology at that
time period that was starting to be widely used by the general public
to capture images not only in private residences, but also in public 
venues. It reportedly greatly disturbed in particular Samuel Warren 
that journalists were now taking photos with this new-fangled pri­
vacy-invading gadget whenever they had the opportunity. Some say 
the essay was inspired by a specific incident in which journalists were 
intruding on a society wedding by taking photos.* However, others
claim the inspiration was from a more general coverage of intimate
personal lives, increasingly including photos, within the society col­
umns of newspapers.† Regardless of the original definition, the defini­
tion now goes far beyond that original simple concept. One thing that 
is the same, though: emerging new technologies, such as those found 
within the Smart Grid, are creating new privacy concerns in ways
similar to the little Brownie camera. 
Privacy also is not simply defined by laws. Laws always lag far 
behind technology use and human practices, and address a small 
* 	 See, e.g., Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, Arizona Law 
Review, 21(1), http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1318
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fraction of the actual privacy risks that exist, and that are created by 
new technologies.
Instead of thinking about privacy as one definition, it is more use­
ful to think about privacy as a concept that involves revealing details 
about individuals in some manner, along with controlling how that
information is used and shared, and the access individuals have to the 
associated information. 
Categories of Privacy 
There are four categories of privacy* that must be considered and  
addressed, both with security controls and with appropriate privacy
practices. 
• 	 Information privacy is concerned with establishing rules that
govern the collection and handling of personal information.
This is the most commonly considered type of category to have
privacy implications that involve protecting specifically ref­
erenced information items. A few examples include financial
information (such as bank account numbers), medical informa­
tion (such as health insurance account numbers), government
records (such as social security numbers), and records of a per­
son’s activities (such as through access logs) on the Internet. 
• 	 Bodily privacy is focused on a person’s physical being and any 
invasion of the body. Some examples include genetic testing, 
drug testing, body cavity searches, information about surger­
ies, and Transportation Security Administration (TSA) scans 
at U.S airports. 
• 	 Territorial privacy is concerned with placing limits on the 
ability to intrude into another individual’s environment. The 
environment is not limited to the home; it also includes the 
workplace and public spaces. Invasion into an individual’s
* 	 See Roger Clarke, What’s Privacy? http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/Privacy.html.
Clarke makes a similar set of distinctions between the privacy of the physical per­
son, the privacy of personal behavior, the privacy of personal communications, and 
the privacy of personal data. Roger Clarke is a well-known privacy expert from 
Australia who has been providing privacy research papers and guidance for the past
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territorial privacy typically takes the form of monitoring such
as video surveillance, drones, ID checks, and use of similar 
technology and procedures. Having others take an individu­
al’s photo or record individuals out in public with their smart 
phones or wearable computers is included in this category. 
• 	 Communications privacy involves protection of the ways in
which individuals correspond with others. Examples include
postal mail, telephone conversations, email, Skype and simi­
lar types of voice-over Internet protocol (VoIP) solutions, and 
other forms. 
What’s the Difference between Security and Privacy?* 
In many organizations the people responsible for privacy are com­
pletely separated from and in entirely different departments from the 
people responsible for security. Often these departments do not com­
municate, or even acknowledge or understand the compelling rela­
tionship that essentially exists between the two. Too often privacy is 
considered a purely legal issue, the responsibility for which is often 
handed to organizational legal counsel. Or, it is ignored altogether as
a separate issue, and management assumes it will be addressed by all 
the various business units during the course of doing business. Security
is too often viewed as a purely technical issue, and the responsibil­
ity for security is more often than not placed within the information
technology or networking support area—often buried beneath several
layers of management. And the twain never meet. Security personnel 
must be actively involved in privacy issues and crafting privacy poli­
cies, and privacy personnel must be actively involved in security issues
and crafting security policies.
So, to the crux of this topic: How is security different than pri­
vacy? It is really pretty simple; you must implement security to ensure 
privacy. You must use security to obtain privacy. Security is a pro­
cess, privacy is a consequence. Security is an action, privacy is a result
* 	 This section is an updated version of the passage from an essay written by Rebecca 
Herold for a Computer Security Institute publication in 2002 (http://www.privacy
guidance.com/downloads/privacyandsecurity.pdf), recently published in Rebecca
Herold and Kevin Beaver, The Practical Guide to HIPAA Privacy and Security
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of successful action. Security is a condition, privacy is the progno­
sis. Security is the strategy, privacy is the outcome. Privacy is a state 
of existence, security is the constitution supporting the existence.
Security is a tactical strategy, privacy is a contextual strategic objec­
tive. Security is the sealed envelope, privacy is the successful deliv­
ery of the message inside the envelope. The bottom line: enterprise 
privacy management strategies and security management architecture 
must be effectively and actively integrated.
What is a common mistake an organization can make that can lead 
to potentially devastating public press, irreversible damage to personal
lives, and huge fines and lawsuits? Often when the privacy respon­
sibility lies in a different part of the organization from the security
responsibility, or the two areas do not communicate, privacy policy
notices are issued, but no security policies, procedures, or mecha­
nisms are implemented to ensure the now-published privacy policies
are enforced. These published privacy policies are in effect a contract
with your patients, customers, and consumers. The privacy policies are 
often the first and main point of contact between the public and your
organization. If an organization tells customers that it is performing
certain activities to ensure their privacy, that organization had bet­
ter well make sure its personnel know what they have committed to, 
whether or not they were involved with the privacy policy creation.
Privacy with respect to many of the current legislated regula­
tions means people are able to make informed choices when seek­
ing care and reimbursement for healthcare based on how protected 
health information (PHI) may be used, or are able to make choices 
about how their personally identifiable financial information is used 
and shared by the organizations with which they do business. Privacy 
enables patients to find out how their information may be used and 
what disclosures of their information have been made. Privacy enables 
consumers to find out how financial information is going to be pro­
tected and know that the people handling their information have
been properly trained to protect their privacy. Privacy limits release 
of information to the minimum reasonably needed for the purpose of 
the disclosure. Privacy gives people the right to examine and obtain a 
copy of their own personal records and request corrections.
Security with respect to these same regulations constitutes those rea­
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tools that are used to maintain confidentiality, integrity, avalability and
privacy. It involves all methods, processes, and technology used to ensure
the confidentiality and safety of the once private information that has
been entrusted to a third party by the consumer, customer, or patient.
Bottom line: You must implement information security controls to 
have privacy. 
Data Types 
Many types of information can be considered to be personal infor­
mation. Generally any data that can reveal information about an
individual or an individual’s life activities, whereabouts, etc., could
be considered to be personal information. In some locations of the
world, business-related employee information is also considered to be
personal information. Some of these types of personal information
are more sensitive than others. Table 3.1 lists some common personal
information items. 
Table 3.1 Personal Information Examples 
GENERAL TYPES OF PERSONAL INFORMATION ITEMS 
• Name 
• Gender 
• Age and date of birth 
• Mailing address 
• Email address 
• User IDs 
• Marital status 
• Citizenship 
• Languages spoken 
• Veteran status 
• Disabled status 
• IP address (some jurisdictions) 
• Dozens (hundreds?) more 
ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION CONSIDERED PERSONAL INFORMATION THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 
• Business and personal addresses 
• Business and personal phone numbers 
• Business and personal email addresses 
• Internal identification numbers 
• Government-issued identification numbers 





 Table 3.2 Examples of Sensitive Types of Personal Information Items 
UNITED STATES 
SENSITIVE PERSONAL INFORMATION 
• Social security number 
• Financial information 
• Driver’s license number 
• Medical records 
• Etc. 
WITHIN THE U.S. AND OTHER COUNTRIES 
SPECIAL CATEGORIES OF DATA (WHICH ARE CONSIDERED TO BE SENSITIVE) 
• Racial or ethnic origin 
• Political opinions 
• Religious or philosophical beliefs 
• Trade union membership 
• Health or sex life 
• Criminal convictions or offenses 
• Etc. 
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Generally, the more personal information items you have, the more 
risk that is generally associated with that personal information. One
of the best and simplest ways to lessen privacy risks is to collect and 
store less personal information.
That said, there are increasingly more types of personal informa­
tion being created. Every organization must be aware of the data they
are collecting, or creating, that could be associated with individuals. 
Such information would likely be considered as personal information,
even if the data is not formally defined in a law or book somewhere 
(Table 3.2).
Smart Grid data, such as data collected from smart meters, when 
collecting energy usage data frequently enough, can create an electric­
ity usage “fingerprint” that can be associated with specific households. 
How frequently meter reads are really needed to improve energy usage,
without having this data reveal too much about personal activities, is a 
question that utilities are trying to answer.
Not all personal information is equal, and so there must be varying 
degrees of safeguards around certain categories, based upon sensitiv­










Table 3.3 Privacy Concerns for Smart Grid Information Disclosure and Misuse 
PRIVACY CONCERN DISCUSSION 
1. Identity theft Specific combinations of personal information may be used to 
impersonate a utility consumer, resulting in potentially severe impacts, 
such as negative credit reports, fraudulent utility use, and other 
damaging consumer actions.
 2. Determine 
personal behavior 
patterns 
Access to data use profiles that can reveal specific times and locations 
of electricity use in specific areas of the home can also indicate the 
types of activities or appliances used. The information revealed could 
be considered a new type of surveillance. The data could be (mis)used 
by other entities to do target marketing, by governments to try and tax 
specific activities and uses, and by persons with malicious intent.
 3. Determine specific
appliances used 
Energy usage data could be used to track the use of specific smart
appliances that are programmed to communicate with smart meters or
Internet of Things (IOT) applications. Appliance manufacturers may want
to get this information to know who, how, and why individuals used their
products in certain ways. Such information could impact appliance
warranties. Insurance companies may want to use this information to
approve or decline claims. And there is an unlimited number of other
possible uses as yet not imagined that these data could provide.
 4. Perform real-time 
surveillance 
Access to real-time energy usage data could reveal if people are in the 
residence, what they are doing, where they are in the residence, and so 
on. This not only presents a safety risk, with burglars and vandals 
using it to their destruction, but also could be used to do target 
marketing based upon home energy use behaviors.
 5. Reveal activities 
through residual 
data 
If the data on the metering devices is not effectively or completely 
removed when the home resident no longer needs to use them, the 
residual data may possibly reveal to the new meter user, or entity that 
possesses the meter, the activities of the former owner. Not only does 
this present similar concerns to those listed in the first three concern 
topics, but it also could be used by activists or others who have 
agendas to reveal what they view as a lack of social responsibility. 
However, to prevent any tampering of historical data and to satisfy the 
size constraints for the new meters—providing more functionality in 
the same physical meter box—the data are not likely to be stored 
within the smart meter itself. But, the possibility of storing data within 
residential meters should be considered in any meter functionality 
plans so that if it does become possible to store personal information 
in smart meters, the privacy issues will be appropriately addressed. 
(continued) 
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Smart Data Privacy Implications 
The data collected throughout the Smart Grid, from smart meters, 
smart appliances, apps, and many other types of grid-connected gad­
gets, can potentially reveal much about the lives of individuals, lead­
ing to privacy invasions and breaches. Table 3.3 provides 15 specific 
 
 
50 DATA PRIVACY FOR THE SMART GRID 
Table 3.3 Privacy Concerns for Smart Grid Information Disclosure and Misuse (continued) 
PRIVACY CONCERN DISCUSSION
 6. Target home Malicious use of meter data for specific consumers could lead to a wide 
invasions number of problems, such as physical invasions to the home because 
crooks could tell when residents were away, whether or not they have 
an alarm system, and so on.
 7. Provide Combinations of meter data, analyzed for one purpose, could reveal 
accidental unexpected information about the residents that is then used to the 
privacy invasions detriment of the residents.
 8. Activity The meter data could reveal resident activities or uses that utility 
censorship companies may then subsequently decide are inappropriate or should 
not be allowed. Without restrictions, if this information could then be 
shared with local government, law enforcement, or public media 
outlets, the residents could suffer embarrassment, harassment, loss of 
vital appliances, or any number of other damaging actions.
 9. Decisions and With meter data being stored in potentially many locations, accessed by 
actions based so many different individuals and entities, and used for a very wide 
upon inaccurate variety of purposes, it is a significant risk that the personal 
data information data could become inappropriately modified. Not only 
could automated Smart Grid decisions made for home energy use be 
detrimental for residents (e.g., restricted power, thermostats turned to 
dangerous levels, and so on), but also decisions about Smart Grid 
power use and activities could be based upon inaccurate information.
 10. Reveal activities Even more personal activities and derived personal information could be 
when used with revealed if the power meter personal information was combined with 
data from other the personal information from other utilities and utility meters, such as 
utilities or third those for gas, water, and so on, or third parties (e.g., data brokers, 
parties energy service providers, vendors, etc.). As the use of big data 
analytics increases and becomes more powerful, this is made more 
likely. 
11. Profiling Profiling may be possible in ways that were previously not possible, or 
not as easily possible. What can you tell about what you can see from 
energy usage? For example, if the consumers are straight or gay? 
Terrorist profiles? Affairs? Illegal activities? Will access to do data 
mining for investigations put people on terrorist watch lists, etc.? Will 
politicians want to use data for potential activity taxation? Performing 
a gap analysis could point out scenarios and associated risks.
 12. Unwanted Embarrassment and other negative impacts resulting from unauthorized 
publicity and disclosure or publication of household or electric vehicle use.
embarrassment 
 13. Tracking behavior When a different individual owns and pays the utilities other than the 
of renters/leasers resident, such as in the case of a rental unit, room subletting, leasing, 
and so on, the landlord or property owner could have access to the 
smart meter data and potentially track the residents’ activities. Rent 
decisions could be made based on past power usage history. Power 
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Table 3.3 Privacy Concerns for Smart Grid Information Disclosure and Misuse (continued) 
PRIVACY CONCERN DISCUSSION 
14. Behavior tracking Will there be any items within the smart meters that can act in ways 
similar to browser/document cookies or web bugs? If so, these items 
could potentially be misused in ways similar to how cookies and web 
bugs are currently misused. Perhaps radio frequency identification 
(RFID) tags can be used in some smart appliances? Perhaps GPS types 
of technologies?
 15. Public What kind of Smart Grid data search engines will there be? What 
aggregated discussions or plans have occurred around this possibility? What 
searches information would be involved? What control would consumers have to 
revealing not have their data included in such searches? The privacy issues 
individual would be similar to the privacy concerns that currently exist with 
behaviors Internet search engines, only the implications could be more wide 
reaching because the data would be based upon individuals’ actual 
daily living activities, and not upon what they consciously choose to 
put onto the Internet. 
Source: Rebecca Herold, Smart Grid Privacy Concerns, October 2009, http://www.privacyguidance. 
com/files/SmartGrid_PrivacyHeroldOct2009.pdf. 
ways in which Smart Grid data could be used to reveal information 
about the lives of those using or associated with all these gadgets if 
proper controls are not applied.
It is important to note that each of the potential privacy risks can be 
sufficiently mitigated with the appropriate technical, administrative, 
and physical controls. 
Data Communications Privacy Concerns 
The manner in which Smart Grid data is communicated can also 
present privacy risks. There are a large number of possibilities for how 
Smart Grid data may be transmitted. 
• 	 The data from smart appliances, smart meters, apps, and other 
devices may be transmitted through utility-owned networks. 
• 	Smart Grid device data may be sent through third-party 
networks via Wi-Fi, broadband, public carriers, or private 
licensed networks. 
• 	Energy consumers’ home area networks (HANs) and home 
energy management (HEM) systems may be used to send 
data directly to appliance vendors, energy management ven­
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Each of these methods has privacy risks that must be mitigated 
through a wide range of controls, such as authentication, encryption,
access controls, and physical controls, just to name a few. Privacy 
impact assessments (PIAs) should be done to determine the associated 
risks in each situation where energy usage data that can be attributed
to specific individuals or households will be transmitted. Appropriate
controls can then be implemented to address the risks. See Chapter 7 
for information about mitigating privacy risks within the Smart Grid.
The Smart Grid is only smart because of the deployment of a 
wide range of sensors and actuators to remotely monitor and control 
equipment coupled with a variety of communication networks. Each
network option has its pros and cons from cyber security perspec­
tives to discourage data interception during transmission. There are 
many technologies, policies, and practices that can reduce the risks of 
unauthorized access to stored data. There are also many books already
written on these topics.
In the subsequent chapters, we’ll explore the most important end 
points and devices where energy usage data is created and privacy 
implications for this data. We like the concept of data owners, data 
custodians, and data managers* as convenient ways to think about 
energy usage data and other data in general, but it’s important to note
that this concept is unique to energy consumption data that is gener­
ated from select utilities in one state. 
Customers are identified as data owners for energy usage data in
a number of states. But after that, at the time this book was written, 
there was no standard approach or definition that describes overall 
privacy rights and responsibilities. 
* In the privacy profession, and in various data protection laws throughout the world,
the following terms are commonly used: 
Data protection authority (DPA): A supervisory entity chartered to enforce pri­
vacy or data protection laws and regulations.
Data controller: An organization or individual with the authority to decide how 
and why information about data subjects is to be processed.
Data processor: An organization or individual that processes data on behalf of the
data controller. 
Data subject: An individual about whom information is being processed. 
However, the terms shown in the text are the terms used by the California Public 
Utilities Commission (CPUC), and within some other parts of the U.S. energy 
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Energy usage data puts significant challenges on territorial or spatial
privacy. But as we’ll explore in this book, the Smart Grid is just a col­
lection of machine-to-machine (M2M) and Internet of Things (IOT)
technologies and applications. Many other M2M and IOT applications
create even more opportunities for risking the loss of privacy. In particu­
lar, the connected home, vehicle telematics, and location-based services
on mobile devices also have real privacy implications. Some of these
applications have an association with the Smart Grid, such as moni­
toring energy usage in the connected home, or electric vehicle (EV)
charging, but other applications may have no data creation or exchange




SMART  METER  DATA
AND  PRIVACY 
Meter Comparisons 
Traditional meters, such as the one shown in Figure  4.1, measure 
electricity, gas, or water use. The most sophisticated metering tech­
nology goes into electric meters. The metrology for gas and water 
meters is much simpler. Why? It’s a matter of power. Gas and water 
meters rely on battery power, and therefore are less complex in terms 
of the amounts of data they collect and transmit. Electric meters can 
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draw the power they need to operate from the electrified wire they
are connected to. More complexity in collecting and processing data 
means more power is needed to perform these functions. The metrol­
ogy in electric meters is based on sensors that detect current and volt­
age. Utility meters are considered revenue grade, meaning they are 
accurate enough to be trusted for financial settlements by supplying 
the data used to calculate consumption of what is measured for billing 
purposes. In other words, a meter—smart or not—is a cash register. 
It is the trusted transaction point for your purchase of electricity, gas,
or water from a utility.
Traditional meters require a visit from a meter reader to jot down 
the difference in gauges (those dials shown at the “mechanical reg­
ister” in Figure 4.1) from their last trip. That means someone from
a utility drives up to your home, dashes over to the meter clamped
on the side of your house, on a pole in your yard, or in your house or
building, reads the register, jots down numbers on a chart or com­
puter, and then dashes off again. The family dogs sometimes went
ballistic over these invasions of their territory.
From a historical perspective, it is interesting to note that while
smart meters may seem like new technology, the first meter designed 
for measuring consumption in real time to accommodate dynamic 
pricing was invented in the 1970s. James Kirtley and Thomas Sterling 
of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) filed a smart 
meter patent application in November 1979 and were granted a patent
in February 1982.* The patent was for a meter that would calculate the 
cost of the energy consumed over short time intervals.
In one author’s (Rebecca Herold) discussion with Dr. Kirtley,† she
discovered there were a couple of inspirations for the invention at that
point in time. 
1. The leader of the MIT research group, Dr. Fred Schweppe,
was concerned with privacy, and indicated a desire that any 
real-time pricing meter should limit the ability of utilities to
accumulate detailed consumption data for each time interval. 
* 	 See http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=
PALL&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.htm&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1
=4317175.PN.&OS=PN/4317175&RS=PN/4317175. 
† In a phone discussion with James Kirtley and Ken Wacks on April 4, 2014. 
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2. Dr. Kirtley indicated he was thinking more about issues
related to data rates than about privacy. There was no wide­
spread Internet in 1978, and available communications tech­
nologies were very immature. The smart meter invention
allowed time-varying rates for electricity to be downloaded 
into the meter by the utility. The meter measured consump­
tion during the time interval when a rate was in effect and 
applied that rate to calculate the cost. The reason for doing the 
calculations in the meter was to minimize data traffic, which 
was relatively expensive then.* 
See the first of four diagrams of the invention in Figure 4.2. When
asked how the invention was received at that time by the utilities, 
Dr. Kirtley told Rebecca, “The industry folks said, uniformly, that
we were idiots, because they thought it [the meter invented] wasn’t
usable.” As we can see now, it took close to 30 years before a smart 
meter would be practical and deployed for residential use.
One of the authors, Christine Hertzog, lives in a neighborhood 
that has had smart electric and gas meters since 2009. There’s no meter 
reader entering the backyard anymore to conduct a monthly read. The 
water meter, which is definitely not smart, still requires someone to
come out to the sidewalk meter vault, lift a heavy cover, and peer 
down to read consumption information. That cover isn’t secure, so 
anyone could lift it and read the numbers. 
AMR Metering 
Meter technology called automated meter reading (AMR) is one evolu­
tionary step away from smart meters. AMR enables specially equipped
vehicles to pick up stored data that is transmitted wirelessly to the
vehicle driving by or an individual walking by to create the bills for
usage. Collection of data only occurs when the right receiver is within
the physical range of meter transmitters equipped to communicate with
that receiver. Each meter has to be “polled” to transmit the latest con­
sumption data, which cover the time period since the last poll. 
* 	 See more about the concept in a paper by the inventors entitled “Impact of New 
Electronic Technologies to the Customer End of Distribution Automation and 






































Figure 4.2 The first of four diagrams in the first “smart meter” patent by Kirtley and Sterling. 
(See all four meter diagrams from the patent filing at http://www.google.com/patents/US4317175, 
and also at http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PALL&p=1 
&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.htm&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=4317175.PN.&OS=PN/4317175 
&RS=PN/4317175.) (From U.S. Patent US 4317175 A.) 
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Smart Meters Overview 
Smart meters have communications technology—wired or wireless—
that can transmit data on a more frequent basis than once a month or 
whenever a drive-by AMR-style meter read takes place. This com­
munications technology accompanies the same metrology that existed 
in traditional, electromechanical meters. Smart meters are part of an 
advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) that includes the revenue-
grade meters, data collection equipment, and communications equip­
ment needed to exchange data with a utility. Figure  4.3 shows an 
example of a typical smart meter. 
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Figure 4.3 Smart meter example. (From PG&E, see http://www.pgecurrents.com/2012/06/12/ 
pge-catches-wave-on-smartmeter-deployments/.) 
The time and fuel savings eliminated in manual or AMR meter 
reading is significant.* It results in reduced miles driven and subse­
quent reductions in carbon emissions as well as improved productiv­
ity, as meter readers can focus on the “outlier” meters.
Smart meters can provide more data than previously collected by 
traditional electromechanical meters as kilowatt-hours (kWh) or con­
sumed electricity. The typical residential smart meter gathers the fol­
lowing data: 
• Instantaneous voltage
• Instantaneous current 
• Peak voltage/current
• System frequency
• Root mean square (RMS) voltage/current
• Phase displacement 
* 	 Examples of utility savings: http://www.clarkpublicutilities.com/index.cfm/payment­
options/about-your-bill/meter-reading/remote-meter-reading/ and https://smartgrid 
.gov/sites/default/files/doc/files/Central%20Maine%20Power%20Case%20Study
_0.pdf. 
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• Power factor 
• Instantaneous apparent power 
• Instantaneous real power 
• Instantaneous reactive power
• Energy use/production
• Harmonic voltage distortion 
• Total harmonic distortion* 
Smart meters are collections of sensors with some data storage 
and communications capabilities. They measure the current coursing 
through a wire, record readings at specific time intervals, store some 
meter usage data (from 1 day to 1 month is typical in the United 
States), and communicate the meter data, along with the code that 
represents the meter, to utilities.
Smart meters can also be enabled to communicate on the “other 
side of the meter,” or inside a home or business. For residential envi­
ronments, some typical protocols for a home area network (HAN) are 
ZigBee, Z-Wave, or HomePlug. There is a variety of communications 
protocols in place for communications with the other side of the meter 
for commercial and industrial environments too. We’ll briefly discuss 
some of the types of signaling that could occur from smart meters to 
devices in a home, but more substantial discussion will be reserved for 
Chapter 5 on the connected home. 
Signaling Types 
In the United States smart meters must comply with American   
National Standards Institute (ANSI)† C12.19 standards for meter 
data structure—in other words, establishing a common structure for 
what is collected. Meter data is typically defined in terms of tables. 
Different standards are in place for Europe (DLMS/COSEM) and 
* http://breakingenergy.com/2013/07/24/the-true-roi-of-smart-meter-deployments/. 
† 	The American National Standards Institute is a standards development organization 
(SDO) that creates standards through a consensus-based process. The C12.19 stan­
dard’s participating entities included utilities, meter manufacturers, automated meter 
reading service companies, ANSI, Measurement Canada (for Industry Canada), 
National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA), Institute of Electrical and 
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Asia (DLT/645 is used in China), but with the same principle in
mind—to structure the data tables. 
Depending on the manufacturer, meters can also provide data 
about power quality or tamper detection. The list above describing 
smart meter data includes measurements for power quality, which 
helps identify power surges and sags that can be harmful to devices 
that rely on a steady source of power. It’s a valuable source of data that
was previously not available in the vast majority of meters since it can 
provide measurements more than once a month. This data can help
utilities diagnose the “health of the grid” and, in particular, the flow 
of electricity into the smart meter.
Many utilities are utilizing smart meters to deliver much more
granular sensing of voltages in their distribution grids. Commonly
known as conservation voltage reduction (CVR) regulation, smart 
meters serve as the sensors to communicate voltage levels. Before 
smart meters, utilities had much less visibility into their distribution
grid operations. They managed by oversupply to ensure that the last
meter on a circuit had sufficient power. However, smart meters can 
communicate details about voltages, and this data allows utilities
to modulate power in the grid much more effectively. Utilities can 
reduce overall power needs—often to the tune of millions of dollars 
in annual savings.* 
The data about energy usage or generation is what is most visible 
and useful to consumers, since it supplies the data that measures kilo-
watt-hours (kWh) and is used for billing. Other specialized meters
collect similar data about natural gas or water consumption.† Some of
these are smart too—meaning they have the ability to remotely com­
municate measurements. 
Smart Meter Communications Capabilities 
Drilling down into the communications capabilities of the smart 
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Every smart meter has a communications card that connects to the 
external world via the utility’s wireless or wired network that supports
the distribution grid. The external communications connection can 
be wired using power line carrier (PLC) technology. This means that
the communication signal is carried in the same wire that is supplying
electricity. Smart meters also have the ability to communicate on the 
other side of the meter to a HAN, which is discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 5 on the connected home.
Smart meters are a collection of sensors. In addition to sensing 
voltage or current, smart meters can also serve as actuators, or devices 
that have a control capability. For instance, a smart meter can be 
remotely connected and disconnected and automatically send mes­
sages about service outages. That means that consumers with smart 
meters no longer have to wait for a field technician to arrive to turn
electric service on or off for relocations; this can be done remotely by
the utility. For utilities, smart meters can alert them to outages the 
moment they occur and reduce the time that homes and businesses
are without electric service. With traditional meters, utilities don’t 
know there’s a problem until someone calls in with a service com­
plaint. Smart meters collect much more data about usage because they
have digital storage, and smart meters can provide data on a much
more frequent basis than the traditional meter reads.
This increased data collection delivers more granular awareness 
about energy usage. What granularity really means is that you can 
obtain a more detailed graph of electricity usage over the course of
an hour or a day or week than what would be available from a simple
monthly read of total kWh. It’s important to note that many of today’s
commercial meters installed on office buildings and factories have 
these communications capabilities and collect the same power quality 
data that is now collected for residential dwellings. These commercial
meters have been “smart” for a number of years. But these are also 
more expensive meters because they typically are polyphase meters—
measuring three phases of electricity. So are smart meters really
new? The answer is yes when it comes to the meters now deployed 
in residential buildings, which are sometimes called single-phase 
meters. Because single-family homes and many multiunit residential
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of consumption (and production) data merits discussion about the 
privacy risks associated with the use of and access to that data. 
Smart Meter Data Read Frequency 
In the past, the typical U.S. electric utility collected consumption data 
from a meter 12 times a year—12 data points. Now, smart meters
have the ability to collect and transmit data as often as once a minute 
or less.* Even at meter data collection at 15-minute intervals, a utility
would gather 3,000 reads (or receipts of data) per meter per month. At 
the time of this writing, the authors could not find a U.S.-based util­
ity that had shown an appetite for collecting data from every meter at
more than a 15-minute interval, which would create significant strains 
on the communications infrastructure and internal utility systems to
manage and store all this data.
However, it is possible that utilities would selectively and tempo­
rarily examine the power quality meter data on a more granular basis 
to conduct diagnostics for customers who experience service issues. 
More granular data could detect power surges or sags that can dam­
age sensitive electronics in appliances and computers. It is also possi­
ble that utilities could schedule more granular meter reads for selected 
meters in order to obtain more fine-grained consumption knowledge. 
We’ll explore that more in Chapter 5 on the connected home. 
Smart Meter Data Granularity 
The granularity of meter consumption data can create insights into
activities within a dwelling. For instance, the well-known graph in
Figure 4.4 offers an interesting distillation of appliance activity from
a study done by Elias Leak Quinn where he established ongoing sur­
veillance of a traditional electric meter. The attribution of specific 
appliance activity does not come from the meter itself, which collects 
* 	 Regulatory policies often dictate the frequency of data collection. In the United 
States, the typical utility collection frequency is around once per hour, although 
some utilities have permission to obtain data on 15-minute intervals. Realistically,
any utility could overwhelm its data management capabilities if it sought to collect 
data on residential meters at a read per minute. Some utilities could have issues
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Figure 4.4 Activities shown by energy usage. (From Elias Leake Quinn, Smart Metering and 
Privacy: Existing Law and Competing Policies, Spring 2009, p. 3, http://www.dora.state.co.us/puc/ 
DocketsDecisions/DocketFilings/09I-593EG/09I-593EG_Spring2009Report-Smart GridPrivacy.pdf.) 
an aggregation of consumption data at the point of the meter out­
side of the house. The identification of specific appliance activity in
this chart occurs because of specialized technologies or algorithms 
that disaggregate that electric current into the specific amounts used 
by them. This disaggregation is possible because each appliance has 
a unique electricity signature in the amount of power drawn from
a meter. Without the technology or disaggregation algorithms, edu­
cated guesses would need to substitute for accurate appliance identifi­
cation when working solely with smart meter data.
What’s missing from smart meter data now? Personal information, 
such as the name of the person paying the bill associated with that
meter, or the address of that person. Why? The reasons are not about 
privacy, although that is a welcome beneficiary of them. The reasons 
have to do with payload and relevance. Information theory* focuses 
on minimization of the amount of data that needs to be sent in a  
transmission. The most important data is the data that identifies a 
* 	 Claude Shannon’s paper, “A Mathematical Theory of Communications,” has been 
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change—such as the total kWh drawn or the price of electricity.* The 
bigger the message, the more power that’s needed to transmit it, and 
the more capacity that is needed in the network. With apologies to
Mr. Shannon, think of it as a transport decision. If you have to go to
the grocery store to purchase a bar of soap and quart of milk, do you 
need a huge cargo truck or a smart car? Obviously, the smart car will
take less energy to get to and from the store, and it takes up less space
on the roads, which means more cars can also use the highway. This 
is a key practice in Shannon’s information theory—keep the data to a 
minimum to optimize the bandwidth.
There’s no provision in meter data standards for transmission of
traditional personal information. A unique meter identification (ID)
is associated with the person who has established a customer relation­
ship with the utility. This unique meter ID is a code that serves as
the shorthand identification of the customer. The unique meter ID is 
matched to data about the customer once it has been transmitted back
to a utility’s billing operations. It is extremely important that utilities
protect the personal customer data that is collected for their opera­
tions, including the association between the meter IDs and custom­
ers, but this data is not contained within smart meter communications 
themselves. 
There’s another key point to the data that is collected and trans­
mitted by smart meters. Most of the meter manufacturers operating 
in the United States have standard encryption capabilities for data.
They use 128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES-128),† which 
is also widely used in a variety of other products. A number of utilities
note that they are encrypting meter data within the AMI networks,
including Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), CenterPoint Energy, and 
Florida Power & Light (FPL).‡ However, other countries may require 
* 	 Pricing information is useful for dynamic pricing and time of use (TOU) tariff
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encryption. For example, the Netherlands requires that selected smart
meter data must be encrypted.* 
Energy Savings Initiatives 
The old adage that knowledge is power is literally true about the results 
of collection and feedback of consumption data on energy or water
use. A number of studies† have shown that once people are aware
of how and when they use electricity, they are more likely to take
steps to reduce the use of it. This recognition of the power of knowl­
edge coupled with a feedback loop spurred development of a couple
of interesting initiatives that involve energy data owners, custodians, 
and managers. The bottom line is that data can be correlated from a 
number of sources and analyzed to create meaningful information for
the owners of the energy usage data. As we’ll discuss later, data has 
significant monetary value to many entities. 
Green Button Initiative 
The Green Button initiative leverages the purpose and use of smart 
meter data.‡ The objective of this 2011 federal government initiative 
is to offer utility customers easy access to their electricity usage data. 
It is modeled on the popular Blue Button§ program that first made 
military veterans’ medical data easily available for them to download,
view, and share with medical resources. The data is organized in a 
standard machine-readable file format that can be shared by the data
owner with third-party entities (data managers) of the owner’s choos­
ing to turn into visual displays and applications that help the data 
owner manage his or her electricity consumption. The common data 
format lets application developers build one interface that will work




§ http://bluebuttondata.org. Since its inception, a growing number of private sector 














Data Class Description 
UsagePoint The location of measurements—a meter or
submeter, or individual load or appliance 
ReadingType The type of measurement contained in MeterReading 
MeterReading A collection of the same ReadingType measurements 
LocalTimeParameters A universally recognized time stamp to ensure time 
has the same meaning for all measurements 
IntervalReading A single measurement that may include cost or quality 
IntervalBlock A collection of IntervalReadings, usually by day,
week, or month 
ElectricPowerUsageSummary A summary of measurements for a specific period
 of time 
ElectricPowerQualitySummary A summary of statistics about power quality for a
 specific period of time 
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with the energy usage data across all utilities that agree to participate 
in the Green Button program.
This data is available in some states now, and a growing number 
of utilities are supporting this initiative.* For consumers, detailed 
data about how and when they use electricity can influence decisions 
about how to save money on electric bills, identify appliances that
are energy hogs and potential savings through use of more energy
efficient models, or even build business cases for energy efficiency
renovations or investments in distributed energy resources (DERs)
like solar photovoltaic (PV). The granularity of this data is unique. 
Instead of a single number identifying the kilowatt-hours consumed 
last month, consumers can see usage at daily, hourly, or smaller incre­
ments of time. 
Figure 4.5 shows the major classes of data supplied by meters in the 
Green Button format. 
The Green Button initiative is based on the premise that energy
usage data has real value to consumers. Each consumer’s electrical
usage data belongs to that consumer, and consumers may opt to share 
their data with companies (data managers) that offer information
services or products. Information services may create comparisons 
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of electricity usage with anonymous peers (usually based on demo­
graphic, geographic, and property information) or offer recommenda­
tions on how to reduce electricity use. The services include web-based 
and mobile apps, offering a wide range of information options for 
consumers. Products may include smart plugs or more energy efficient 
appliances.
The federal government has promoted private sector development
of applications that leverage Green Button data through a challenge* 
in 2012 that offered monetary prizes to the best solutions. There’s sig­
nificant potential for applications that can go beyond simply tracking 
existing energy usage. Green Button data can be combined by autho­
rized data managers with other data to analyze the value of rooftop 
solar panels or electric vehicles for individual consumers, or to iden­
tify local utility rebates that consumers can claim to help reduce over­
all energy costs through investments in energy-efficient appliances
or building upgrades. Smart Grid-enabling technologies like smart
meters and Green Button apps create new data, and new information
based on this data. That information has value to consumers, utilities, 
and a range of other entities.
Perhaps energy usage data will enjoy an evolution similar to that
seen for credit card data. Once upon a time, we simply received our 
monthly bill with itemized expenses. Then credit card companies 
started summarizing those monthly expenditures into categories, and 
sent annual reports about spending patterns. The summary reports 
helped consumers understand exactly how much money over the 
course of a year was spent on dining or entertainment or fuel. That 
is powerful information that can shape budgets and spending habits. 
The same logic can be applied to energy usage habits and decisions.
Green Button data also serves to illustrate the roles of data owner­
ship, custodianship, and management. Green Button data is owned 
by the consumer. The local utility supporting Green Button is a cus­
todian of this data. The investor-owned utilities (IOUs) follow the 
privacy and security mandates for this data as defined by their state 
regulatory agency. A third party or service provider selected by the 
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A key point is that there is not one national data privacy policy that
covers all the roles. 
For instance, if the California-based author, Christine, chooses the
Best Data Company to receive her Green Button data, that triggers
notification to her local utility, the data custodian, that she authorizes
it to allow Best Data Company to access and receive her data on a one­
time or ongoing basis. Best Data Company is now a manager of her
data. In California, even when the data has crossed the utility boundary
to Best Data Company, the utility’s data privacy policy is in force for
her data. Her consumption data cannot be sold by Best Data Company.
However, if she directly hands her data over to a third party without her
utility’s involvement, then these privacy safeguards no longer apply; but
if the third party has a privacy policy in place, it will apply.
This is an important point: many consumers may not be aware this 
data can cross boundaries and be subjected to different public util­
ity commission (PUC) privacy policies. California serves as a good 
example of requiring legal privacy protections for energy usage data. 
The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) has been very
supportive of the Green Button initiative and a follow-on project 
called Green Button Connect, which we’ll explore below. 
Green Button Connect 
Green Button Connect is an extension of the initial White House Green 
Button initiative.* The Connect project encourages utilities to make it
procedurally and uniformly easy for consumers to provide authorization
to release data to their selected third parties. Large organizations like
utilities can create unintended complexity for consumers to complete
a service request that authorizes their selected data manager to receive 
their Green Button data. Green Button Connect defines a standard
process to request data and authorize data managers to access Green
Button data on behalf of the data owner. Green Button Connect does 
not create new energy usage data; it makes it easier for consumers to
get access to this data. However, as noted above, if the utility has not 
been involved as a data custodian, this data is now at the mercy of the 
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privacy policy in place at the third party selected by the consumer (the
data owner) and any other applicable privacy laws for that location.
The CPUC, in collaboration with its three IOUs and other interested 
parties, created Decision 13-09-025,* issued September 19, 2013, that
requires that the third-party companies that seek to become Green 
Button data managers must comply with the same requirements for 
privacy and security that apply to the regulated utilities themselves. 
Utilities, as data custodians, have a defined process to follow if a third 
party is identified or suspected of data abuse. Most importantly, if a 
consumer believes his or her privacy has been compromised by a third 
party with access to the energy usage data, a request to the utility to 
terminate that third party’s authorized access can occur immediately.
One California utility, San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E),
relies on the TRUSTed Smart Grid Privacy Program† for the Green 
Button Connect program. TRUSTed is “a self-regulatory program 
that certifies that companies use responsible privacy practices as they
collect and share consumer smart grid data.” This program was devel­
oped by the Future of Privacy Forum in collaboration with TRUSTe‡ 
and is somewhat similar to an Underwriters Laboratories (UL)
approval or a Good Housekeeping seal of approval. The privacy cer­
tification must be annually renewed. This program requires that data
owners (consumers) be notified of any security incidents that could 
impact or result in a privacy breach.
Like any other data, energy usage data should have privacy protec­
tions. Given that this data is new and there’s little experience with it, 
we should expect that consumers won’t always know who is responsi­
ble for the security and privacy of the data that they have made avail­
able to utilities and third parties. Consumer education is essential 
to help data owners understand the chain of data custody and what
privacy safeguards exist if data is transferred from a utility to a third 
party, or from the consumer directly to a third party without utility
involvement. 
* Available for download at www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/smartgrid.htm. 
† 	http://www.sdge.com/newsroom/press-releases/2013-01-27/powertools-app­
helps-sdge-customers-manage-save-energy. 













Figure 4.6 The value of data. 
California is very interested in making energy usage data available
for academic research. The CPUC is actively working on developing 
data practices and policies that make energy usage data available
while protecting consumer privacy. The CPUC rules indicate that if
data has identifiable characteristics removed, it can be available for 
research use without individual consumer consent. Data privacy prac­
tices of anonymization and aggregation will factor in to these policies
and guidelines. As we noted before, knowledge is power.
Figure 4.6 puts it another way. Data is the starting point for us to
learn how to manage our energy usage as intelligently as possible. 
Applications that illustrate when and what our energy usage is can be 
as helpful as reports that summarize spending categories and manage 
financial budgets. 
AMI Networks 
Let’s briefly review the networks that transmit smart meter data. 
These are sometimes called advanced metering infrastructure (AMI)* 
networks. The typical utility has several networks that are deployed 
* 	 From the Smart Grid Dictionary: “Electricity meters, bi-directional communications 
network hardware and software, and associated system and data management soft­
ware that measures and records usage data at set intervals, and provides usage data to 
consumers, utilities, and other parties at set intervals. The set intervals are specified 
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for specialized services. The AMI network is one of them. It trans­
ports smart meter data from meters to collection points where routine 
data—like consumption data—is usually aggregated and then trans­
mitted on a scheduled basis back to a utility’s central operations. Some 
smart meter data is considered high priority and sent in real time back
to a utility for immediate action. High-priority data includes a “last 
gasp” message from a meter—an indicator that there’s a service dis­
ruption causing a cessation of electricity to that meter. Smart meters
give utilities the ability to detect an outage in real time and initiate
restoration activities immediately—not hours later when impacted 
customers call to complain. 
AMI networks are bidirectional. Utilities can send messages or com­
mands to smart meters as well as receive data. One useful command is
to activate or connect a meter. This simple command eliminates count­
less hours spent waiting for the utility service representative to arrive
and start the flow of electricity into a new home or apartment. This
same functionality lets utilities determine if restoration services have
been successful in returning all affected customers to full power. 
This bidirectional network functionality has real promise for trans-
active energy. It is technically possible for a utility to send price sig­
nals to the meter, and then into a building to any appliances or other 
devices that are capable of receiving that signal. This “prices to devices” 
scenario is discussed as a means to automate decisions about when to
use electricity. It is intriguing, but as of mid-2014, there were only a 
few pilots exploring this capability. There are a number of reasons,
but from a technology perspective, it’s a chicken-and-egg dilemma. If
there isn’t a communications capability from the utility, then there’s 
no need for electricity-consuming devices to have communications 
functionality to a utility. And if the devices lack communications 
capabilities, there’s no need to build utility networks that can send
signals to them. 
The introductions of smart appliances and smart plugs are chang­
ing this situation. However, in many instances, there’s little or no
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communications are occurring over cellular, broadband, and Wi-Fi
networks that may not belong to utilities. Smart meters could be one
gateway to data exchanges of consumption data, but other gateways
are proposed by companies including AT&T, Comcast, Google, and
Apple.* 
Smart Meter Data Summary 
In summary, smart meters and their AMI networks do collect and 
transmit energy usage data and voltage measurements. Green Button
data enables electricity customers to get more detailed information
about their consumption that can help them save money. It’s a volun­
tary, opt-in program where the customer controls who gets access to 
his or her data. 
Once smart meter data is transmitted back to a utility, what hap­
pens to it? There are several utility software applications that use data 
from smart meters, as well as traditional, noncommunicating meters. 
Meter data management systems (MDMSs) are specialized software 
applications that handle the volumes of data that are derived from 
smart meters. At a high level, MDMS applications generally include 
a data repository that holds meter reads, events such as outage and
restoration with time stamps, and support audit trails to document 
any data updates or changes. MDMS applications excel at manag­
ing large volumes of data, and smart meters can create significant
amounts of data. As of mid-2014, no U.S.-based utility was collecting 
smart meter data at a smaller time increment than 15 minutes. That 
translates into 35,040 annual data collection events per smart meter.
MDMS applications also perform validation, estimation, and edit­
ing (VEE) of meter read data. These functions help ensure the accu­
racy of meter data, which is vital for utility bill calculations. Some
MDMS applications offer additional analytics capabilities on energy
usage data. Some MDMS applications have personal information, 
such as customer name or address; others just reference unique meter
IDs to associate consumption with a particular meter. 















74 DATA PRIVACY FOR THE SMART GRID 
Other utility systems may not contain detailed energy usage data, 
but generally do contain personal information such as name, address, 
and even financial data. The customer information system (CIS) and 
customer relationship management (CRM) applications are a couple
of these applications. Another is the utility billing application that
generates the monthly bills consumers receive for electricity, gas, or
water. These applications generally hold the customer name, address,
and depending on which system is in play, financial information. 
Some utilities own these applications and keep all data within logical 
utility boundaries as defined by their data networks.
Utilities may outsource some of these capabilities to third parties 
and allow consumer data (that could range from smart meter data to
automated payment data) to leave the utility’s computer systems and 
communications networks and travel across public networks to non-
utility destinations. To be clear, outsourcing functions like customer
service or billing is a standard practice across many business sectors. 
Many businesses are migrating to cloud-based solutions that are def­
initely outside of their logical perimeters, meaning that sometimes 
sensitive data resides outside of their direct control. What we want to
point out is that energy usage data could end up outside of a utility’s
controlled domain of computers and communication networks.
Smart meters produce more data, there’s no question about that. 
Smart meter data has many privacy protections, with a number of
states clearly stating that the consumer is the data owner of the data 
coming from the smart meters. This is not the case with most loca­
tion-based services. There are legitimately beneficial reasons for con­
sumers to have their energy usage data correlated with other data and
analyzed to bring about changes in energy use that reduce costs and 
carbon footprints. However, to conform with generally accepted pri­
vacy principles, all entities accessing, using, and possessing smart data 
meters should be held accountable for protecting the data, and not 
using the data beyond what the data owner has authorized.
Utilities and any third parties that have custodianship or manage­
ment of energy usage data or any other sensitive data, such as personal
information, need to exercise all required precautions for physical
and cyber security and privacy. Mapping and auditing the commu­
nications and computer facilities where data travels and resides is 








THE CONNECTED  HOME 
Smart Grid technologies embed new sensing, control, and communi­
cations technologies into utility networks and devices. The same tech­
nologies can also be incorporated in the networks and devices found 
in homes, businesses, and factories. In many cases, they already are. 
The connected home* is a convenient term to describe the burgeoning
applications that can improve security and quality of life and reduce 
operating costs for people in a dwelling. Some people also call it a 
smart home. By either term, it consists of communications networks 
and communications-enabled devices or equipment, most notably 
appliances, electronics equipment, and sensored (sensor-equipped) 
home structures, and depending on the solution and degree of sophis­
tication, it may be controlled remotely. Figure 5.1 illustrates the main
consumption domains. This chapter focuses on the activity in the resi­
dential or home domain. 
Home Area Networks 
Commercial and industrial buildings have interior communications 
networks that serve the same purpose as home area networks (HANs).† 
A HAN, as its name describes, is a network in your home. It is also a
gateway for connection to the outside world. You may have one today 
in the form of a wireless router that connects your laptops, printers,
tablets, smart phones, and entertainment devices to the Internet. As
* 	 See more about connected homes at http://solartoday.org/2014/06/interest-in­
connected-home-and-alternative-energy-solutions-to-increase-six-fold-accenture­
research-shows/. 
† 	These may be specialized M2M networks called building automation systems 
(BASs) or energy management systems (EMSs) to manage HVAC, lighting, and 
other building services separately from networks that transmit human communica­
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Figure 5.1 Smart Grid domains. (From Report to NIST on the Smart Grid Interoperability 
Standards Roadmap, Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), Palo Alto, CA, 2009.) 
(mostly) wireless technologies proliferate in North American homes*  
in the form of Wi-Fi† routers for computers, laptops, tablets, and other 
mobile devices, similar technologies can enable home thermostats, 
clothes dryers, hot water heaters, and other appliances outfitted to 
communicate within the home and with the outside world. 
* 	 Power line carrier (PLC) technology uses the electrical wiring to send communica­
tions. It is more commonly used in Europe than in the United States. 
† 	From the Smart Grid Dictionary: “An IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers) standard 802.11 that refers to a family of specifications developed by 
the IEEE for wireless LAN technologies that use unlicensed radio spectrum. The
term Wi-Fi initially described operations in the 2.4-GHz band, but the term has 
also been applied to unlicensed wireless devices operating in the 5-GHz band in
accordance with IEEE 802.11a. Wi-Fi technologies may also work in licensed spec­
trum. The FCC (Federal Communications Commission) does not require devices 
operating in unlicensed spectrum to meet the IEEE standards. The IEEE 802.11i
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HANs connect energy management devices (like programmable
communicating thermostats (PCTs)*), consumer electronics, appli­
ances, and energy management applications inside the home.† A 
HAN in a smart home logically connects devices that can be remotely 
monitored and controlled, and communicates status between devices 
and a homeowner. The key common capability is that all devices in a 
HAN are communications enabled or “smart.” Therefore, a refrigera­
tor may be drawing electricity, but unless it is equipped with an abil­
ity to transmit or receive communications through either “in skins” 
or built-in communication capabilities or an external smart plug,‡ it
won’t appear as a connected device in your HAN. Your HAN could 
be your gateway to the Internet for bidirectional communications 
to the rest of the world and will be discussed later in this chapter.
Communication that occurs solely between devices is also known as
machine-to-machine (M2M) communications, and in many aspects 
a HAN is an example of M2M.
This book won’t explore the technological pros and cons of each 
HAN communications technology or protocol. Other books debate
the distinctions between wireless and wired signaling technologies for 
home automation.§ Regardless of the communications scenario, here’s 
a key point. There is data that can be created by devices and carried by 
a HAN. Communication options and their standards and protocols 
offer different degrees of security of data, and different mechanisms 
(technical, physical, and administrative) for securing the data. While 
good security is integral to data privacy protection, our discussion in
* 	 From the Smart Grid Dictionary: “A thermostat that controls HVAC components
based on consumer time and temperature preferences. It may communicate with a 
smart meter or a smartphone. PCTs may be used to deliver automated participation 
in demand response programs.” 
† 	From the Smart Grid Dictionary: “A network of energy management devices, digi­
tal consumer electronics, signal-controlled or enabled appliances, and applications 
within a home environment that is on the home side of the electric meter. It is similar 
to a home-based LAN, but it connects more than personal electronics like comput­
ers, printers, and TVs. HAN specifications include OSHAN, ZigBee, HomePlug, 
Z-Wave and Wireless M-Bus (a wireless variant of M-Bus).” 
‡ 	From the Smart Grid Dictionary: “Hardware that enables remote monitoring and 
control of devices in homes or businesses. It retrofits existing 120V AC wall outlets 
with (typically wireless) communications capabilities.” 
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this chapter remains focused on the policies and practices that gov­
ern energy usage data. Chapter 8 includes discussion of the security
methods that can be used to secure energy usage and production data. 
Key points to consider in any communications scenario are the own­
ership, custodianship, and management of energy usage data, because 
they have significant impact on the privacy risks accompanying this 
data, but are too often overlooked after the security controls have been 
established. 
Communications Options 
With regard to ownership, custodianship, and management of energy
usage data, there are two primary communications scenarios to con­
nect HANs to the external world. The first option is utility-based
communications. In this scenario, utility networks carry data back
and forth between the HAN and the utility head end.* Utility-based
communications may use the smart meter as the transmitter and 
receiver to relay messages between the utility and the devices con­
nected to a HAN (i.e., the gateway.) A smart meter that can serve as 
a gateway has two wireless radio communications chips. One chip
enables communications between the utility and the meter. The sec­
ond chip enables communications between the meter and the HAN, 
or directly with devices in the home that are enabled to transmit and 
receive data. At the time of this writing, only a small percentage of all 
the smart meters in the United States have an activated second chip. 
The vast majority of installed smart meters do not have an active com­
munications channel established in the home.† Utility-based commu­
nications may also use some other communications platform. What
makes them utility based is that the electric utility owns and manages 
the communications between the HAN and the utility.
The second category covers broadband service providers such as
AT&T, Verizon, Comcast, and some alarm companies. These com­
panies provide home automation services and home security services
* 	 The head end is industry jargon to denote the centralized reception point for data
that is behind the utility (or other entity’s) logical firewall protecting its operations. 
† 	The reasons are generally summarized as an absence of a predominant home auto­
mation standard and a paucity of utility services that can leverage communications 
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along with their traditional voice, Internet, and cable TV services. 
You may have seen the ads about remotely monitoring or adjusting 
thermostats to enhance comfort or save money. The gateway device 
into the home that supports these capabilities is not a smart meter,
nor is it owned and controlled by the electric utility. It is a broadband
router or other network device that functions as a hub for these ser­
vices in the home. 
Home Energy Management Systems 
Home energy management systems (HEMSs) are software applica­
tions that display information about a home’s energy consumption
and may also provide control capabilities for devices that are capable
of being managed by it. Some HEMS solutions also bundle in spe­
cialized hardware such as programmable communicating thermostats 
(PCTs) or smart plugs. HEMSs leverage the communications capa­
bilities of a HAN. HEMSs are fairly new solutions with little stan­
dardization, and there’s a wide range of vendors that provide varying 
features and functionality. We’ll discuss HEMS solutions in general 
terms and avoid any comparisons of them.
Your home might already have a programmable thermostat. You 
can define and modify the timing for heating or air conditioning to
occur, and the temperature setting for that heating or cooling. With
a PCT and an interface with a HEMS solution, you can do that pro­
gramming from a laptop, tablet, or smart phone. Your connection
could be a HAN, a utility-supplied interface with the local grid, or
the Internet via a third-party solution from a cable provider.
HEMSs often start as a software solution that controls a PCT 
since heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) is the largest 
use of electricity or gas in the average residential building.* The solu­
tion could be part of an offering from a company that you authorize to
work with your Green Button data. HEMSs are targeted to residen­
tial buildings, and typically single-family use. Similar management
systems called building energy management systems (BEMSs) or
simply energy management systems (EMSs) provide similar functions 
* 	 HVAC loads are also predominant for most commercial buildings, but we’ll focus 
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for commercial buildings or multifamily housing such as apartment 
buildings. Given the focus on the privacy risks related to energy usage 
data, most of our discussion will address HEMSs and the single- and 
multifamily residential market sectors, which have the most apparent
privacy-related risks. However, there are still risks for other types of
locations and buildings. These are discussed in the next sections of
this chapter. 
HEMS Adoption 
Today, HEMS applications are still in early adoption stages. There 
are many reasons that these applications are slow to achieve mass
popularity, but two important reasons are: (1) a lack of common com­
munications standards or protocols between consumer products such
as appliances and electronic devices, and (2) lack of common com­
munications standards or protocols between those devices and the 
grid. According to Chris Kotting, executive director of the Energy
Information Standards Alliance (EIS Alliance), “The development
of a common expression of fundamental or abstract information for 
Home Energy Management Systems (HEMS) is crucial for manu­
facturers and service providers to develop systems that allow for dif­
ferent appliances, HVAC, lighting, entertainment and other home 
systems to work together. This is true not only for equipment entering 
the marketplace now [at the time this book was written], but for prod­
ucts still on the proverbial ‘drawing board.’ These systems may each
use different ways of expressing information internally, and having a
common expression all can refer to will allow them to communicate 
needed data, and only needed data, for intelligent coordination.”* 
Here’s an easy way to think about it, and this is equally true about 
interoperability concerns for manufacturers of any Smart Grid tech­
nologies. For instance, some manufacturers may use yes/no to indicate
if power is on or off in a device. Other vendors may program this 
status data as on/off. When converting back to binary machine code,
everyone has to agree that if yes is the equivalent of on, and no equals 
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no/off state. Simply put, different ways of saying the same thing pre­
vent different companies’ products from working together, and that
increases costs and complexity for consumers.
Industry associations such as the EIS Alliance exist to encourage 
different systems and architectures from vendors to operate together 
in homes with appropriate communications and coordination. That 
means that consumers can install different vendors’ products in homes
with the confidence that the products can “play well together” under 
the monitoring and control of HEMSs and HANs. Just like we would 
like all the equipment in our entertainment centers to work with a 
single remote control, we will want one HEMS solution to be used
for our kitchen, laundry, and electronics appliances and devices found 
in homes. As noted above, most communications service providers are 
bundling additional services, including healthy lifestyle applications,
along with dedicated touchscreen displays that function as sophisti­
cated remote controller devices.* Current trends point to the smart 
phone becoming a universal home controller via apps.† Whatever
the type of app or device that is chosen, app developers, smartphone
manufacturers, and communications service providers will need to
ensure they engineer the apps and devices with privacy controls to
address the associated risks if they hope to be well received by a pri­
vacy-breach-weary public. Additionally, the legal privacy protections 
regarding energy usage data vary based on the provider and the type
of device that serves as the interface to a utility, a broadband or mobile
carrier’s network, or another service provider via the Internet. 
HEMS Communications with the Smart Grid 
Here’s one scenario that describes how HEMS solutions or smart 
devices connected by a HAN can communicate with a utility or an
* 	 As just one example, in Rebecca’s home state of Iowa, Mediacom, a cable and tele­
communications company, is seeking to become the home energy management 
solution of choice with its dedicated devices and apps that run on laptops, smart 
phones, and other types of devices. See more at https://mediacomcable.com/site/
bundlesdg/home_security.html. See “HEMS Vendor Taxonomy” showing a wide
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ESP and become part of the Smart Grid. A homeowner has enrolled 
in a utility’s program that asks customers to voluntarily reduce elec­
tricity use on specific dates and times.* These selected time frames
typically occur on the days when a utility has the greatest demand
for electricity. As noted before, wholesale electricity markets obey the 
laws of supply and demand. When demand is greatest, supply is most
expensive. The utility wants to avoid buying megawatts of electricity 
at this most expensive peak price because it is regulated or managed 
to keep electricity rates as low as possible for consumers.
One way to avoid buying expensive electricity is to ask customers to
voluntarily reduce their use. So on a very hot day in California when 
every air conditioner in the Central Valley is running full blast, the 
utility asks our hypothetical homeowner to cut back on electricity use.
How does the utility do this? Some programs are set up so the hom­
eowner gives permission for the utility to automatically raise the tem­
perature on residential thermostats by a degree or two, or cycle AC unit
compressors on and off.† The homeowner can opt out of participation
if needed. Other demand response (DR) programs send a message by 
our homeowner’s preferred means of communication—usually a text, 
email, or phone alert—requesting voluntary cutbacks in electricity use. 
These reductions in energy use are made by the homeowner—the con­
sumer—not the utility. The reduction impacts are negligible to each
participating homeowner, but on an aggregated scale, these actions 
add up to sufficient reduced electricity usage to avoid that purchase of
the most expensive electricity. That has a benefit to the utility and to all 
customers by keeping electricity costs lower. Our homeowner enjoys a 
reduction in electricity rates or a rebate on the bill.
HANs and HEMSs offer interesting possibilities to expand the 
number of electricity-using devices that could automatically partici­
pate in these programs, increasing the potential for significant reduc­
tions in electricity during the times when it is most expensive. When 
* 	 These are usually known as demand response (DR) programs within utilities, and 
are branded by a variety of different names when marketed to utility customers. 
† 	Programs operate today in this fashion without a HAN or a smart meter to support 
them. Simple radio controllers are affixed to outdoor AC units and these respond to 
signals from utility networks. Some other programs control residential pool pumps 
in the same fashion. These programs are effective, but require that each AC unit or 
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“smart” appliances, which have communications capabilities, are added 
to the equation, the hypothetical amounts of electricity consumption
that can be avoided at certain times dramatically increase. Here’s an
example of how this might look in the future and on the path of a 
transactive energy future. If you have a HAN connecting your smart 
appliances and have designated that your thermostat, refrigerator’s ice
maker, clothes dryer, dishwasher, and electric hot water heater can par­
ticipate in a DR program, each of these devices must have communica­
tions capabilities to receive and transmit data to your HEMS—which
is mostly likely in a laptop, tablet, or smart phone. You would program 
settings for demand response, such as “don’t make ice between 2:00
and 7:00 p.m.” or “start a dishwashing cycle only after 6:00 p.m.,” in
order to avoid using electricity during the hours of greatest demand. 
Sure, you could run around the house and turn things off manually in
response to an email or text, but there might come a day where you for­
get to adjust something and receive an expensive electric bill as a result
of consuming electricity at the wrong time. This is why the concept 
of set and forget is very important to developers of connected homes, 
smart appliances, and HEMS solutions.
Continuing with this scenario, on those DR event days, your appli­
ances would receive signals via your HAN that instructed them to
operate with the restrictions you put in place on them. These signals 
could come from a utility and be sent via a smart meter, or they could 
be sent over the Internet to your HAN from the utility or from an
energy services provider (ESP). This distinction becomes extremely 
important, as you’ll learn later in this book. If you choose to override
those controls, you can—so on that DR event day when you have a 
party planned for 50 people, you will have all the AC and ice you 
need, but it may cost you.
In this future scenario, here’s where the granularity and value of
data beyond energy management come in to play. The utility or ESP
will need to know if you are complying with the electricity reduction
request, and if not, how much variance there is in your electricity use. 
Depending on the turnaround times between their initial request and 
their checkup to see if your appliances are performing as expected, 
your utility or ESP might send a text alert to let you know that your
home hasn’t reduced electricity use as much as anticipated. Is this a 
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failing, so it is running more than it should, and consumes more elec­
tricity as a result. Perhaps a device isn’t programmed correctly. Perhaps 
you have out-of-town guests and overrode all appliance instructions 
while they are in town. All your utility or ESP can tell you is that you 
are using more electricity than you promised to use. Or is there more 
it can tell about your electricity use? Quite possibly yes, if it correlated 
this data with other energy usage data. 
HANs Do Not Need Smart Meters 
Here’s a key point to remember: a HAN does not need a smart meter
to perform as described here. It could work with an Internet connec­
tion—wired or wireless. This is the approach adopted by companies like
Comcast or Verizon. It also requires a collection of smart plugs or appli­
ances that can communicate across that HAN supporting a common
protocol. Just like the wireless local area network (LAN) in your home
can connect to all computers, entertainment displays, tablets, and smart
phones that have communications capabilities, a HAN could connect
smart appliances and other types of smart electronic devices. We’ll dis­
cuss smart appliances in greater detail later in this chapter. 
HANs as Communications Gateway Devices 
A HAN could be the gateway device for communications “on the other
side of the meter,” meaning it could serve as the interface between utility
or ESP equipment and smart devices in the home. However, its ability
to function within a dwelling is unrelated to a connection to the outside
world. HANs and HEMSs, like wireless modems, should have strong
passwords to prevent unauthorized access to devices in your home. For 
instance, an article in Forbes magazine* detailed how that author hacked
into several homes that deployed a device from an unnamed manufac­
turer—a device that had no password protections and no other security
controls implemented. The author was able to obtain personal informa­
tion, and remotely control devices like lamps that were connected to the
hacked systems. No smart meter or HEMS solution was involved in
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integrity can be compromised. It is critical for each consumer to ensure
all the appropriate security controls are implemented within his or her
HAN to minimize the risk that unauthorized entities can gain access
to the data within the HAN. 
History just continues to repeat itself. Years ago, the examples of
password carelessness concerned companies that installed expensive 
telecommunications equipment and never changed the default pass­
word of 1234 to something unique, exposing themselves to all sorts 
of nefarious havoc. More recently, the Department of Homeland
Security encouraged transportation agencies to change default pass­
words for the digital signs that offer traffic advisories after a couple of
quite visible hacks.* 
Comcast was contacted as part of an inquiry to learn more about 
the home automation services, and in particular, ask questions about 
encryption of data and privacy policies. The answers, or rather the 
lack of them, reveal a great deal. At the time of this writing Comcast 
had not received too many questions about data privacy, and there­
fore didn’t have much information about technologies and policies in
this topic area. That’s not a criticism leveled solely at Comcast. It’s a 
cautionary message to all of us. However, we had to feel sorry for the 
contact center agent—she obviously hadn’t been trained to address 
these questions and had no resources to turn to.† The investigating 
author, Christine Hertzog, asked about obtaining a copy of the data 
privacy policy for one of its home automation services that included 
home energy controls. The response was, “We’ll get back to you in 3–5 
days.” Christine is still waiting for that information. 
Privacy Risks within Rentals and Other Leased Spaces 
The prior discussion focused on single-family residences. However,
there are additional concerns with using HEMSs within rental
* 	 http://www.torontosun.com/2014/06/06/after-godzilla-attack-us-warns-about­
traffic-sign-hackers. 
† 	An SGIP SGCC Privacy Subgroup training subteam led by Rebecca Herold cre­
ated sets of “train the trainer” type of training slides for a variety of entities to use.
Included in these was a set to train those who must answer such questions from 
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properties. Rent payments sometimes include utility services like
electricity or water, particularly in properties where one meter is asso­
ciated with all units. This creates the concern that the named party for 
the meter supplying a rental unit would then have access to detailed 
energy usage data for renters. Could tenants subsequently be discrim­
inated against, evicted, or have their rent payments raised if the land­
lord determined the renter was using too much electricity? Would 
landlords be able to monitor tenant activities through their energy
usage throughout the day and in various locations of their rented 
spaces? It is technically feasible, but not practically feasible, at least 
without some level of awareness on the part of the tenants. However,
these privacy concerns need to be addressed as more laws mandating 
the reporting of energy usage are deployed in cities and states to drive 
energy savings and job creation.* 
Utilities are struggling with how to provide energy usage reports to
entities legally entitled to such information for residential rental units
without infringing on the privacy of those living within them. For 
example, in January 2013, Xcel Energy asked Minnesota state regula­
tors for guidance† on the minimum number of customers to include in
aggregated energy usage data reports without infringing on the pri­
vacy of those whose data was being used. Could they aggregate total 
building energy usage data for a 50-tenant property without exposing 
any individual customer’s information? The privacy risks of a building 
with just two or three renters would be more significant because of
fewer tenants being involved—the ability to perhaps even intuitively 
guess at unit’s energy usage data would be much easier to accomplish.
Xcel Energy requested more legal guidance and state policy to protect 
consumer privacy to help utilities to make better decisions whenever 
aggregated energy usage data was evaluated with the goal of energy
usage improvement. 
* 	 California’s Assembly Bill (AB) 1103 mandates benchmarking at a whole building
level of energy efficiency information for nonresidential buildings, which raises pri­
vacy concerns for commercial and industrial tenants. Resolution of these concerns is
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While current laws protect social security numbers (SSNs) and 
standards protect credit card numbers, at the time this book was writ­
ten, no known laws or regulations existed to protect renters’ energy
usage data from building owners or landlords,* or indeed from being
published for public review. Since housing trends are moving toward
more multifamily and rental housing,† this area should be addressed 
sooner rather than later, given the associated privacy risks. Chapter 7 
provides more discussion of the various privacy risks of renters, and 
Appendix A documents the privacy risk levels for energy usage data 
within privately owned dwellings and commercial and industrial sites. 
Employee Privacy Risks within Commercial 
Buildings and Industrial Sites 
Similar to the privacy concerns within residential rentals, there have 
also been concerns expressed about the privacy risks of HEMSs 
within commercial buildings and industrial sites. However, unlike
residential dwellings, industrial and commercial facilities have his­
torically not been locations where there is an expectation of privacy 
outside of locker rooms, bathrooms, or other personal care spaces. 
In 2010 one of the authors, Rebecca Herold, participated in a team
that included a National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) representative and the security officer from a large Midwest 
utility that spent several months researching and discussing the pos­
sible privacy issues within commercial buildings and industrial sites. 
Appendix A documents the privacy risk levels for these areas. The 
conclusion was that since these areas have historically been subject to
monitoring and surveillance for safety reasons, and because business
owners typically have established policies that employees and others
within the premises are subject to monitoring, and with consideration
* 	 This scenario applies when a building owner, landlord, property management com­
pany, etc., pays for the utility bills. 
† 	Fannie Mae report: http://www.fanniemae.com/portal/research-and-analysis/
data-note-0312.html. For more discussion about the unique challenges of rental
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of the bulk electricity usage in commercial sites, there were mini­
mal privacy risks within such locations specifically related to electric­
ity usage. However, when considering the use of personally owned 
electric devices, plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs), and mobile devices 
with smart energy apps loaded on them that could reveal information
about an employee’s off-business-site activities, there are some privacy 
risks involved. 
Chapter 7 provides more discussion of the various privacy risks of
renters and employees. 
Disaggregation Technologies 
Disaggregation technologies use specialized current-sensing equip­
ment and data algorithms to break down electricity use into indi­
vidual device or appliance consumption. These technologies can be 
deployed at the smart plug level or at the electrical panel as a “whole
home” solution. Here’s a basic overview of disaggregation technolo­
gies. The associated privacy risks of disaggregation will be discussed 
in Chapter 7. 
Hardware 
One version of this technology deploys a smart plug that connects 
into the wall socket, and then the appliance or device to be studied is 
plugged into that smart plug.
Whole home disaggregation technology incorporates sensors at the 
electrical panel or breaker box* that samples the flow of household
current and detects patterns of energy use that are common to a spe­
cific appliance, based on comparison of those patterns to a collection
of other power consumption patterns. Those collections of patterns or
signatures are usually derived from plug-level research. Each type of
appliance has a unique signature, and if you collect enough examples
of signatures, you could match electricity signatures the way crime 
technicians match tire or shoe treads. This could be useful for home 
energy audits, spotting appliance failures before they happen, or other 
* 	 The electrical panel box is also known as a fuse box, panelboard, circuit breaker box,
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helpful predictive uses, as discussed below. However, as with other 
benefits, this also brings insights into energy usage that create privacy
concerns, as discussed in Chapter 7. 
Software 
There are disaggregation technologies that are software based too.
These solutions take smart meter data and run sophisticated analy­
ses of the energy usage data correlated with such things as weather
data and even information gathered from queries with their custom­
ers. Typically cloud based, software disaggregation technologies also 
seek patterns based on large libraries of electricity signatures. The big­
gest distinction between the hardware- and software-based solutions 
is that the hardware solutions have much more granular data than
software solutions, which are at the mercy of the utility’s scheduled 
meter read. The difference can be 25 milliseconds (hardware) to 15 or
60 minutes (software).* 
Here’s an important point. Disaggregation technology was not 
installed in smart meters at the time this book was written, and meter 
manufacturers weren’t too keen on installing this technology into
their meters. Meter manufacturers and utilities want to keep meters
focused on what they are meant to do—measure the electricity you 
use so they can send you an accurate bill. Loading a meter down with
processor-intensive comparisons of electricity signatures, or consum­
ing valuable utility network space to communicate to a cloud, just to
learn what appliance is operating at any point in time, conflicts with
the primary mission of keeping track of how much power is flowing 
through each meter.
In conclusion, disaggregation software and hardware technologies
are opt-in technologies that are visible to homeowners (as hardware 
installed in the breaker box, or software feedback loops). So why would 
someone want this technology? The answer is that the ability to break 
down an electric current into the unique signatures of consumption
* 	 See http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/perfecting-energy-disaggregation­
in-the-home for discussion of hardware. Software disaggregation technologies rely
on the data transmitted by smart meters; thus, the interval is set by the utility. To
date, utilities in the United States have not collected smart meter data in intervals 
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by different devices is a powerful tool to assist consumers, utilities, 
and manufacturers in understanding energy consumption behaviors 
and patterns for appliances and electronics. There are a number of
academic studies that demonstrate the value this data delivers to help
consumers make informed and fact-based decisions about usage.* It
could show a homeowner that a replacement of an aging appliance 
for a more energy efficient one is a great money-saving investment. 
From a utility perspective, this data could help formulate programs
to encourage selection of more energy efficient appliances or target 
new categories of devices for demand response programs based on
when they are used. Even from a market research perspective, this
data could be quite valuable for manufacturers to influence product 
designs or future services. We emphasize the use of the word could
here because the numbers of disaggregation devices were fairly low at
the time this book was written, and much of the existing work with
this data had been in academic research. 
Disaggregation technologies eliminate the guesswork involved to
see when the blender is whirring or the hot tub jets are bubbling, 
because “libraries” of electricity signatures can easily compare and 
match the signatures disaggregated from plug devices or technology
at the electric panel.
However, while disaggregation activities bring benefits as described, 
they also bring significant privacy risks that must also be addressed. 
These risks and a few possible mitigation methods are discussed in
Chapter 7. 
Smart Appliances 
Appliance is the generic term we use for kitchen equipment or white 
goods like refrigerators, stoves, microwaves, and dishwashers. It also 
covers laundry devices—washers and dryers. Electronic devices like
TVs and receivers, hot tubs, smoke alarms, baby monitors, and closed-
circuit TV (CCTV) surveillance systems can also be considered 
appliances. Finally, there’s equipment that resides in a utility closet 
or basement or outside—the heating, ventilation, air conditioning 
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(HVAC) gear, water heaters, spas, and pool pumps. This last group­
ing has some special characteristics.* 
A smart appliance is a device or appliance that can bidirection­
ally share data with a utility or service provider, and some even have 
data storage or data processing capabilities. It is also likely to contain
more sensors than ever before to create new or more data. One of the 
authors would like to have a sensor or two in the oven to warn about 
possible overbaking before activating the sensor called the nose or the
sensor called the smoke detector. 
Connecting Home Appliances 
As noted earlier in the discussion about HANs, there are two basic 
scenarios to deliver connectivity to home appliances. The first sce­
nario is that selected smart appliances communicate with the electric
grid via utility-owned equipment. The second scenario is that smart 
appliances connect to the Internet, and a hub or gateway within a 
residential dwelling is the communications manager. For the first 
scenario, that could be a HAN controller, and in the second scenario, 
it could be a Wi-Fi router or hub supplied by a telephone or cable 
service provider, or even an appliance manufacturer.† The connected 
smart appliances (in the future, to include EVs, energy storage,
and private generation assets such as rooftop solar in this category) 
communicate with this hub or gateway, which in turn manages the 
connectivity to the utility or another vendor or energy services pro­
vider. It turns out there is a third scenario, in which smart appliances
communicate directly to the cloud and use an operating system like
Android or iOS and apps to deliver information to the appliance 
owners. And as our research discovered, this data was provided to
the appliance manufacturers.
Increasingly more appliances, even a hairdryer or toaster oven, 
could be outfitted with communications capabilities. The annual
* 	 Some of these devices are typically powered by natural gas rather than electricity.
Particularly when it comes to furnaces or water heaters, the operations are already 
automated courtesy of sensors for temperature (air or water). 
† 	http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/whirlpool-launches-the-wi-f i­
smart-appliance. 
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Consumer Electronics Show in Las Vegas highlights this trend. Here 
are some smart devices available when this book was written: 
• 	 A smart lock that can be controlled remotely and have a cam­
era to record who is at your door* 
• 	 Smart appliances that may track energy usage, but can also 
provide detailed information about usage and have cameras 
built in to record those using them† 
• 	 Wi-Fi-enabled crock pots, and lightbulbs with remote control 
capabilities‡ 
• 	Thermostats that analyze heating and cooling settings to 
detect trends with remote monitor and control capabilities§ 
• 	 Smart toothbrushes that collect data on your brushing habits, 
including duration, frequency, and neglected zones in your 
mouth, and then communicate with your iOS or Android 
smart phone via Bluetooth technology¶ 
From a utility perspective, appliances that consume the most elec­
tricity or gas are most important for DR programs. These appliances 
may have operational flexibility or discretionary use—meaning the 
device or appliance owner can postpone use to different points in time 
or modify parameters such as heating or cooling temperature, or even 
operate differently to provide other (somewhat esoteric) services back 
to the utility or ESP. For utilities, these are the appliances that make 
sense to enroll in demand response programs. These generally include 
HVAC equipment, clothes dryers, dishwashers, ovens, and hot water 
heaters—devices that tend to be the biggest energy users. These smart 
appliances must somehow connect to a utility or third party that man­
ages DR programs to receive or transmit data. 
* 	 For example, see http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/ces-2014-smart-devices-mashed­
home-appliances/story?id=21468578#1. 
† 	For example, see http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/ces-2014-smart-devices-mashed­
home-appliances/story?id=21468578#2. 
‡ For example, see http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/ces-2014-smart-devices-mashed­
home-appliances/story?id=21468578#4. 
§ For example, see http://www.cnet.com/products/nest-learning-thermostat/. 
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DR Programs 
DR programs are price based or capacity based. Price-based systems 
are precursors to future transactive energy markets and are predicated 
on the assumption that electricity (or gas or water in the future) is in 
some sense dynamic in price. Smart appliances could have the intelli­
gence to be programmed or instructed to operate or not based on price 
signals. The programming is controlled by the appliance owner and,
once in place, would automatically perform based on those instruc­
tions. Owners have the ability to override the usual programming for 
any special circumstance. This is the basic construct for OpenADR,
an industry group that promotes an open protocol for all appliance and 
device manufacturers to adopt to readily accept utility price signals.
OpenADR, the acronym for Open Automated Demand Response,
is an open standard for electricity providers and system operators to
communicate DR signals over any existing Internet Protocol (IP)­
based communications network like the Internet. It has support from
a number of industry stakeholders, including appliance manufacturers, 
building managers, ESPs, and utilities who see the value in widespread 
adoption of the standard. We’ll discuss OpenADR more in Chapter 9.
We alluded to data collection by appliance manufacturers a few 
paragraphs back, and this deserves careful examination. This is another 
new area of data collection. Some data is based on energy consump­
tion, but most of the data collected today focuses on consumer use of
appliances, and that concerns privacy. One of the pioneers in smart 
appliances is Whirlpool Corporation. At the time of publication, 
there were four electric appliances—a refrigerator, a clothes washer, a 
dryer, and a dishwasher—that were equipped with a technology called 
6th Sense Live™,* and similar technology is embedded in some water 
heaters that are powered by natural gas.† This technology includes a
platform for aggregated communications and control from a company 
called Arrayent.
Arrayent supplies the wireless communications platform to connect 
these Whirlpool appliances to the Arrayent cloud. The communica­
tions are bidirectional, meaning data can be sent to or received from
a connected appliance. There can be benefits to that exchange of data. 
* See http://www.whirlpool.com/smart-appliances/. 












94 DATA PRIVACY FOR THE SMART GRID 
For instance, an appliance could submit data that assists in diagnosis 
of a problem and speeds repair time. A manufacturer could provide 
an over-the-air (OTA) update of software or firmware in an appli­
ance, extending the useful life of that appliance. But manufacturers
could also monitor use of an appliance. For instance, the Whirlpool 
refrigerator equipped with 6th Sense Live can send an alert to the 
owner’s smart phone if the fridge door is open for 5 minutes. A sensor
monitors appliance status, and then communicates this data to the 
Arrayent cloud. Arrayent’s communications are encrypted, which is 
commendable. But who owns this data? It’s not energy usage data, so 
it is not governed by state laws or utility policies that address energy
usage data. This is data about how and when, and often where, an
appliance is used.
The view of data custodianship gets even murkier. A consumer 
buys the product from Whirlpool. He or she might assume that the
privacy policy on Whirlpool’s website covers his or her purchase. That 
would be a mistaken assumption, because website privacy policies
typically cover use of the Whirlpool website unless the posted privacy 
policy specifically says the privacy promises also apply to sites where 
the data is shared (neither of the authors has seen such a privacy policy
with this type of statement). Does Arrayent have custodianship and 
management of consumer data? The data is based in its cloud, but its 
stance is that the device or appliance manufacturer is responsible for 
the user data it collects. 
Here’s what the Arrayent website says about data privacy for data 
that resides in its cloud: “If you are an end user of the Arrayent
Cloud Service, please check with the applicable device manufacturer 
(or other Arrayent enterprise customer) regarding treatment of your
information on and in connection with the Arrayent Cloud Service.”* 
This statement indicates that in the scenario described above, the 
data management responsibilities reside with Whirlpool. We do  
not know if the U.S. Federal Trade Commission or State Attorneys 
General offices would consider Arrayent’s position to be congruent 
with their views of custodial responsibilities. Historically custodians 
of personal information, and information with privacy impacts, have 
* 	 At the time this book was written, this statement was extracted from the Arrayent
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been accountable to varying degrees when security incidents and pri­
vacy breaches have occurred. We use this example to highlight today’s 
realities about data in the connected home. We do not have any reason
to believe that Whirlpool or Arrayent abuses or misuses consumer 
data. However, certain types of data—energy usage data—have spe­
cial privacy safeguards in some states. Other data that may be used 
in conjunction with energy usage data may not enjoy the same safe­
guards, or may be governed by other policies, as is the case for finan­
cial data or health data. 
Here’s another example that blurs the line between energy usage 
data and other usage data. Smart phones and tablets are growing 
in popularity as the preferred device for home energy management. 
Some home goods manufacturers are installing Android or Apple 
operating systems into their appliances too. For instance, Google’s
Android operating system (OS) can be added to devices that range 
from rice cookers to refrigerators. The Android OS capability would 
offer convenience to consumers—that Android smart phone or tablet 
could notify you when a laundry cycle is complete or when it’s time to
take the cookies out of the oven. However, the OS also offers Google
or appliance makers an opportunity to collect usage data. This data 
may or may not include energy usage data. This data will not be the 
revenue-grade usage data pulled from a meter that is used to calculate 
bills. This could be the appliance’s own measurement of its electric­
ity use, or this could be melded with Green Button data. One point 
is clear: at the time of this writing, this data did not enjoy the same 
protections imposed on electric utilities regarding energy usage data.
A new release of Android capabilities will allow proximity sensing 
so that your home lights could automatically turn on as you or your
smart phone approach your dwelling. A smart tracking capability
can be a great convenience. But there’s probably some time-stamped 
data collected somewhere that creates a detailed mapping of personal
movement inside a home. Apple has similar products and plans for 
more home/iOS connectivity. Its HomeKit allows iPhone control of 
appliances, door locks, and plugs.
Mobile devices and their operating systems offer portability, con­
venience, and ubiquity to consumers. We expect to see them used for 
status updates and more as home or business-based on-site generation,
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Mobile devices have a very special role in data privacy, particularly 
with regard to capabilities such as location-based services (LBSs),
geo-fencing, and smart tracking.
In summary, HEMSs, HANs, and smart appliances can help con­
sumers intelligently manage energy use. Smart appliances can provide 
additional value, as noted, in the form of performance monitoring
and troubleshooting diagnostics, and could save consumers money.
However, the veritable explosion of sensors that can be embedded 
into appliances, and the communications capabilities that make them 
smart, creates new data. The addition of mobile devices and their 
operating systems creates even more data and the means to natively 
communicate it. The data provided by smart appliances may never be 
communicated with a regulated electric utility. But if it is, a regula­
tory agency may have provided guidance about utility practices for 
personal information and energy usage data. Consumers do need to
pay close attention to privacy policies for the new devices installed 
in homes that have communications capabilities. Understanding the 
chain of data custody is critical to recognizing who has access to your










ELECTRIC  VEHICLES, 
CHARGING  STATIONS, 
AND  PRIVACY 
On May 22, 2012, the U.S. White House issued* an Apps for Energy† 
data challenge, with one of the challenges focused on Apps for Vehicles
in 2013.‡ Under the auspices of the Department of Energy, the chal­
lenge’s objectives were to encourage development of applications that
improve safety and fuel efficiency of vehicles using vehicle-generated 
open data. Data such as engine speed, distance, brake position, and 
headlights status are some examples of vehicle-generated data. In the 
past, this data was typically only available to auto technicians with
specific diagnostic equipment.
Making this “open” data to vehicle owners means that they will be
able to use this data and share it with authorized third parties or data 
managers. This data is called vehicle telematics.§ In some facets, this
initiative to democratize data is similar to the Green Button initiative. 
It’s another situation where existing data is now more readily avail­
able and accessible for its data owners, or it is new data being created 
because of improved sensor and communications technologies that can 
be leveraged to provide value to consumers and other organizations. 
Consumers can benefit from applications of this data into information
that helps them drive safely or more cost effectively. Our discussion
will focus on the implications of privacy at the intersection with the 
Smart Grid, which typically means public or private charging—with 
or without electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE). 
* See http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/05/22/unlocking-power-energy-data. 
† See http://appsforenergy.challengepost.com/. 
‡ See http://appsforvehicles.challenge.gov. 
§ The privacy implications of vehicle telematics apply to traditional internal combus­
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There are three levels of charging associated with the delivery speed
that can be deployed for EVs. Level 1 is the standard two-prong plug 
to handle 120 V. It takes the longest to fully charge an EV. Level 2 
is the standard three-prong plug used for dryers and microwaves to
handle 240 V. It is sometimes called AC fast charging, and is faster 
than a level 1 charge. Level 3 uses direct current (DC) for charging 
instead of alternating current (AC). DC charging delivers the fastest 
charging option of the three levels. However, AC is the wiring found
in the vast majority of U.S. buildings today, although this may change 
over time. 
If you charge directly from a standard two-prong wall outlet, an
EV looks just like another appliance or device on the electrical grid. 
Energy usage data is treated exactly like any other device on the other 
side of a smart or traditional meter. 
However, there are a number of reasons where EV owners will
prefer to use specialized EVSE products for charging purposes. The 
majority of those reasons come down to the convenience of having an
infrastructure of charging stations as EVs roam streets and highways. 
But there are trade-offs with privacy that we’ll explore in this chapter.
At the time of this writing, the EV charging infrastructure was
immature in comparison to the traditional internal combustion
engine fueling infrastructure, which has had a century to work out the 
details. There are some parallels, and these serve to highlight similari­
ties and differences. One similarity is the point of sale (POS) transac­
tion. Gas tank and pump configurations can be privately owned, and 
are particularly common in rural areas and on farms. You won’t have 
a POS transaction involving a credit or debit card with these stations 
since the owner buys gasoline in bulk and is billed on a periodic basis. 
Privately owned charging equipment that is associated with a meter 
is similar in operation. The meter functions as the POS device, long 
accustomed to a role as a utility cash register.
POS transactions at your corner gas station have more in com­
mon with public charging infrastructure options. There’s a transaction
that involves a credit or debit card—or a radio frequency identifica­
tion (RFID)-enabled card that is read by the charging station and
enables “authorization” to use the charging station. But while a corner 
gas station is generally owned by an oil company or a franchisee to
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options. These ownership options have impacts on the treatment of
energy usage data as well as other data. 
Publicly Owned Charging 
Policies for EVs, and charging stations in particular, vary between 
states. Some states like California prohibit utilities from owning
charging stations. In Texas, utilities can be more directly involved in
setting up charging stations and networks. Some states don’t allow an
entity other than a utility to sell power. Therefore, if a charging sta­
tion includes a financial transaction to pay for that EV charge, then 
the entity must be classified as a utility. It’s a confusing patchwork of
rules, and therefore consideration of privacy impacts has to be done on
a state-by-state basis. As a more distributed energy resource (DER) 
is deployed across states and as transactive energy concepts translate
into reality, we expect to see these rules change to remove obstacles to
greater prosumer participation.
However, the current situation complicates the picture for privacy.
In one state, a shopping center owner may install a charging station or
two for customer use on a lease arrangement from a charging station
network provider. The shopping center owner pays for the electricity 
to encourage shoppers to extend their time at the mall while recharg­
ing their EV or plug-in hybrid EV (PHEV). It also helps the shop­
ping center avoid any issues with being confused with a utility.
In another state, a parking garage installs a number of charging 
stations and charges customers for the parking space to recharge 
their EVs and PHEVs. The electricity is free, but the EV driver uses 
a mobile app supplied by the parking garage to reserve an EV space 
via credit card. 
Figuring out where the energy usage data goes in these two cases is 
fairly easy—it follows the meter that is associated with that charging 
station. Financial data follows the banking network that manages any 
POS transaction. But EV fueling creates new data, such as charging 
station locations and time spent obtaining the charge, as part of a 
consumer’s charging history.
Another quick comparison and contrasting to traditional gas sta­
tions is instructive. Most people pay for gas by debit or credit card. 
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gas. In some parts of the United States, you have to enter your zip code 
as a means to validate that you are the legitimate owner of the card
used for payment. All this data is transmitted via secure networks. 
An EV charging station can perform very similar functions via very
similar technologies and processes, but it may also identify the total 
time plugged in to the charging station, carbon credits or greenhouse
gas savings, and alert you when your EV is completely recharged.
The data created and collected about driving and charging patterns
of EVs is of tremendous value to governments and utilities. There are a
number of good reasons for this interest. First, federal, state, and local
governments can use this data as a gauge of consumer interest in EVs,
their driving patterns, and the most popular charging locations. Such
data helps them understand the impacts of policies and tax implications
as more EVs share roads, but not the gas tax,* of fossil fuel-powered
vehicles. Second, EV charging is equivalent to adding a new home’s
electricity burden on a local grid, so utilities are keenly interested in
learning where EVs are plugging in to their grids. These charging loca­
tions may need prioritization for upgrades to support the increased
electricity demand. In many of these cases, the interest is in aggregated
data, not data that can be used to identify specific individuals. However,
personal data is automatically involved in billing transactions.
ChargePoint®† is an example of a new public charging infrastruc­
ture business based on new technologies and delivering new busi­
ness to business (B2B) and business to consumer (B2C) services. 
ChargePoint consists of software and networks to support public 
EVSE. It is targeted to: 
• 	 Companies that have EV fleets 
• 	  Companies that want to offer EV charging as a benefit for
employees or customers 
• 	 Companies that want to become the service stations of the future 
• 	 Utilities that are authorized to offer charging stations 
• 	EV drivers who want organized information about public 
charging stations, and charging reports about their use of
ChargePoint-supported EVSE 
* The federal gasoline tax funds highway projects. 
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ChargePoint software gathers data from EV drivers at their charg­
ing stations about how their cars are used (number and distance of
trips), number of charging events, number of kilowatt-hours used, and
how this translates to greenhouse gas savings. The data has value to
a number of stakeholders, as illustrated in the ChargePoint America 
example.
In June 2013 the company announced that it had successfully com­
pleted the ChargePoint America project,* a federal- and state-funded 
project to deploy 4,600 charging stations at single-family homes, 
multifamily housing, and commercial and public locations to support 
more than 2,000 EVs registered to participate. The purpose of the 
program, which ended in December 2013, was to gather data that was 
publicly available to researchers, municipal planners, and policy mak­
ers to help them learn more about EV charging patterns and avoided 
CO2 emissions. EV drivers voluntarily participated in this program, 
and researchers reviewed the data results to create their summary of
the project.
Whether part of the ChargePoint America program or not,
the typical process that ChargePoint established is that EV driv­
ers register with ChargePoint, which collects personal data (name,
address, email address) as well as financial data (credit card† or other 
payment information) to accommodate those charging stations
that bill for EV charges as well as pay for the ChargePoint cards.
Because there are mobile apps that can provide many of the same
capabilities available by the web, there’s the possibility for collection
of smart phone numbers and addresses for text and email alerts, or
for collection of IP addresses for laptops and other types of mobile
computers using the app. ChargePoint also interfaces with a couple
of navigation solutions, so location-based data could also potentially 
be collected. 
* 	 See a summary of the project at http://www.plugandgonow.com/wp-content/
uploads/2010/07/ChargePoint-America-Summary.pdf. 
† 	Credit card data protection is governed by standards known as Payment Card 
Industry Data Security Standards (PCI-DSS) (https://www.pcisecuritystandards.
org/). These standards establish the secure communications requirements of sensi­
tive data, encryption of this data, and physical and cyber storage of sensitive data. 
Any organization accepting credit card payments must comply with, and be certified
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Now, let’s reexamine the types of data that are collected by the type
of ChargePoint user with an eye toward personal data. 
• 	Companies that have EV fleets: Who is charging, time
and duration of charge, location of charge. Greenhouse gas 
(GHG) credits and avoided gallons of gas by vehicle. 
• 	  Companies that want to offer EV charging as a benefit for
employees or customers: Who is charging, time and duration of
charge, location of charge. Behaviors based on different pricing
structures—free versus fee based. Payment information for fee-
based EVSE. GHG credits and avoided gallons of gas by vehicle. 
• 	Companies that want to become the service stations of the 
future: Who is charging, time and duration of charge, location
of charge. Payment information. Behaviors based on different 
pricing structures or offers tailored to different customer cat­
egories. GHG credits and avoided gallons of gas by vehicle. 
•	 Utilities that are authorized to offer charging stations: Who
is charging, time and duration of charge, location of charge. 
Behaviors based on different pricing structures or offers tai­
lored to different tariffs or time of day. GHG credits and 
avoided gallons of gas by vehicle. 
• 	 EV drivers who want organized information about public charg­
ing stations, and charging reports about their use of ChargePoint­
supported EVSE: Name, address, type of EV, credit card or
other payment information, charging history (location, date,
time), phone number, email address. Other data includes gallons
of avoided gas and reductions in GHG emissions. 
One important point: Retailers offer free charging to attract cus­
tomers and have them linger for a couple of hours. ChargePoint and 
other similar businesses are set up for retailers to recognize who is 
reserving or connecting a charge at their EVSE. The retailer (or other 
retailers) can potentially send offers for discounts on products or ser­
vices to the EV owners at those charging stations, to a mobile device, 
or possibly to the EV itself (e.g., the EV dashboard).
At the time this book was written, ChargePoint claims to have 65% 
of the commercial EVSE market. Other EVSE companies include 
CarCharging Group (which acquired Ecotality from bankruptcy) 
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how charging station markets are segmented—private versus public 
charging with subsegments of each (single family, multiunit residen­
tial, fleet, employer, etc.). When there’s the possibility of a credit card
payment, the implementation of the controls required by the Payment 
Card Industry Data Security Standards (PCI-DSS) helps to secure 
communications and handling of card and owner data. But the pri­
vacy policies for other EV driver data are very immature.
This gets to one of the most important points about EVs, the Smart 
Grid, and privacy. Charging stations blur existing privacy policy lines 
and the roles of data owner, data custodian, and data manager. Many
EV drivers may assume that all charging stations adhere to the pri­
vacy policy in place for energy usage data enacted by their local utility. 
That may be true in some states, but the registered customer of the 
meter that is behind the charging station is usually considered to be 
the owner of the energy usage data produced by that meter. Charging 
stations that support point of sale (POS) transactions are governed by 
the privacy policy of the bank for financial data, and applicable indus­
try regulations. Charging stations that support any form of electronic
authorization without payment are generally governed by the posted 
privacy policy of the EVSE owner or sales vendor.
Prior to its bankruptcy and acquisition by CarCharging Group,
Collaboratev, established by Ecotality and ChargePoint, was a new
business entity to encourage interoperability between different EVSE
networks for billing and station management. Think of it as a roam­
ing agreement. Today, you can make mobile phone calls at your home 
location, and on the other side of the country. You get one bill, because
there’s a significant amount of work that’s been done to negotiate agree­
ments between different wireless carriers. Collaboratev aimed to let EV
drivers plug in to any charging station, just as we can use almost any
bank’s ATM across the country. That’s a great convenience, although
there might be extra fees associated with charging at an EVSE that is
outside of your network. While this arrangement was in limbo at the
time of this writing, agreements like this will be inevitable to encourage
the maximum convenience of charging locations for EV owners.
What are the protections for any personal data? The now defunct 
Collaboratev website offered this statement: “Driver information secu­
rity is of utmost importance to us. Collaboratev will not have access to
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and network affiliation. The inclusion in the Collaboratev network
will in no way compromise the personal or confidential information
of any EV driver.” That sounds promising, but there was an additional
statement in its explanation of solution features: “Collect aggregated
charge spot data and make it available to all industry stakeholders.”
EVSE owners are also promised the benefit of “improve profitability 
through monetization of charge spot data.”
In our near future, if a major department store retailer offers free 
charging, the nearby national coffee chains may strike up deals to
push offers for discounted beverages—advertising at the EVSE or
pushing a text message to your smart phone. Just like Google collects
web search data in exchange for providing its search services for free 
(along with a very nice business of selling advertising based on that
search data), free charging in the future may come at the cost of col­
lection of some personal data. From our perspective, there is no free
lunch, and no free EV charging. 
Private Charging 
Experts note a trend about charging locations—most people charge 
their cars at home, plugging in to a wall outlet or EVSE installed in
their garage or carport. As noted above, if you charge without using an
EVSE, an EV or PHEV is just another electricity-consuming device
on the electrical grid. The meter collects usage data (how much is con­
sumed) and the utility reflects that information in billing statements.
Of the three types of charging that can be deployed in residen­
tial settings, the majority are configured for level 1 or level 2 charg­
ing using AC. An EV owner could theoretically plug his or her EV
into an existing wall socket in the garage.* No EVSE installation is
required. Utilities may view EVs as an appliance or device that gets 
special treatment in terms of pricing, which is determined by state-
based regulatory decisions.† Because of the load a full charge can  
* 	 The amount of electricity drawn for a full EV charge is equivalent to an entire home, 
so an electrician should determine if existing electrical equipment (panels and wir­
ing) can handle the additional electricity load. 
† 	The authors make no recommendations about the pros and cons of regulations sur­
rounding EV meter arrangements or charging station ownership, but point out that 
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require from the grid, utilities may also give EVs special treatment in
terms of their short- and long-term distribution grid upgrade plans.
If there are no EV tariffs that encourage charging at off-peak hours 
through cheap electricity rates, then the EV is simply one additional
power-consuming device. Plug in that EV to any available socket and 
charge. Utility bills will reflect the increased use of electricity. If a 
utility offers special EV tariffs, then there are two options. Option
1 is to install a separate meter and generate a second bill directed to
the person identified with that meter. This option offers the flexibility
for an EV owner and utility to agree to use a special electricity rate or
tariff for the EV (typically with some restrictions on when charging 
can occur, which conforms to off-peak demand hours) and a separate 
tariff for all other home use. Option 2 is to install a submeter and 
generate one bill that has a line item for EV charging versus the rest 
of the household electricity use. This option is similar to option 1 from
a billing flexibility perspective for both the utility and the EV owner.
In these scenarios, an EV owner is a utility customer with one or
two meters, which would be addressed with the utility’s typical bill­
ing processes. Data about EV charging activity that occurs at home
is governed by the utility’s existing privacy policies and practices, and 
any associated laws or regulations, for any appliance or device.
When a charging station is added into the equation, then the 
privacy questions harken back to the discussion on public charging. 
Understanding who owns the EVSE is important. Ownership of 
EVSE can become complicated. Depending on the state, investor-
owned utilities (IOUs), municipal utilities, and rural cooperatives
may own EVSE and have it installed at your home location for you. 
Homeowners may own EVSE. Owners of apartment buildings may 
purchase EVSE for tenant use. If the EVSE are registered with a net­
work like Ecotality or ChargePoint or another service provider, then 
there is the potential for personal data about the users of the EVSE to
be available to EVSE owners. 
There’s one other consideration regarding EVSE for private use. That
concerns the equipment itself. Is it smart—meaning is it communica­
tions enabled? If it is, then there’s a need to understand what data is
transmitted, and who gets that data. The scenario could be as basic
as a traditional direct load control device, similar to the equipment
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unit or pool pump. It simply receives a signal from a utility to suspend
operations until a later point in time in response to peak demand condi­
tions. This would be most likely used when there is a single meter for all
devices—EVSE plus all the typical electrical loads within a dwelling.
If the EVSE is on its own meter or a submeter, it could be enabled 
to respond to price signals sent by the utility to the meter, which then 
uses ZigBee, HomePlug, or another communications mode to the 
EVSE. This scenario would most likely play out in dynamic pricing.
As previously explored in Chapter 4, personally identifiable informa­
tion is not transmitted by the smart meters in use at the time of this
writing. Therefore, EVSE that is connected to smart meters is sending
consumption information at established intervals of consumption reads
(e.g., once per hour, once every 15 minutes, etc.) and might be receiving
pricing information, if the local utility supports that arrangement. 
Utility-Supplied Network Charging 
Austin Energy serves as an example of a utility that offers an EV
charging program within its territory. The utility has offers for rebates 
for its customers to purchase and install level 2 EVSE. It also offers 
a subscription-based program for unlimited charging at a network of
EVSE within the boundaries of the city of Austin. The utility con­
tracts with ChargePoint America to run this charging network. The 
state of Texas makes it clear that the customer is the owner for smart 
meter data. Is that equally true of EV data that is generated in EV
programs like the one offered by Austin Energy? It’s difficult to dis­
cern from the utility’s website. The lines of demarcation between data 
owner, custodian, and manager are not well defined.
Table 6.1 shows the status, as of 2014, of state decisions regarding 
EV charging and state regulation. It answers a basic question: Do 
states exempt electric charging from existing regulation? 
Other Privacy Implications with EVs 
Our discussion has focused on EV electricity usage for billing purposes
and charging station data collection. There are other types of data that
may become more important to a variety of stakeholders over time, for
instance, the federal excise tax on gasoline funds road projects across
ELECTRIC VEHICLES AND PRIVACY 107 
Table 6.1 State Utilities Laws and Electric Vehicle Charging Stations 




























New Hampshire No 
New Jersey No 
New Mexico No 
New York No Open for public comment. 
North Carolina No 





Rhode Island No 
South Carolina No 
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Table 6.1 State Utilities Laws and Electric Vehicle Charging Stations (continued) 







West Virginia No 
Wisconsin No 
Wyoming No 
District of Columbia Yes 
Source:	 Kendrick Vonderschmitt, Council of State Governments, October 9, 2013, http://knowledge 
center.csg.org/kc/content/state-utilities-law-and-electric-vehicle-charging-stations. 
the nation. EVs don’t pay this tax, but still enjoy use of the roads.
Governments may wish to learn about total EV miles driven and loca­
tion of those miles to figure out new road infrastructure funding mech­
anisms that fairly allocate costs across all road users.
States that have low carbon fuel standards (LCFSs) or clean fuel 
standards (CFSs) would benefit from data on the miles that EVs drive 
to calculate miles avoided in CO2-spewing vehicles or supply data
for other petroleum displacement programs. For instance, LCFSs are 
a key component of California Assembly Bill 32 (AB32), the state’s 
signature clean energy and climate law. This type of data could create
credits that accrue to individual EV owners, fleet owners, or other 
agencies. These two examples elegantly illustrate the monetization of
data. Accurate collection of data can lead to money in the form of tax 
revenues, air quality credits for cap and trade purposes, or other pro­
grams that reward desired behaviors. Although there’s been specula­
tion that this information should be gathered from meters, it seems an
easier collection mechanism is vehicle telematics. Cars already have 
odometers, and EVs and gas-powered cars, like smart phones, can 
have location-based sensing. 
Telematics 
Vehicle telematics certainly apply to all cars, not just EVs, but because 
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driving habits and charging times as basic market research into what
consumers want and do. For instance, MyFord Mobile* is a smart 
phone app that connects drivers with their EVs. App users can check 
the status of charging activities, and find charging stations. A wire­
less service subscription is included with each Ford EV. Ford is now
converging telematics with the connected home realm—it is in a part­
nership with Whirlpool, SunPower, Nest Labs, and Eaton. The ini­
tiative is called MyEnergiLifestyle and combines data from renewable
energy generation with EV charging data and appliance use data to
inform residential prosumers about intelligent energy management.† 
General Motors has cracked open its OnStar communications 
platform to apps that link Volt charging to home energy management
systems (HEMSs) and utilities. Its OnStar RemoteLink‡ mobile app 
lets users of traditional gas guzzlers or EVs lock or unlock their car
doors from any distance or remotely start their vehicles, among other 
capabilities. It also collects mobile and vehicle location data when it
is active. Volt owners also have the ability to connect to social media 
applications like Facebook or Twitter to let them share information
about their driving history, energy efficiency, and charging details 
(which creates other types of privacy risks). GM hosts a website for 
Volt owners called MyVolt.com to “access an unprecedented level
of real-time data along with remote vehicle commands and critical
vehicle diagnostics.”§ Much of this data has nothing to do with the
Smart Grid, but we highlight it here to emphasize that much of this 
data is new or newly available, and may have associated privacy risks. 
It no longer exists in containerized settings like car service diagnos­
tics equipment. Event data recorders (EDRs) can now transmit data 
to a manufacturer, which is what enables OnStar’s collision detection
service to automatically inform about accidents to expedite emer­
gency responses. 
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Privacy policies are an interesting facet of vehicle telematics. For 
instance, the GM privacy policy governs its websites, but not OnStar, 
and not mobile apps. Mobile apps—both GM and third party—are 
governed by separate privacy policies, and GM is explicit in its guid­
ance*: “GM is not responsible for the collection or use of information
by 3rd Party Applications. We recommend that you carefully review
the privacy statement of each 3rd Party Application prior to down­
loading or using them.” We couldn’t agree more. 
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Basic Risk Mitigation Strategies 
Once privacy risks have been identified, organizations must deter­
mine the best way to mitigate them. Before jumping right into miti­
gation, it is important to first understand the four basic categories of
risk mitigation. 
• 	 Risk avoidance: Risk avoidance consists of the actions taken 
to avoid as much exposure to the risk as possible. Risk avoid­
ance is usually the most expensive of all risk mitigation options 
because organizations can never eliminate 100%, even though 
some will go to great lengths trying to do so. Many organiza­
tions have outsourced processing, collection, or other types of 
access to personal information and energy usage and consump­
tion data thinking that will eliminate (thus avoiding) their risks. 
However, as explained in Chapter 2, the organization that col­
lected personal information and energy usage and consumption 
data will continue to have some obligations and liability for it, 
even if the data is sent to another contracted entity. 
• 	 Risk limitation: Risk limitation is the most common risk   
management strategy used by businesses. Risk mitigation lim­
its an organization’s exposure by taking actions to help protect 
against the risk, and reduce the possibility of the risk being 
exploited to a level deemed acceptable by the appropriate busi­
ness leaders. An example of limiting the risk of data loss for 
energy consumption data would be making regular backups of 
the data. The more frequently the backups are created, the less 
data that is possible to be lost by a hardware failure. An exam­
ple of mitigating a privacy breach involving customer energy 
usage data that is stored on a smart meter would be to encrypt 















112 DATA PRIVACY FOR THE SMART GRID 
• 	 Risk transference: Risk transference involves transferring
the risks to a third party. For example, it is becoming com­
mon for organizations to purchase cyber security insurance to
transfer the cost of information security incidents and privacy
breaches to an insurance company. While this will address
the monetary losses involved with any exploitation of the
associated data risk, the organization must still have appro­
priate safeguards, controls, and privacy protections in place 
for legitimate insurers to pay for any incidents that occur. 
• 	 Risk acceptance: Risk acceptance is the opposite of risk avoid­
ance. Risk acceptance does not reduce risks, but it is still con­
sidered a valid strategy. Risk acceptance is actually a common
choice whenever the cost of other risk mitigation strategies,
such as avoidance or limitation, outweighs the estimated cost
of the risk impact itself. If a risk does not have a high possibility
of happening, many organizations will simply accept the risk. 
Smart Grid Privacy Risks 
In general, privacy risks within the Smart Grid fall into one of two 
broad categories: 
•	 Type I: Personal information and energy data not previously
readily obtainable. 
• 	 Type II: Methods and technologies for obtaining (or manip­
ulating) personal information and energy data that did not
previously exist. 
Energy Usage Data Privacy Risks* 
Throughout this book many different types of privacy risks within the 
Smart Grid have been described at a high level. Appendix A provides
a table documenting the different categories of data that will be found 
* 	 This section is an updated version of the corresponding section of NISTIR 7628
Rev. 1: Guidelines for Smart Grid Cybersecurity: Volume 2–Privacy and the Smart 
Grid; September 2014; http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2014/NIST.IR.7628r1.
pdf; that was originally created in 2010 by the NIST Smart Grid CSWG Privacy 
Group that Rebecca Herold has led since mid-2009, and in which Christine Hertzog 
managed the use cases reviews for 3 years. 
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within the Smart Grid, and that can be obtained from smart devices, 
along with the likelihood that the specific types of data found within 
each category will have privacy implications. Also shown are the vari­
ous types of audiences and groups that may have an interest, legitimate 
or not, to get access to each type of data. Table 7.1 provides a summary 
of the primary privacy risks considered at the time of this writing.
A detailed sense of activities within a house or building can be 
derived from equipment electricity signatures, individual appliance 
usage data, time patterns of usage, and other data. Especially when 
collected and analyzed over a period of time, this information can 
provide a basis for potentially determining occupant activities and 
lifestyle. For example, a forecast may be made about: 
• 	 The number of individuals at a premise 
• 	 When the location is unoccupied
• Sleep schedules
•	 Work schedules 
• 	Other personal routines that involve usage of the building’s 
electricity grid* 
While technology that communicates directly with appliances 
and other energy consumption elements and devices already exists, 
increased energy usage data may create broader incentives for its use 
and provide easier access by interested parties.† Appliances so equipped 
may deliver granular energy consumption data to their data owners, 
data custodians, and data managers, as well as to outside parties. The 
increased collection of and access to granular energy usage data will 
create new uses for this data. Some examples include: 
• 	 Residential demand response (DR) systems
• Marketing
• 	 Insurance actuarial tables 
• Law enforcement 
* 	 It is important to emphasize that the activities that can be determined, or that are inferred, 
must be attached to the electric grid. There have been some outrageous claims regarding 
activities, such as using a traditional battery-powered electric toothbrush, flashlights, or 
vibrators can be determined by smart meters; this is simply not true and not possible. 
Smart meters and customer-owned home energy management systems and apps cannot 
determine the usage of objects that are not even drawing electricity from the grid. 
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Many of these new uses will be innovative and provide individual and 
consumer benefits, some will impact privacy, and many will do both.
Such data might be used in ways that raise privacy concerns. Some 
examples include: 
• 	 Granular energy usage data may allow numerous assumptions 
about the health of a dwelling’s resident in which some insur­
ance companies, employers, newspapers (when regarding 
public figures), civil litigants, and others could be interested. 
• 	 Most directly, specific medical devices may be uniquely iden­
tified through serial numbers or MAC addresses,* or may 
have unique electrical signatures; either could indicate that 
the resident suffers from a particular disease or condition that 
requires the device.† 
• 	 More generally, inferences might be used to determine behav­
ioral and health patterns and risk. For example, the amount 
of time the computer or television is on could be compared to 
the amount of time the treadmill is used.‡ 
• 	 Electricity use could also reveal how much the resident sleeps 
and whether he gets up in the middle of the night.§ 
* 	 A media access control address (MAC address) is a unique identifier assigned to 
network interfaces to allow for communications on the physical network segment. 
MAC addresses are used as network addresses for most IEEE 802 network tech­
nologies. MAC addresses are typically established by the manufacturer of a network 
interface controller (NIC) and are programmed within its hardware, such as the 
card’s read-only memory or some other firmware mechanism. 
† 	Susan Lyon and John Roche, Smart Grid News, Smart Grid Privacy Tips Part 2: 
Anticipate the Unanticipated, February 9, 2010, http://www.SmartGridnews.com/
artman/publish/Business_Policy_Regulation_News/Smart-Grid-Privacy-Tips­
Part-2-Anticipate-the-Unanticipated-1873.html. 
‡ 	Elias Quinn mentions an Alabama tax provision that requires obese state employees 
to pay for health insurance unless they work to reduce their body mass index. Elias 
Quinn, Privacy and the New Energy Infrastructure (draft), February 2009, p. 31, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1370731. He suggests that Smart 
Grid data could be used to see how often a treadmill was being used in the home. 
§ 	Ann Cavoukian, Jules Polonetsky, and Christopher Wolf, Privacy by Design, 
SmartPrivacy for the Smart Grid: Embedding Privacy into the Design of Electricity 
Conservation, November 2009, http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/pbd-smart­
priv-Smart Grid.pdf (describing the types of information that could be gleaned from 
combining personal information with granular energy consumption data). 
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• 	 Similarly, appliance usage data could indicate how often meals 
are cooked with the microwave, the stove, or not cooked at
all, as well as implying the frequency of meals.* 
Energy Production Data Privacy Risks 
More consumers are becoming energy prosumers and pumping 
electricity into the Smart Grid that is generated from their distrib­
uted energy resources (DERs). This book’s authors live in states that 
are leaders in prosumer energy generations. Rebecca lives in Iowa, 
which is number 1 in the nation in wind energy production.† Rebecca 
is acquainted with many who have wind generators on their land. 
Iowa landowners with wind turbines on their land receive more than 
$16 million annually in lease payments.‡ Christine lives in California, 
which just passed SB871, which provides substantial incentives to 
photovoltaic (PV) solar system owners, such as full residential tariff 
credit for their excess daytime power and a 30% investment tax credit 
for buying a capital asset that generates long-term tax-free income in 
the form of avoided utility bills.§ California leads the United States in 
cumulative solar energy production and capacity.¶ There are privacy 
risks that are also related to prosumer energy production data. Some 
of the data that is involved in these risks includes: 
• 	 Name and address of the prosumer 
• 	 Amount of energy produced 
• 	 Amount of energy used by the prosumer on-site 
• 	 Payments made for the energy sold back to the utility 
• 	 Log of electricity generation history 
* Ibid., p. 11. 
† 	During 2012, Iowa produced a national record of almost 25% of all the electricity 
generated in the state from wind turbines. Iowa is back to first in the nation in terms 
of the percentage of total generation from wind energy. Iowa was also the first state 
in the nation to exceed 20% of total generation coming from wind energy. Iowa’s 
installed wind generators can produce enough power to provide electricity to over 
1,500,000 average-sized homes. http://www.iowawindenergy.org/whywind.php 
(accessed June 20, 2014). 
‡ http://www.iowawindenergy.org/whywind.php (accessed June 20, 2014). 
§ Published June 27, 2014, http://www.breitbart.com/Breitbart-California/2014/06/
27/Solar-Power-is-not-Green-it-s-Filthy. 
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Not only are utilities interested in this data (and they have a pri­
mary purpose by logic of maintaining grid stability as well as financial
settlements), but also many other entities would likely want to know
this information—all creating privacy concerns. Some of these enti­
ties include: 
• Neighbors of the prosumers
• Insurance companies
• Government agencies
• Law enforcement 
• Smart Grid component vendors
• Marketing agencies




The most effective way to identify specific privacy risks, such as those 
described in Table 7.1, is by doing a privacy impact assessment (PIA).* 
A PIA† is a structured and repeatable type of analysis of how informa­
tion relating to or about individuals, or groups of individuals, is han­
dled. A report similar to an audit report is generated to describe the 
types of privacy risks discovered based upon each privacy category, 
to document the findings, and then to provide recommendations for 
mitigating the privacy risk findings. Common goals of a PIA include: 
1. Determining if the information handling and use within the
identified scope complies with legal, regulatory, and policy
requirements regarding privacy
2. Determining the risks and effects of collecting, maintaining, 
and disseminating information in identifiable, or clear text,
form in an electronic information system or groups of systems 
* 	 For more information about PIAs, along with PIA tools, see http://www.privacy­
professor.org. 
† 	This section is updated text originally from Rebecca Herold, The Privacy Management 
Toolkit, Houston: Information Shield, January 2006. 
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3. Examining and evaluating the protections and alternative 
processes for handling information to mitigate the identified
potential privacy risks 
There are many times when a PIA can be beneficial and should be 
conducted by utilities, vendors of products or services, energy services 
providers (ESPs), and any other entities that may handle energy usage 
data. Here are some of the most important times to conduct a PIA: 
1. Conduct an initial PIA before making the decision to deploy
a Smart Grid service, tool, or participate in the Smart Grid.
2. Conduct a PIA following significant organizational, systems,
applications, or legal changes.
3. Conduct a PIA following privacy breaches and information
security incidents involving personal information.
4. Conduct a PIA as an alternative, or in addition, to an inde­
pendent audit.
5. Conduct a PIA on the designs of any new Smart Grid prod­
uct or service. 
6. Conduct a PIA when mergers or acquisitions occur.
7. Conduct a PIA on divestiture plans prior to initiating the 
divestiture. 
Privacy Risk Mitigation Methods 
Once an organization identifies privacy risks, appropriate risk mitiga­
tion actions need to be determined. Here are some of the most effec­
tive methods to mitigate privacy risks within the Smart Grid. 
 1. Adopt existing and recognized privacy principles and frame­
works to guide your organization’s decisions involving per­
sonal information or energy data of all kinds.
  When creating or updating a privacy management pro­
gram, organizations should start with existing, comprehen­
sive, well-vetted, and widely accepted privacy standards or 
principles. The following are some of the most commonly 
used privacy standards and policies:
 a.	  OECD Privacy Framework. On September 23, 1980, 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
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Development (OECD), whose membership consists of 34 
countries, reached a consensus on issues related to the pro­
tection of privacy to promote the free flow of information 
across country borders and to prevent legal issues related 
to the protection of privacy from creating obstacles to the 
development of their economic and social relations. These 
are reflected in the eight OECD Privacy Guidelines, 
which were most recently updated at the time this book 
was written in 2013.*
 b.	  American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA)/Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants 
(CICA) Generally Accepted Privacy Principles 
(GAPPs). Most commonly known as the AICPA/CICA 
GAPPs, these privacy tools include a universal frame­
work for CPAs to conduct risk assessments and provide 
criteria to protect the privacy of personal information. The 
AICPA/CICA GAPPs’ Security for Privacy Principles 
have been mapped to ISO/IEC 27002.†
 c. 	APEC Privacy Framework. Published in 2005, this 
framework establishes and promotes an approach to pro­
tecting privacy when sharing information throughout 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) member 
countries, with a goal of removing barriers to the free flow 
of information.‡
 d. 	European Union (EU) Privacy Framework. The 
European Commission has proposed reforms to existing 
1995 data protection rules that include a single set of rules 
on data protection that include a policy communication, 
a regulation setting out a general EU framework for data 
protection, and a directive to protect personal data pro­
cessed for judicial activities.§ 
* 	 See full OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data, http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/privacy.htm. 
† 	See more at http://www.aicpa.org/INTERESTAREAS/INFORMATIONTECH
NOLOGY/RESOURCES/PRIVACY/Pages/default.aspx. 
‡ See more at http://www.apec.org/Groups/Committee-on-Trade-and-Investment/~/
media/Files/Groups/ECSG/05_ecsg_privacyframewk.ashx. 
§ See http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/index_en.htm. 
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 e. 	Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs). The 
FIPPs are a set of principles based upon the tenets of the 
U.S. Privacy Act of 1974. Several slightly different ver­
sions are used by various U.S. federal agencies, including 
the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Trade 
Commission, and the Department of Commerce. For the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the FIPPs are 
transparency, individual participation, purpose specifica­
tion, data minimization, use limitation, data quality and 
integrity, security, and accountability and auditing. For 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), they are notice/
awareness, choice/consent, access/participation, integrity/
security, and enforcement/redress.
f.	  ISO/IEC 15944-8 Information Technology. Business 
Operational View. Identification of privacy protection 
requirements as external constraints on business transac­
tions. Modeling business transactions using scenarios and 
scenario components is done by specifying the applicable 
constraints on the data content using explicitly stated 
rules. External constraints apply to most business transac­
tions. This part of ISO/IEC 15944 describes the business 
semantic descriptive techniques needed to support privacy 
protection requirements when modeling business trans­
actions using the external constraints of jurisdictional 
domains. It was published in April 2012.
 g.	  ISO/IEC 27002: Information Technology—Security 
Techniques—Code of Practice for Information 
Security Management. Section 15. The International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) jointly 
issued this international standard, last updated and pub­
lished in December 2005. It is part of a growing family 
of ISO/IEC information security management systems 
(ISMSs) standards. It is the security compliance standard. 
ISO/IEC 27002 provides a security framework. Section 
15 covers compliance, including legal requirements; secu­
rity policies and standards and technical compliance; and 
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information systems audit considerations. It is part of a 
growing family of ISO/IEC ISMSs standards.
h. 	ISO/IEC 29100: Information Technology—Security 
Techniques—Privacy Framework. This international 
standard published in December 2011 provides a privacy 
framework that specifies a common privacy terminology; 
defines the actors and their roles in processing personal 
information; describes privacy safeguarding consider­
ations; and provides references to known privacy princi­
ples for information technology.
i. 	Privacy by Design (PbD). This is a privacy framework 
by Ann Cavoukian, PhD, information and privacy com­
missioner of Ontario. PbD promotes the proactive incor­
poration of privacy as the default and data protections 
embedded throughout the entire life cycle of systems and 
technologies. The seven foundational principles of PbD 
were published in August 2009.* 
 2. Identify	 and use privacy standards and guidelines from  
authoritative organizations to support privacy efforts.
  Many different organizations have created privacy stan­
dards and guidelines to support the privacy principles and 
frameworks. The following is a good representation of some 
of the groups that have established a wide variety of privacy-
related standards and guidelines on various topics that entities 
in the Smart Grid can use to help mitigate their privacy risks. 
 a.	  In 2011, the North American Energy Standards Board 
(NAESB) created a Data Privacy Task Force to develop 
model business practices for third-party access to consumer 
Smart Grid data. The task force’s goal was to develop model 
business practices based on existing reports and laws.† At 
the time of this writing, NAESB had published the follow­
ing nonbinding privacy standards for the energy industry:
 i. 	 NAESB REQ.22, Third Party Access to Smart Meter‐
Based Information. Per NAESB, the “document 
* See more at http://privacybydesign.ca/. 
† 	See information about the NAESB Data Privacy Task Force activities at http://
www.naesb.org/news.asp. 
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establishes voluntary Model Business Practices for Third 
Party access to Smart Meter-based information. These 
business practices are intended only to serve as flexible 
guidelines rather than requirements, with the onus on 
regulatory authorities or similar bodies to establish the 
actual requirements.”* NAESB based the privacy recom­
mendations within this standard largely upon the rec­
ommendations provided within NISTIR 7628 Rev.  1.†  
After completing the draft of REQ.22, the NIST Smart 
Grid CSWG Privacy Group also provided recommen­
dations for how it could add privacy protection improve­
ments to the standard.‡ NAESB subsequently made 
updates to the original version of the standard.§ 
 ii.	  NAESB REQ.21, Energy Services Provider Interface.¶  
Per NAESB, the “purpose of the NAESB Energy 
Services Provider Interface (ESPI) standard (REQ.21) 
is to create a standardized process and interface for the 
exchange of a retail customer’s energy usage informa­
tion between their designated data custodian (i.e., 
distribution company) and an authorized third party 
service provider.” REQ.21 includes some recommen­
dations for mitigating the associated privacy risks. 
 b.	  On December 16, 2010, the U.S. Department of 
Commerce National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (NTIA) published “Commercial Data 
Privacy and Innovation in the Internet Economy: A 
Dynamic Policy Framework.”** Because many consider the 
Smart Grid to be a new type of telecommunications net­
* 	 See the background and accompanying information NAESB provided about the stan­
dard at http://members.sgip.org/apps/group_public/download.php/2883/NAESB 
%20REQ%2022%20Voting%20Package.pdf. 





¶ See the text at http://www.naesb.org/ESPI_standards.asp.
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work, utilities and other Smart Grid participants are using 
this for their privacy program implementation. 
c. 	On January 31, 2012, the U.S. Department of Energy,
Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (DOE
OE) hosted the Smart Grid Privacy Workshop to facili­
tate a dialog among key industry stakeholders. In response
to workshop findings and in support of the privacy blue­
print, DOE OE and the Federal Smart Grid Task Force
are facilitating a multistakeholder process to develop a vol­
untary code of conduct (VCC) for utilities and third par­
ties providing consumer energy use services that addresses 
privacy related to data enabled by Smart Grid technologies.
The following work groups were created to develop a set of
privacy standards to support this effort:
− Mission Statement Work Group
 
− Notice/Awareness Work Group
 
− Choice/Consent Work Group
 
− Access/Participation Work Group
 
− Integrity/Security Work Group
 
− Management/Redress Work Group
 
− Integration Work Group
 
− Implementation Work Group

At the time of this writing a wide collection of draft
and final privacy principles had been created.* 
d. In October 2009 the Home-to-Grid Domain	 Expert
Working Group (H2G DEWG) at NIST published the 
“Privacy of Consumer Information and Devices in the 
Electric Power Industry.”† The paper outlined: 
− The importance of providing consumers ownership of
their associated energy usage data 
− Recommended industry privacy policies 
* 	 Rebecca Herold also participates in some of these groups. See all the content cre­
ated by the work groups at https://www.smartgrid.gov/news/doe_addresses_pri­
vacy_data_enabled_smart_grid_technologies_convenes_multistakeholder_process. 
† 	This document was written by Rik Drummond and edited by Rebecca Herold and 
Dr. Ken Wacks. Also participating in the development of this document were Dr. 
Matthew Schneider of Emerson Electric and Larry Silverman of GridPlex, Inc. See 
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− Privacy risks of inappropriate energy usage data use 
e. 	 In December 2012, the State and Local Energy Efficiency
Action Network published “A Regulator’s Privacy Guide to
Third-Party Data Access for Energy Efficiency: Customer
Information and Behavior Working Group.”* This docu­
ment contains a summary of privacy legal requirements 
throughout the energy industry, as well as in other indus­
tries. It also includes a long list of references to a wide
variety of privacy standards.
3. Document and implement organizational privacy policies, 
procedures, and assigned responsibilities.
Organizations within the Smart Grid sector will mitigate
privacy risks by developing documented privacy policies† to
define the consumer and premises information, how the infor­
mation will be safeguarded, how that information should be
retained, how information can and cannot be shared with
third parties, and how information will be secured against 
breach. The policies should be supported by documented pro­
cedures that are written to support the business environment. 
Providing education to employees is critical to the success of
the policies and procedures. All employees should be provided 
regular privacy training,‡ which should include clear explana­
tion of each employee’s responsibilities for complying with the
privacy policies. Ongoing awareness communications should
be provided to make sure employees are reminded of the pri­
vacy policies requirements, their personal responsibilities for
privacy, and the privacy procedures that are applicable to them.
Similarly, Smart Grid services consumers and custom­
ers should be provided with a privacy notice that clearly and 
* 	 Prepared by M. Dworkin, K. Johnson, D. Kreis, C. Rosser, and J. Voegele, Vermont 
Law School; S. Weissman, UC Berkeley; and M. Billingsley and C. Goldman,
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. See http://www1.eere.energy.gov/seeac­
tion/pdfs/cib_regulator_privacy_guide.pdf. 
† 	For privacy policies templates specific to utilities and other Smart Grid entities, see 
http://www.privacyprofessor.org. 
‡ 	For guidance on privacy training and awareness programs, see Rebecca Herold,
Managing an Information Security and Privacy Awareness and Training Program, Boca
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succinctly describes the information the organization is col­
lecting and how that information will be used, shared, and 
secured. The consumers and customers should also be told
the procedures they need to follow to gain access to their
own applicable information, and their options for submitting 
requests to correct information, as well as to delete informa­
tion that is no longer valid, or no longer needed to support the
service provided by the organization.
4. Utilize privacy use cases to identify where to include privacy 
protections and data safeguards.
Develop privacy use cases that track data flows containing 
personal information, energy usage data, energy consump­
tion data, or energy production data to address and mitigate
common privacy risks that exist for business processes within
an organization or between organizations. Privacy use cases 
help IT and network architects, functional process owners, 
and engineers build or specify privacy protections into their 
products, processes, and operations to mitigate privacy risks.
A privacy use case is a description of data flows within a spe­
cific scenario or scope that will help entities to rigorously track
data flows and the privacy implications of collecting and using
data, and will help organizations to address and mitigate the
associated privacy risks within common technical design and
business practices. Privacy use cases reflect the electricity value
chain and the impacts that Smart Grid technologies, new poli­
cies, new markets, and new consumer interactions will have on
the privacy of customers and consumers within the Smart Grid.
The privacy use cases can serve as a valuable tool for all types of
Smart Grid entities, including utilities; energy service companies
(ESCOs); vendors of products and services that may include col­
lection, storage, or communication of personal data; and policy
makers, to better understand the implications of Smart Grid
technology changes to existing processes and procedures.
When the general privacy concerns have been identified,
the entities within each part of the Smart Grid sector can
then look at their associated business processes and techni­
cal components to determine the privacy concerns that exist 
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may be utilized to represent generalizations of specific scenar­
ios that require interoperability between systems and partici­
pants in support of business processes and workflow. Through
structured and repeatable analysis, business use cases can be 
elaborated upon as interoperability/technical privacy use cases
to be implemented by the associated entities. The resulting 
details will allow those responsible for creating, implement­
ing, and managing the controls that impact privacy to do so 
more effectively and consistently.
Table 7.2 is one of the 44 privacy use cases within NISTIR 
7628 Rev. 1.* This provides an example of a privacy use case 
format that can be used by Smart Grid entities to establish
their own Smart Grid privacy use cases for their own spe­
cific services and products they are creating for Smart Grid
use. Developers of Smart Grid applications, systems, and 
operational processes can employ a more comprehensive set of
privacy use cases to create architectures that build in privacy 
protections to mitigate identified privacy risks.
5. Use data aggregation, de-identification, and other similar 
techniques, where appropriate and effective, to protect privacy.
Throughout hundreds of Smart Grid meetings the authors 
have attended over the years, one of the most common meth­
ods touted to protect privacy is to use aggregated data so that
individual energy consumers and prosumers and their asso­
ciated activities and personal information are not able to be 
revealed. However, there are real concerns with how well 
aggregation and de-identification methods work, and the lack
* 	 The privacy use cases in NISTIR 7628 Rev. 1 were created by a subteam of the NIST
Smart Grid CSWG Privacy Group. The subteam was led by Christine Hertzog and 
the team included Rebecca Herold, Tanya Brewer (NIST), Sarah Cortes (Inman
Technologies), and Brandon Robinson (Balch & Bingham). Marianne Swanson,
who was the senior advisor, Information Systems Security, Information Technology
Laboratory, and leader of the NIST CSWG groups at the time, was also a strong
supporter of the efforts of the subteam to create the privacy use cases. The subteam 
created the privacy use cases by expanding the collection of CSWG use cases to 
cover all Smart Grid value chain participants, in addition to utilities (regulated or 
not) that will offer Smart Grid-related products and services. See the full set of 44
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of control over each aggregated or de-identified data set once 
it has been created. Here are just a couple of the problems: 
a.	  For one de-identification risk example, it may not be possible 
to reidentify individuals from a single de-identified data set. 
However, if other data is combined with a de-identified data 
set, use of a variety of different types of algorithms may be 
used to achieve reidentification. Reidentification refers to 
the ability to use methodologies to determine specific indi­
viduals that were removed from de-identified data sets. 
b.	  As an example of an aggregation risk example, disaggre­
gation refers to a set of statistical approaches for extract­
ing end use or appliance-level data from an aggregated 
energy signal from a meter or other specialized device.*  
Disaggregation technologies can be used on energy usage 
data to analyze the frequency and durations for use of the 
studied appliances. See Figures 7.1 and 7.2 for examples of 
the details disaggregation can reveal.
  The possibility of disaggregation of anonymized data and 
reidentification is not just theory; it has been demonstrated 
multiple times in recent years.† The interest in disaggrega­
tion continues to increase, as demonstrated in 2013 when 
Belkin Energy had a disaggregation competition to advance 
* 	 For a discussion of disaggregation, see Energy Policy, 52, 213–234, 2013, Special 
Section: Transition Pathways to a Low Carbon Economy, http://www.science
direct.com/science/article/pii/S0301421512007446. 
† As described in Klaus Kursawe, How to Have the Cake and Eat It, Too: Protecting Privacy
and Energy Efficiency in the Smart Grid, Institute for Computing and Information
Science, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands:
That this kind of re-identification is possible has been shown in past studies, e.g., on
Netflix move preference data [NaSh08]. In all those cases, data that was anonymised
(such as movie preferences, or anonymised health data) could be de-anonymised with
a surprising efficiency. It is therefore no longer possible to cleanly separate between
personal identifiable data and harmless data, as each additional data item makes iden­
tification a little bit easier. Due to the wealth of data that can be derived in smart grid
readings, there is a clear indication that the approach of simply separating identifiable
and anonymous data is a good start, but will quickly reach its limits.
As a more concrete example, grid data may reveal that a person always stays up 
late when a particular TV show is on, which in return may give some demographic 
data. It also can be linked with some semi-public data (e.g., people who ‘like’ this
show on social networks) to assist in the de-anonymisation. Additional data mining
may give information about my occupation, holiday schedule, religious preference,











Kitchen outlets 1 
2500 Kitchen outlets 2 
Kitchen outlets 3 
Kitchen outlets 4 
2000 Lights 1 
Lights 2 
1500 Lights 3 
Washing machine 
Microwave 





00:00 01:00 02:00 03:00 04:00 05:00 06:00 07:00 
Time 
MITIGATING PRIVACY RISKS 135 
Figure 7.1 Examples of the details disaggregation can reveal. (From O. Parson et al., N  on-
Intrusive Load Monitoring Using Prior Models of General Appliance Types, presented at 1st 
International Workshop on Non-Intrusive Load Monitoring, Pittsburgh, PA, 2012.) 
Figure 7.2 Examples of the details disaggregation can reveal. (From Sidhant Gupta et al., 
ElectriSense: Single-Point Sensing Using EMI for Electrical Event Detection and Classification in the 
Home Best Paper Award, November 2012, http://homes.cs.washington.edu/~sidhant/research.html. 
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the use of disaggregation as a way to improve energy usage.* 
Therefore, if an entity is going to use anonymization of aggre­
gated data or de-identification as a privacy mitigation tool, it
needs to establish well-defined rules to govern the use of such
data.† These rules should include at least the following:
i. Establish documented policies and supporting proce­
dures. The rules for when, where, why, and how aggre­
gated and de-identified data should be used need to be
established within policies. Procedures with specific 
steps for how to comply with those policies also need to
be documented within each department that wants to
create, use, or share such de-identified and aggregated
data. Having these policies and procedures clearly doc­
umented will enable the organization to perform such
activities in a consistent way, and also make clear that
other methods are not approved for use. 
ii. 	Use an aggregation protocol that has been demon­
strated to be effective for preserving privacy. Too many
ineffective de-identification and aggregation methods
are used by organizations, using simplistic methods 
that provide little to no privacy protections. For exam­
ple, throughout her work with many energy industry
organizations over the past decade, one of the authors 
(Rebecca Herold) found that many organizations sim­
ply removed the name or address from a data set and 
called it de-identified. Two examples of proven effec­
tive aggregation methods include the Diffie–Hellman­
based private aggregation (DiPA) protocol and the 
low-overhead private aggregation (LoPA) protocol.‡ 
* See https://www.kaggle.com/c/belkin-energy-disaggregation-competition. 
† For in-depth discussion of the need for de-identified data controls, see Daniel 
C. Barth-Jones, The ‘Re-Identification’ of Governor William Weld’s Medical 
Information: A Critical Re-Examination of Health Data Identification Risks and 
Privacy Protections, Then and Now, June 4, 2012, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2076397 
or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2076397. 
‡ 	See a good explanation of these protocols within Klaus Kursawe, How to Have the Cake 
and Eat It, Too: Protecting Privacy and Energy Efficiency in the Smart Grid, Institute for 





MITIGATING PRIVACY RISKS 137 
iii. 	 Establish data minimization requirements for de-iden­
tified and aggregated data. Besides removing the more 
obvious personal information items, all other items 
that are not necessary for the purposes for which the 
aggregated data is being used should also be removed. 
The less data that remains, but still supports the de-
identification and aggregation purposes, the less pri­
vacy risk there will be. 
iv. 	Do not combine aggregated or de-identified data sets 
with other data sets that contain the types of data that 
have been removed, or new types of data that were not 
in the original data set. This applies to other aggregated 
and de-identified data sets. Whenever additional types 
of data items are introduced to an aggregated or de-
identified data set, this will pollute the integrity of the 
data set and increase the risk that those additional items 
may have allowed for reidentification or disaggregation. 
Clearly documented policies and procedures need to be 
in place for this issue. 
v.	  Require any employee, contractor, or other third party 

that wants to include new data elements (which might 

add quasi-identifiers and thus increase reidentification
 
risks) with de-identified or aggregated data to provide
 
legitimate validation that the data remain de-identi­




vi. 	   Prohibit attempts to reidentify or disaggregate data if 
statisticians with expertise in reidentification and disag­
gregation indicate a valid risk exists that such activities 
could reveal individuals and their relatives, family, or 
household members. As indicated earlier, many orga­
nizations are actively are using such disaggregation 
methods, so it is important for the privacy, information 
security, and legal offices to discuss the needs for such 
actions and balance the approved activities with privacy 
risk mitigation actions. 
 vii.	  Specify that de-identification status no longer applies 
if, at any time, the data contains data elements that can 
now be used to identify an individual in some manner. 
 viii.	  Formally document within policies and procedures a 
requirement for data recipients and users of statistically 
de-identified and aggregated data to always comply 
with any time limits, data use restrictions, qualifica­
tions, or conditions established within the statistical de-
identification determination associated with the data. 
 ix. 	Establish policies and procedures to require others 
to protect the data to prevent unauthorized access. 
Require that those holding and using de-identified 
and aggregated data implement and maintain appro­
priate data security and privacy policies, procedures, 
and associated physical, technical, and administrative 
safeguards as appropriate to ensure the data is accessed 
and used only by personnel or parties who have agreed 
to these same restrictions and conditions. Also require 
that the data will remain de-identified and aggregated, 
and that reidentification and disaggregation attempts 
are prohibited. It is important to note that extensive 
safeguards and associated security controls may not 
be necessary for data that has statistically been deter­
mined to have a low probability of reidentification. 
However, for data sets with mid to high likelihood, 
safeguards and security controls need to ensure risks of 
reidentification and disaggregation attempts are con­
trolled and kept acceptably low. 
 x.	  Require those transferring de-identified or aggregated 
data to third parties to enter into data use agreements 
and contracts that require the data recipients to also 
comply with the previously described actions and 
requirements. This will enable the important chain of 
custody* data stewardship principle to be maintained 
for the accompanying de-identified or aggregated data 
throughout its uses. 
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* See Chapter 4 for more information on the chain of custody concept. 
 6. Build privacy controls into smart meters and other smart devices.
  Use the results of research and the privacy use cases to build 
privacy controls into smart meters and other smart devices. 
Some effective controls to consider include*: 
 a. 	Encrypt the meter data in storage locations and while 
being transmitted through networks. 
 b.	  Provide the associated smart meter, or other type of smart 
device, and consumer the ability to control the levels of 
aggregation and de-identification within the smart device, 
to the level that still allows for the utility or smart device 
supplier to be able to obtain the necessary business value. 
 c. 	Collect the minimum amount possible of personal infor­
mation from the individuals using smart meters and smart 
devices without lessening the range and quality of services 
provided.
 d. Retain data within the smart device for only the amount 
of time necessary to provide the associated service. 
 e. 	Provide methods for consumers to have choices and con­
trol over how the associated data from smart devices is 
used and shared. 
 f.	  Securely dispose of personal information and energy data 
when they are no longer needed for the purpose for which 
they were originally collected. 
 g.	  Obtain consent whenever possible prior to collecting per­
sonal information and energy data.
 h. Implement data integrity methods and tools.
 i.	  Implement technical logs to record each entity or individual 
that has accessed personal information and energy data.
  For more details about security safeguards to use, see 
NISTIR 7628 Volume 1 Revision 1 and NISTIR 7628 
Volume 3 Revision 1. 
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* 	 For a detailed paper discussing how to build some of these privacy controls into smart 
meters, in addition to others, see Future of Privacy Forum and Dr. Ann Cavoukian,
SmartPrivacy for the Smart Grid: Embedding Privacy into the Design of Electricity 
Conservation, Information and Privacy Commissioner, Ontario, Canada, November
2009, http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/pbd-smartpriv-smartgrid.pdf. 
 7. Obtain cyber security and breach insurance.
  It is becoming common, and indeed a basic expected busi­
ness practice, to obtain cyber security and breach insurance 
in many industries, such as the financial and retail sectors. It 
is also a good idea for entities within the Smart Grid sector 
to obtain cyber security and breach insurance given the many 
risks that are involved within this vast new converged grid and 
network.* Such insurance will be a way to transfer some of the 
liability risk to another entity in the event of a security incident 
or privacy breach; it does not replace the need to implement a 
comprehensive information security and privacy program.
  Of paramount importance is getting valuable insurance, 
and not simply purchasing the first cyber insurance that may 
pop up in an online search. Look for insurance that covers the 
following: 
 a.	  Privacy breaches and the associated costs. Look for poli­
cies that provide discounts for implementing a compre­
hensive privacy program (as described in this book). 
 b.	  Information security incidents and associated costs, includ­
ing the downtime and any associated financial losses. 
 c. 	Cost of lawyers and related court costs in the event of 
lawsuits. 
 d. Fines and penalties applied by regulatory oversight agen­
cies, if not expressly forbidden by any applicable laws or 
regulations. 
 e. 	Insurance that assigns a value to both tangible and intan­
gible assets, such as customer information and energy data.
 f. Physical damage	 to the network components, includ­
ing smart meters and smart appliances, as applicable. 
Many cyber security insurance policies don’t cover physi­
cal damage, so it is important to be sure and check on 
this. Many cyber security policies also exclude physical 
* 	 For a full discussion of the need for cyber security insurance, including consider­
ations for utilities and others within the Smart Grid, see Cybersecurity Insurance 
Workshop Readout Report, National Protection and Programs Directorate, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, November 2012, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/cybersecurity-insurance-read-out-report.pdf. 
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damage from supervisory control and data acquisition 
(SCADA) system attacks. 
 g.	  Incidents and breaches that are caused by insiders (employ­
ees and contracted entities).
 h. Reputational risk provisions that protect corporate boards 
of directors are built in to many cyber security insurance 
policies. These are designed to reward companies that 
adopt information security and privacy policies, stan­
dards, practices, and controls that restore their operations 
(and reputations) quickly.
 i. Provisions for guaranteed service and backup operations, 
as available and possible.
  It is to be expected that the more these coverages include, 
the higher the premium will be. Each entity needs to deter­
mine the risks that apply to it, and then choose coverage to 
mitigate the possible costs of those risks, if they would be 
exploited, that it wants to transfer to the insurer.
 8. Include privacy provisions within vendor contracts.
  As mentioned within the de-identification and aggrega­
tion controls, other individuals and entities that are given 
access to the data must be contractually bound to protect 
that data. A high-level listing of requirements to include in 
outsourced vendor contracts when personal information or 
energy data is shared with them, or if they have access to it 
any way, follows*:
 a.	  Privacy notices. Require contractors and other third 
parties to provide a privacy notice to energy customers 
prior to sharing personal information or energy data with 
another party, and also when a significant change in orga­
nizational structure, such as merger, bankruptcy, or out­
sourcing, occurs.
b.	  Customer authorization for disclosures. Require con­
tractors and other third parties to seek customer authori­
zation prior to disclosing personal information or energy 
* 	 See the full details for each of these requirements within NISTIR 7628 Rev. 1 at http://
nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2014/NIST.IR.7628r1.pdf. Also see NAESB REQ.22
http://www.naesb.org/retail_request.asp. 
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data to other parties unless the service for which the data 
disclosure is necessary has been previously authorized by 
the customer.
 c. 	Data disclosure and minimization. Require contrac­
tors and other third parties to not collect more personal 
information and energy data than is required to fulfill the 
agreed upon service, and to obtain a separate authoriza­
tion before personal information or energy data is used in 
a different manner.
 d. 	Customer education and awareness. Require contractors 
and other third parties to educate their employees, and 
customers as appropriate, about their privacy protection 
policies and practices, including the steps the contractor 
or other type of third party is taking to protect privacy.
 e. 	Data quality. Require contractors and other third parties 
to implement processes and technologies, as necessary, to 
ensure data is kept as accurate and complete as possible.
f.	  Data security. Require contractors and other third parties 
to have clearly documented security policies and support­
ing procedures that are periodically reviewed and updated 
as necessary.
 g.	  Privacy impact assessment. Require contractors and 
other third parties to perform periodic privacy impact 
assessments (PIAs) in accordance with the recommenda­
tions earlier in this chapter.
h. 	Data retention and disposal. Require contractors and 
other third parties to have clearly documented policies and 
procedures establishing how long data will be retained, as 
well as when and how personal information and energy 
data will be disposed of. This should be detailed in the 
privacy notice given to the customer.
i. 	Data breaches. Require contractors and other third par­
ties to be aware of and comply with any laws or require­
ments governing data breaches. This applies not just to the 
third party, but also to its contracted agents.
j.	  Employee training. Require contractors and other third 
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security and privacy training regularly so they know how 
to protect customer personal information and energy data.
k.	 Audits. Require contractors and other third parties to 
have independent third-party audits of security and pri­
vacy practices performed, and also to provide the orga­
nization a copy of their documented information security
and privacy policies, and any other supporting documen­
tation, upon request.
9. Comply with privacy laws and regulations.
Be sure to know and comply with all your applicable data
protection laws,* regulations, and industry standards. And
don’t forget to ensure you will also comply with all your con­
tracts that include requirements for protecting personal infor­
mation and energy data. 
* 	 In the United States, a good source of information about state-level Smart Grid 








HOW TO TAKE  CHARGE
OF  YOUR PRIVACY 
Roles and Responsibilities 
It is important to consider the primary roles that exist for the asso­
ciated privacy responsibilities for energy usage and production data 
and who has control over that data. There are terms used in the pri­
vacy profession* for those that have responsibilities for protecting 
privacy. There are sometimes different terms used to describe data 
or data relationships within the energy industry. In order to have 
those in the privacy professions better understand the terminologies 
used within the energy professions, and vice versa, it is instructive to
relate the privacy roles to the data owner/custodian/manager roles 
identified in Chapter 2. This will also help the professionals from
different areas of expertise to communicate with each other more 
successfully. Therefore, within this chapter we are going to take a 
departure from our other chapters and use both the roles and respon­
sibilities terms from the privacy profession and the Smart Grid sector
to help establish a better understanding and linkage between the two 
sets of terms. 
* 	 The privacy responsibility categories/terms used in this chapter are the ones used 
not only by privacy professionals throughout the world, but also by those who are 
certified for various categories of privacy expertise by the International Association 
of Privacy Professionals (IAPP), effectively validating and promoting the use of 
these terms by privacy professionals and experts throughout the world. One of the 
authors, Rebecca Herold, holds three of the certifications, CIPT, CIPP/US, and 
CIPM, and teaches the corresponding certification classes for the IAPP. For more 
information about the IAPP, see http://www.privacyassociation.org. 
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• 	 Data subject.* In the privacy profession, the data subject is 
considered to be a person who can be identified, directly or 
indirectly, by reference to an identification number or to one 
or more factors specific to his or her physical, physiological, 
mental, economic, cultural, or social identity, or by the char­
acteristics of the person’s activities. 
  When considering privacy within the Smart Grid, the data 
subject is the individual about whom energy usage or produc­
tion data applies and is processed, along with any associated 
personal information items, such as name, address, account 
number, and so on. As discussed in Chapter 2, the energy 
consumer or prosumer, or as it relates to privacy terms, the 
data subject, is legally considered to be the data owner in 
increasing numbers of states, as well as in some countries out­
side of the United States. This chapter will look at the ways 
in which the data owner, which we will recognize here as the 
data subject, can exercise control of his or her associated data, 
and the responsibilities he or she has for protecting his or her 
own privacy. 
• 	 Data controller.† In the privacy profession, this is the orga­
nization or individual that collected (or in some situations 
created, such as when a doctor creates the vital signs for a 
patient with tools used during the provision of care) the per­
sonal information from the data subject. The data controller 
has the obligation to decide how and why information about 
data subjects will be processed within the bounds of legal 
requirements and existing privacy risks, and has the responsi­
bility to appropriately safeguard the data throughout the time 
that he or she is a custodian of the data. 
  In the Smart Grid sector, the data controller is the data 
custodian, and is generally one of two types of entities: 
* 	 This is the definition provided during IAPP training for the CIPP Foundations 
course, and within the CIPP Foundations Textbook. It closely aligns with the 
description provided for the EU Data Protection Directive at http://ico.org.uk/
for_organisations/data_protection/the_guide/key_definitions. The OECD Privacy 
Framework also use these terms; see http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_ 
privacy_framework.pdf. 
† Ibid. 
 1.	  The utility that collects from the consumers’ or prosumers’ 
energy usage data from the smart meter and the energy 
production data from the energy production devices 
 2.	  The third parties that directly collect data from energy 
consumers or prosumers that is not used by or has any 
oversight from a utility. These would be organizations 
such as energy service providers (ESPs), smart appliance 
vendors, and energy app creators.
  As discussed in Chapter 2, the data custodian, or data con­
troller, is responsible for establishing the controls to ensure 
the secure transmission, handling, and storage of energy data 
and the associated personal information of the consumers. 
This chapter will look at the ways in which the data custo­
dian or data controller can implement privacy protections and 
security controls for the energy data and associated personal 
information that he or she has collected, and for which he or 
she is responsible. 
• 	 Data processor.* In the privacy profession this is an organi­
zation or individual that processes data on behalf of the data 
controller. The employees of data controllers with access to 
the data are considered to be data processors. The outsourced 
entities hired by the data controllers to do any type of storage, 
processing, or transmission, or have access of any kind to the 
data, are also considered to be data processors.
  In the Smart Grid sector, the data processor is typically 
referenced as the data manager. The following types of enti­
ties are data managers in handling energy data and associated 
personal information:
 1.	  Utility employees with access to energy data or the associ­
ated personal information. As indicated in Chapter 2, data 
custodians can be data managers. To be more specific, the 
employees of the data custodians are the data managers 
(data processors) because they are the ones within the data 
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custodian’s (data controller’s) enterprise with direct access*  
to the energy data or personal information.
 2. Contracted workers with direct access to the energy data 
or personal information are also the data managers (data 
processors) of the data custodians (data controllers). 
 3. 	The employees of third parties that directly collect data 
from energy consumers that is not used by or has any over­
sight from a utility are data managers (data processors) of 
the third-party data custodian (data controller).
  Data managers/data processors are responsible for know­
ing, understanding, and complying with the data custodian’s 
(data controller’s) internal information security and privacy 
policies to protect energy data and personal information. 
• 	 Data protection authority. In the privacy profession, this is 
the term used to indicate the supervisory entity chartered to 
enforce privacy or data protection laws and regulations. Some 
countries have one centralized data protection authority 
(DPA) to oversee compliance for all the country’s data pro­
tection laws and regulations. As a few examples:
• 	 The UK has the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO).† 
• 	 Canada has the Privacy Commissioner.‡ 
• 	 Germany has the Federal Data Protection Commissioner.§ 
• 	 Hong Kong has the Office of the Privacy Commissioner.¶ 
  In contrast, the United States does not have a single central­
ized DPA. There are multiple groups, sometimes determined by 
industry consensus or through legislation, that function as a DPA 
for a specified scope of responsibility. Some of these include: 
* 	 If an individual or entity has access of any kind to energy usage data or personal 
information to fulfill his or her job responsibilities or a contractual requirement, this 
is considered to be direct access. Direct access would include viewing energy data 
or personal information on a computer screen, handling hard copy documents that 
contain energy data or personal information, maintaining, manipulating, and stor­
ing data in cloud-based services, or any other way in which the individual can see or 
access data as an integral part of his or her job responsibilities and activities. 
† See http://ico.org.uk/. 
‡ See https://www.priv.gc.ca. 
§ See https://www.ldi.nrw.de/LDI_EnglishCorner/mainmenu_DataProtection/Inhalt2/
authorities/authorities.php. 
¶ See http://www.pcpd.org.hk/. 
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• 	 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
• 	 State Attorneys General offices 
• 	 Federal financial regulators 
•	  Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards 
(PCI-DSS)
  When considering privacy within the Smart Grid, state 
public utility commissions (PUCs), the Department of 
Commerce (DOC), and a wide range of other regulatory 
agencies and energy industry standards groups can be consid­
ered DPAs. It is important to point out that the FTC also has 
DPA authority over utilities and other Smart Grid entities 
with regard to the posted privacy notices and the corporate 
privacy policies of those entities. 
Table 8.1 maps the relationships between the Smart Grid sector 
terms and the privacy profession’s terms. 
Privacy Possibilities and Responsibilities for the Data Subject 
Energy consumers and prosumers, as data subjects/data owners, 
can proactively take a variety of actions to protect their own pri­
vacy by safeguarding their own energy usage and production data 
and personal information that they provide to Smart Grid entities. 
Additionally, there are actions they can take to ensure the utilities 
and third parties to whom they provide their energy data and per­
sonal information have appropriate safeguards and policies in place 
to protect their privacy. 
Table 8.1 Relationship Map for Privacy Terms and Smart Grid Terms 
PRIVACY PROFESSION SMART GRID SECTOR 
Data subject Is the same as Data owner 
Data protection authority Is the same as Energy or privacy rule-making authority 
Data controller Is the same as Data custodian 
Data processor Is the same as Data manager 
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Table 8.2 Recommended Information for a Data Custodian’s Privacy Noticea 
• The purpose for which energy usage and production data and personal information are being collected 
• A high-level description of the security controls that have been implemented 
• The ways in which data is kept accurate 
• The ways in which the data is used 
• How data subjects can make choices about how their data is used and shared 
• Individual access to corresponding data, and rights to make corrections to the data 
• How notifications will be made when the privacy policy changes 
• Contact information for questions about the privacy policy 
a These are based upon the OECD Privacy Framework; see http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_ 
privacy_framework.pdf. These principles are the basis of many other privacy standards and 
frameworks. 
Here are a few of the actions energy consumers and prosumers 
should consider taking to help protect their privacy: 
 1. Read the privacy notices* posted on the websites and in the 
contracts provided by the data custodians (e.g., utilities, 
energy service providers (ESPs)—traditional or new entrants 
such as broadband or mobile carriers, smart appliance ven­
dors, and mobile app-based energy management services).
 2. Before a data custodian collects your energy data or personal 
information, ask him or her for a copy of his or her privacy notice 
if he or she does not have one posted. Make sure it describes 
how the custodian secures the data and information he or she 
collects, and the rights data subjects have over their data. If the 
data custodian does not have one, that is a red flag. See Table 8.2 
for content recommendations for a good privacy notice.
 3. If you do not understand some of the information within the 
notices or contracts, or if some of the information concerns you, 
contact the data custodian and ask for clarification. If energy 
data or personal information is collected by a utility, the utility 
is the custodian, but if the data is not collected by a utility, then 
the custodian is the entity that collected the data. 
* 	 Some organizations call privacy notices, which describe the privacy promises made
to the public and to customers, their privacy policies. However, in the information 
security and privacy professions, the term policy is used to refer to the business’s
rules that employees must follow. 
 4. If the terms described within the posted privacy notice are too 
invasive,* and you have not received a satisfactory explanation 
from the data custodian, find another data custodian, if 
possible. If not possible, contact the data custodian’s privacy 
officer. If the data custodian takes privacy seriously, he or she 
will have a privacy officer, or at least some position that has 
been assigned to address privacy issues. If he or she does not 
have a privacy officer or someone with privacy responsibilities, 
that is a red flag in and of itself.
 5. If you call or send a message to a utility or third-party cus­
tomer service agent with a privacy question or concern, and he 
or she cannot provide an answer or he or she avoids answering 
your question directly, that is a red flag. You should then get 
in touch with the privacy officer or identified privacy contact.
 6. Understand the chain of custody for energy data to identify 
the organizations (data custodian and associated data proces­
sors) that have access to your energy data and personal infor­
mation and their roles. 
 7. Know the DPAs that establish the privacy protections for your 
energy usage and production data and personal information, 
and how to get in touch with them if you have any concerns 
about the privacy protections for your data.
 8. Ensure the data custodian has a documented information 
security and privacy breach plan in place.
 9. Determine the recourse process to follow if you suspect or 
know your privacy has been compromised.
 10. Occasionally do an online search to see if the data custodian 
has had a privacy breach, or any type of information security 
incident or privacy breach.† 
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* 	 For example, if the notice contains a blanket statement that they may share any data
collected from you with any others for any reason they determine to be appropriate, 
that would be a statement that is overly broad that you would want to obtain clarifi­
cation about. 
† 	At the time of this writing, 51 U.S. states and territories had laws requiring busi­
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Why take the time and trouble of doing these actions? Because you 
cannot expect the data custodians that collect your energy data and 
personal information to always have all the safeguards in place neces­
sary to lessen privacy risks.
Bottom line: With so much data being generated and shared, it is 
important for consumers to not just assume the data custodians that
collect their energy data and personal information are appropriately 
protecting their privacy and effectively safeguarding their data.* 
Data Subject Privacy Use Case Example 
Privacy use cases† are valuable to use to break down specific scenarios 
involving access to energy usage and production data and personal 
information. The data custodians and data processors that obtain and 
access your energy data and personal information rely on privacy use
cases to identify where risks exist and document the best controls to
mitigate the identified risks.
As an example, let’s consider the privacy issues involved with using
electric vehicles (EVs). Consumers can use a privacy use case to help
determine the privacy issues that they should be aware of for situa­
tions where their energy data and personal information are involved. 
Table 8.3 shows one of the EV privacy use cases from NISTIR 7628
Rev. 1,‡ updated by the authors to reflect how a consumer privacy use 
case can be created by a data custodian and provided to consumers as
an awareness-raising document, in addition to the privacy notice. 
* 	 For more advice and tools to help consumers to protect their privacy and effectively
secure their energy usage and production data personal information, see Rebecca’s 
site: http://www.privacyprofessor.org. 
† 	As described within NISTIR 7628 Rev. 1: “A Privacy Use Case is a method of look­
ing at data flows that will help entities within the Smart Grid to rigorously track data
flows and the privacy implications of collecting and using data, and will help organi­
zations to address and mitigate the associated privacy risks within common technical
design and business practices. Use cases can help Smart Grid architects and engineers
build privacy protections into the Smart Grid.” See http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/
ir/2014/NIST.IR.7628r1.pdf. 
‡ 	See all 44 Smart Grid privacy uses in NISTIR 7628 Rev. 1; http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/
nistpubs/ir/2014/NIST.IR.7628r1.pdf. 
Category: Demand response  Privacy use case 12 
Scenario: Mobile plug-in electric vehicle (PEV) functions 
CATEGORY DESCRIPTION 
Demand response is a general capability that could be implemented in many different ways. The 
primary focus is to provide prosumers with pricing information for current or future time periods so 
 they may respond by modifying their demand. This may entail just decreasing load or may involve
shifting load by increasing demand during lower-priced time periods so that they can decrease 
demand during higher-priced time periods. The pricing periods may be real time based or tariff 
based, while the prices may also be operationally based or fixed, or some combination. Real-time 
pricing inherently requires computer-based responses, while the fixed time-of-use pricing may be 
manually handled once the prosumer is aware of the time periods and the pricing. 
SCENARIO DESCRIPTION 
• In addition to prosumers with PEVs participating in their home-based demand response 
functions, they will have additional requirements for managing the charging and discharging 
of their mobile PEVs in other locations: 
• Prosumer connects PEV at another home 
• Prosumer connects PEV outside home territory 
• Prosumer connects PEV at public location 
POTENTIAL DATA OWNER/DATA SUBJECT PRIVACY ISSUES 
• Privacy and security controls for the PEV energy usage data and personal information about 
the PEV owner/operator 
• Retail electric supplier (utility or charging service providers (CSPs)) access to the energy 

usage data and personal information about the PEV owner/operator
 
• Unauthorized access to the energy usage data and personal information about the PEV owner/ 
operator by those in the vicinity of the retail electric supplier charging station 
• Retail electric supplier (nonutility) access to the energy usage data and personal information 
about the PEV owner/operator that the utility possesses 
• Security and privacy controls for the energy usage data and personal information about the 
PEV owner/operator under the control of the retail electric supplier (utility or CSP) 
• Prosumer access to, and ability to correct, their corresponding energy usage data and 

personal information about the PEV owner/operator
 
DATA PRIVACY RECOMMENDATIONS FOCUSED ON THE DATA OWNER/DATA SUBJECT 
This use case presumes a single residential (one owner/car) situation. (There are other scenarios 
as well, but for simplicity’s sake we limit our discussion to one scenario per use case.) There are 
three possible grid interfaces considered here: 
• Basic 120 or 240 V plug for electricity downloads connected to a dumb or smart meter 
• A meter that is capable of running backwards for download and upload of electricity (net 
metering) 
• Charging stations that can charge/discharge electricity to and from the grid 
 1. From the perspective of the prosumer, utilities are involved in the first two interfaces in terms 
of owning the meter at the time this book was written, but the third scenario may involve third 
parties that own the meters connected to charging stations and interact directly with 
prosumers without utility intervention. It is important for prosumers to understand the chain 
of custody in scenario C. 
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2. Look for privacy notices from the utilities and third parties such as CSPs that clearly delineate all
responsibilities and collection processes and uses for energy usage data and personal information. 
3. When utilities are the data custodian, look for statements in their privacy notices that describe
when there are situations where EV energy consumption data (or other data) could be handled by
third parties like CSPs, and if these third parties must comply with utility privacy policies. 
4. Utilities and CSPs may have personal data such as name, credit card/debit card, phone 
number, and address for billing for any roaming charge programs that they manage. Look for 
descriptions of security safeguards in privacy notices or contracts, which should include 
information about monitoring and security responsibilities by data custodians. 
5. Prosumers may have an electronic payment arrangement, so the utility or CSP would also have
sensitive financial data and perhaps authorized access to deposit funds in cases of payments to
prosumers for participation in demand response (DR) programs or other smart charging situations.
For instance, California investor-owned utilities (IOUs) are not allowed to provide charging stations,
so all charging stations will be owned by third-party CSPs, energy service providers, property owners,
municipal entities, or businesses. However, these utilities may still have smart charging agreements
in place with specific cars or charging stations and will require this information. Appropriate security
controls need to be in place here. Prosumers should also carefully examine statements about if any
data is sold to other parties and who those parties are. 
6. For charging or discharging that occurs away from the consumer’s home address, but is billed 
back to a utility account, utilities will need to determine what nonhome address location 
information is necessary to collect for billing/payment purposes, and what should be 
displayed on paper or electronic bills. There should be the minimum necessary information 
about charge time, date, and location on electric bills provided to the utility. 
7. CSPs or other contracted agents who act as utility agents may have access to personal data 
for billing purposes. The utility should provide clear, simple identification of all entities 
involved, or provide a formal statement to document the data chain of custody that may be in 
place based on their relationships with the utility, authorized third parties, and CSPs. 
8. Note: The collection of location information creates special privacy concerns regarding EVs. It 
creates special safety and security concerns as well. This is pertinent for charging information 
that occurs at the consumer’s home, not just away from home. This is because EV charging at 
home could establish vehicle location for a given date and time if the EV is plugged in and 
actively charging or discharging. 
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Table  8.3 Privacy Use Case for Consumer Use (continued) 
Information Security Controls to Support Privacy Protection 
Table 8.4 lists some of the types of information security controls the 
data controllers and data processors should be using to effectively
secure energy data and personal information. If data subjects have
concerns after asking the questions previously listed, they can ask 
their data controller about these information security controls as well. 
There are also situations where the data subject should be implement­
ing his or her own information security controls within his or her own 
home or property where electricity service is provided to help protect 
his or her privacy, particularly when he or she is sharing energy usage
CAN BE USED
   CAN BE APPLIED BY
BY DATA
  DATA SUBJECTS FOR 
CONTROLLERS
  THE SYSTEMS AND 
AND DATA
  ACTIONS UNDER 
INFORMATION SECURITY CONTROLS PROCESSORS?
 THEIR CONTROL? 
TECHNICAL INFORMATION SECURITY CONTROLS 
The following are just some of the technical security controls that can be used. In the 25+ 
years one author (Rebecca) has been an information security and privacy practitioner and 
professor, she has found these to be the necessary technical controls for organizations, 
throughout all industries, as well as individuals on their personal computing systems.a 
• Password protection: Use strong passwords. Use Yes Yes 
passwords to log in to computing devices as well 
as to access networks and communications 
networks. 
• Network security controls: Use firewalls, intrusion Yes Yes, if the third- 
prevention systems (IPSs), intrusion detection party solutions 
systems (IDSs), and log monitoring. support them 
• Encryption: Use for data in storage as well as for Yes Yes, if the third- 
data in transit (passing through the public and party solutions 
privacy networks). support them 
• Wireless data security controls: When wireless Yes Yes, if the third- 
networks are used, ensure the transmissions are  party solutions
encrypted, and that strong passwords are used. support them, and if 
Avoid public networks that do not use encryption. within the data 
subject’s own 
network 
• Antimalware software and systems: Use Yes Yes 
comprehensive antimalware software and systems 
to protect against viruses, Trojan horses, key 
loggers, and other types of malicious code. 
ADMINISTRATIVE AND BEHAVIORAL INFORMATION SECURITY CONTROLS 
The following are some of the administrative security controls that can be used, and have been 
found by Rebecca to be the most important and effective for generally all organizations and 
individuals.b 
• Security and privacy responsibility: Assign a role Yes Not applicable 
to have primary responsibility for information 
 security and privacy throughout the organization,
as well as include privacy responsibilities to 
specific positions. 
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Table 8.4 Effective Information Security Controls 
(continued) 
INFORMATION SECURITY CONTROLS 
• Privacy impact assessment (PIAs) and risk 
assessments (RAs): Perform PIAs and RAs to 
identify where risks exist throughout the 
organization. Use the results to determine actions 













 CAN BE APPLIED BY
DATA SUBJECTS FOR 





• Privacy and information security policies and 
procedures: Establish documented information 
security and privacy policies and supporting 
procedures to appropriately mitigate risks, as well 
as to meet existing legal requirements. 
• Provide regular training, with attendance 
required, as well as provide ongoing awareness 
communications: Ensure all data processors 
understand and comply with privacy policies. 
• Enforce compliance: Enforce compliance with 
internal privacy policies and supporting 
procedures. Ensure sanctions are defined and 
applied appropriately and consistently for 
noncompliance with information security and 
privacy policies. 








should review the 
data controller’s 
privacy notice to 
ensure he or she 
has established 
internal policies for 
the data managers 
to follow 
 Data subjects need
to stay aware of new 
privacy threats; they 
will usually need to 
do this on their own; 
some data 
 controllers are also
providing this type of 
awareness 
information to their 
 customers, so this is
a possibility as well 
Data subjects 
should understand 
how they can raise 
privacy concerns 





notices to ensure 
audits are 
conducted 
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Table 8.4 Effective Information Security Controls (continued) 
(continued) 
CAN BE USED
   CAN BE APPLIED BY
BY DATA
  DATA SUBJECTS FOR 
CONTROLLERS
  THE SYSTEMS AND 
AND DATA
  ACTIONS UNDER 
INFORMATION SECURITY CONTROLS PROCESSORS?
 THEIR CONTROL? 
PHYSICAL INFORMATION SECURITY POSSIBILITIES 
The following are some of the physical security controls that can be used, and have been found 
to be effective for generally all types of organizations.c 
• Protect against loss and theft: Establish controls Yes Yes 
to help prevent loss and theft of computing and 
digital storage devices and hard copy 
information. Use device tracking tools. Implement 
remote data wipe tools. Encrypt data on mobile 
storage devices to protect them in the event the 
devices are lost or stolen. 
• Disposal controls: Establish controls to help prevent Yes Yes 
disposal of readable or otherwise accessible data on 
digital storage devices and hard copy. 
• Don’t post sensitive information: Do not write down Yes Yes 
passwords and post in work areas, or anywhere else 
for that matter. Do not leave confidential information 
on whiteboards or in meeting areas. Do not include 
sensitive information within photos or videos.d 
• Establish effective physical security perimeters: Install Yes Yes 
walls, card-controlled entry gates, manned reception 
desks, fences, door locks, etc., as appropriate to 
mitigate risks around facilities that contain 
information and information processing facilities. 
• Entry controls: Secure areas should be protected by Yes Yes 
appropriate entry controls to ensure that only 
authorized personnel are allowed access. 
• Protect against external and environmental Yes Yes 
threats: Install physical protection to data storage 
and collection devices against damage from fire, 
flood, earthquake, explosion, civil unrest, and other 
forms of natural or man-made disasters. 
• Secure work areas: Implement physical protection Yes Yes 
and guidelines for working in secure areas. This 
includes when working in the field, within vehicles 
used for servicing, within home offices, etc. 
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INFORMATION SECURITY CONTROLS 
• Environmental protections: Protect data collection, 
transmission, and processing equipment from 

























a More detailed descriptions of technical security controls can be found in ISO/IEC 27002:2013; see 
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/store/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=54533. NIST 




d This happens much too often. For example, see https://twitter.com/GarethDEdwards/status/ 
197403763152138240/photo/1. 
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Table 8.4 Effective Information Security Controls (continued) 
data and personal information directly with data processors such as
third parties, or with data controllers that offer energy management
services without any involvement of utilities. Such instances are indi­
cated within the table. 
Privacy Responsibilities for the Data Controller/Data 
Custodian and the Data Processor/Data Manager* 
Data custodians, as well as their data processors, need to have all the 
appropriate security and privacy controls implemented that are listed 
in the “Privacy Possibilities and Responsibilities for the Data Subject”
section, as necessary to reduce their privacy risks to an acceptable
level. This means you should first perform a privacy impact assess­
ment (PIA) to determine your risks.† 
Table 8.5 shows the same privacy use case as in Table 8.3, which 
showed the data subject point of view for the privacy issues involved 
with using plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs). Table  8.5 is the same
* 	 There may be scenarios where the data controller has a different use case than the 
use case the data processor should use. However, for the purposes of illustrating
privacy use cases here, we’ve combined the two since they would both have the same 
responsibilities for this particular privacy use case. 
† 	An example PIA report is in NISTIR 7628 Rev. 1; see http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nist­
pubs/ir/2014/NIST.IR.7628r1.pdf. For tools and additional information on how to 
do PIAs, see http://hipaaprivacy.org/product/privacy-impact-assessment-training. 
Category: Demand response Privacy use case 12 
Scenario: Mobile plug-in electric vehicle functions 
CATEGORY DESCRIPTION 
 Demand response is a general capability that could be implemented in many different ways. The
primary focus is to provide prosumers with pricing information for current or future time periods so 
they may respond by modifying their demand. This may entail just decreasing load or may involve 
 shifting load by increasing demand during lower-priced time periods so that they can decrease
demand during higher-priced time periods. The pricing periods may be real time based or tariff 
based, while the prices may also be operationally based or fixed, or some combination. Real-time 
pricing inherently requires computer-based responses, while the fixed time-of-use pricing may be 
manually handled once the prosumer is aware of the time periods and the pricing. 
SCENARIO DESCRIPTION 
In addition to customers with PEVs participating in their home-based demand response 
functions, prosumers will have additional requirements for managing the charging and 
discharging of their mobile PEVs in other locations: 
• Prosumer connects PEV at another home 
• Prosumer connects PEV outside home territory 
• Prosumer connects PEV at public location 
SMART GRID CYBER SECURITY POTENTIAL STAKEHOLDER 
CHARACTERISTICS OBJECTIVES/REQUIREMENTS ISSUES 
• Enables active • Integrity is not critical, • Prosumer data privacy 
participation by since feed-in tariff and security 
prosumers pricing is fixed for long • Retail electric supplier 
• Accommodates all periods and is generally access 
generation and storage not transmitted • Prosumer data access 
options electronically 
• Enables new products, • Availability is not an 
services, and markets issue 
• Confidentiality is not an 
issue, except with 
respect to meter reading 
12.1 DATA PRIVACY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This use case presumes residential (one owner/car) situations, but DR may also be 
used with EV fleets that are common to governmental entities and other businesses. 
These recommendations address residential situations only. There are three possible 
grid interfaces considered here: basic 120 or 240 V plug for electricity downloads 
connected to a dumb or smart meter; a meter that is capable of running backwards 
for download and upload of electricity (net metering); and charging stations that can 
charge/discharge electricity to and from the grid. From the perspective of the 
prosumer relationship, utilities are involved in the first two interfaces in terms of 
owning the meter, but the third scenario may involve third parties that intermediate 
the utility-consumer relationship with ownership of charging stations. This would be 
similar to the situation in which old pay telephones were owned by a number of 
different vendors, not just the phone company. Consumers may not always be aware of 
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Table 8.5 Privacy Use Case for Data Custodian Use 
(continued) 
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Table 8.5 Privacy Use Case for Data Custodian Use (continued) 
the ownership of the charging point and may assume that the privacy policies and 
practices the utility adopts apply in all scenarios. Utilities may wish to add a 
statement in their general privacy policies that serves to educate prosumers that 
there are select situations where EV energy consumption data (or other data) could be 
handled by third parties that are not required to abide by utility privacy policies. 
12.2 Roaming models for AC charge billing purposes are developing around the world. DC or 
fast charging appears to follow the familiar gas station analogy of credit/debit/cash 
payments, although these charging stations may be installed for private use too. 
Credit cards or mobile phones will be the common payment mechanism for roaming 
charging, and may entirely bypass utilities as data custodians—other than the 
supply of electricity to the meter connected to the charging station equipment. 
However, here are some other scenarios to consider: 
Utilities may have personal prosumer data such as name, credit card/debit card, phone 
number, and address for billing for any roaming charge programs that they manage. 
In addition, customers may have opted for an electronic payment arrangement, so the 
utility would also have sensitive financial data and perhaps authorized access to 
deposit funds in cases of payments to consumers. For instance, California IOUs are 
not allowed to provide charging stations, so all charging stations will be owned by 
third-party energy service providers, property owners, municipal entities, or 
businesses. However, these utilities may still have smart charging agreements in 
place with specific cars or charging stations and will require this information. The 
AICPA security safeguard principle has specific application here. 
For charging or discharging that occurs away from the prosumer’s home address but is 
billed back to a utility account, utilities will need to determine what nonhome address 
location information is necessary to collect for billing/payment purposes, and what 
should be displayed on paper or electronic bills. Consider the amount of identification 
that appears on a bank statement if a consumer uses an ATM, or the level of detail on 
credit card statements for gas purchases to develop policies. Consider the minimum 
necessary information about charge time, date, and location on electric bills. The 
AICPA purpose specification and accountability principles apply here. 
Charging service providers (CSPs) or other contracted agents who act as utility agents 
may have access to personal data for billing purposes. Prosumers may not be aware 
of all the entities involved when they plug in to a charging station. The utility should 
consider clear, simple identification of all entities or some formal statement of the 
data management principle to help educate consumers as to the “data chain” that 
may be in place based on their relationships with utility, authorized contracted 
agents, and CSPs. The notice principle applies here. 
Note: The collection of location information creates special privacy concerns regarding 
EVs. It creates special safety and security concerns as well. This is pertinent for 
charging information that occurs at the consumer’s home, not just away from home. 
This is because EV charging at home could establish vehicle location for a given date 
and time if the EV is plugged in and actively charging or discharging. 
AICPA PRINCIPLE APPLIES: X NOTES 
12.3 Management X This use case covers mobile or roaming charge/ 
principle	 discharge. 
At home, charging/discharging information related to 
(continued) 
AICPA PRINCIPLE APPLIES: X NOTES 
PEVs provides motoring range and habit information 
 that can endanger a person’s safety and freedom.
This requires special privacy protection. 
When using a third-party charging station, there is a 
need to determine how all principles apply, and how 
consumers are educated is important. It may not be 
appropriate for a utility to address this issue, but it 
could still be a smart grid issue. Consumers will 
appreciate education from a trusted source to 
understand what personal data may be collected, 
used, and retained by various entities in mobile 
charging scenarios. 
Utilities will need to determine and assign 
responsibility for how EVs are incorporated into DR 
programs, and then develop appropriate privacy 
policies regarding any personal data that would 
accompany the reporting, billing, and management 
of these DR programs. 
12.4 Notice principle X Notice may be challenging when it is a charging 
station owned by a third party as discussed in 12.1. 
 Special efforts must be required of third parties through
the contracts between the third parties, utility-
 authorized contracted agents, and utilities. Utilities
should ensure that authorized contracted agents 
adhere to the privacy policies and practices enacted 
 by the utility to protect personal information and
energy consumption data. For unrelated third parties, 
utilities lack immediate or ongoing opportunities to 
inform consumers that different privacy policies may 
be in effect. Utilities may wish to add a statement to 
their general privacy policies that addresses EV 
 charging devices that are “in their control” or “out of
 their control,” and the consumers must be made
aware of the risk of disclosure of this information. 
12.5 Choice and X There may be choices available at the charging 
consent stations/points. If not, then the charging station 
principle should clearly indicate the data being collected, 
how they will be used, shared, and retained, and 
then obtain consent to use the data as a 
consequence of charging at that location. 
12.6 Collection X This principle applies for any entity that is delivering 
principle power or maintaining a financial transaction. Only the 
 data necessary for the customer to obtain the
electricity charge, and then for the charging company 
to be financially reimbursed, should be collected. 
(continued) 
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Table 8.5 Privacy Use Case for Data Custodian Use (continued) 
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Table 8.5 Privacy Use Case for Data Custodian Use (continued) 
AICPA PRINCIPLE APPLIES: X NOTES 
12.7 Use and retention X Data collected from PEV charging stations should be 
principle used only for the purposes of supporting the 
associated payments, and then irreversibly deleted 
after they are no longer needed for business 
purposes. If data is intended for planning, 
balancing, or operational purposes, the utility 
should adopt privacy-enhancing technologies and 
practice to anonymize this data and de-identify it. 
12.8 Access principle X Since charging stations may be owned by a number 
of entities, it may be difficult for individuals to 
know who to contact to gain access to their 
personal data. PEV charging stations need to 
ensure customers can get access to their 
associated PEV charging data, and access to this 
data within related businesses should be limited to 
only those with a business need to know. 
12.9 Disclosure to X Since charging stations may be owned by a number 
third parties of entities, it may be challenging to obtain implicit 
principle or explicit consent before sharing data. Even if 
consent is not feasible, consumers should be told 
the ways in which the data is used. 
12.10 Security for X Applies with special regard to any financial 
privacy principle transactions. Applies with special regard to 
location-based information. All personal data 
collected and created during these activities must 
be appropriately safeguarded to ensure 
unauthorized access to the data does not occur, to 
preserve integrity of the data, and to allow for 
appropriate availability. 
12.11 Quality principle X PEV charging data must be accurate, and controls 
need to be incorporated to ensure this. 
12.12 Monitoring and X Develop and maintain audit policies to ensure that 
enforcement procedures are consistently applied with regard to 
principle personal data. 
privacy use case, but now with the focus on data custodians. Data 
custodians and data processors can use privacy use cases to help deter­
mine the privacy risks and then identify the most appropriate con­
trols to mitigate the risks. The privacy use cases within NISTIR 7628
Rev.  1 use the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants  
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(AICPA) Generally Accepted Privacy Principles (GAPPs).* These are 
commonly used by auditors, and so make a practical tool to also use 
for privacy use cases. 
Other Helpful Privacy and Information Security Resources 
This chapter provides an excellent foundation for resources with pri­
vacy responsibilities to identify privacy and information security risks, 
and a description of some of the controls to implement to mitigate 
those risks. Here are some additional resources, in addition to the 
other resources listed in the footnotes throughout the book, that the 
authors recommend to energy data custodians, data processors, data 
subjects, and DPAs to protect privacy. 
From the authors: 
• 	 Christine Hertzog’s Smart Grid blog posts: http://www.
smartgridlibrary.com/home-2/blog/ 
• 	 SGL Partners consulting services: http://www.smartgrid 
library.com/consulting-services/ 
• 	 Rebecca Herold’s blog posts: http://www.privacyguidance. 
com/blog 
• 	Rebecca Herold’s Smart Grid privacy and informa­
tion security tools and services: http://hipaaprivacy.org/
product-category/energy-smart-grid-privacy/
From government and industry:
• 	 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST): 
http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/
• 	Federal government initiatives: https://www.smartgrid.
gov/federal_initiatives/featured_initiatives 
• 	Department of Energy: http://energy.gov/oe/services/
technology-development/smart-grid 
• 	National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL): 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/smart-grid-state­
action-update.aspx 
* 	 See http://www.aicpa.org/INTERESTAREAS/INFORMATIONTECHNOL
OGY/RESOURCES/PRIVACY/GENER ALLYACCEPTEDPRIVACY
PRINCIPLES/Pages/default.aspx. 
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From other sources: 
• 	Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC): http://
epic.org/privacy/smartgrid/smartgrid.html 
• 	Organization for the Advancement of Structured 









TRANSACTIVE  ENERGY 
We introduced the term transactive energy* as the future evolution of
the Smart Grid in Chapter 2. Transactive energy is an evolving con­
cept, as initial pilots are testing the capacities of existing technologies, 
policies, processes, and business models.† The Department of Energy, 
Pacific Northwest National Lab, and utilities including Bonneville
Power Administration and Portland General Electric are participat­
ing in a pilot discussed later in this chapter.
Transactive energy proponents envision an organized marketplace 
where prosumers can buy or sell electricity with confidence that trans­
actions are managed through enforceable rules that apply to all. This 
marketplace is managed in coordination with utility grid operations to 
ensure a safe and reliable supply of power for consumers. But the con­
cept of transactive energy also encourages grid resiliency—the abil­
ity to recover from man-made and natural disruptions—and reduces 
some of the grid fragility that we currently experience. Technologies
such as renewables coupled with energy storage, inexpensive sensors 
coupled with wireless networks, and analytics coupled with cost-effec­
tive data storage can support distributed energy resources (generation, 
demand response, energy efficiency, and storage) with highly distrib­
uted intelligence. All this helps grid managers operate with enhanced 
situational awareness, and that increases grid resiliency.
Transactive energy requires a convergence of technologies, policies, 
and financial drivers in an active prosumer market—where prosum­
ers are buildings, electric vehicles (EVs), microgrids, or distributed 
* 	 From the Smart Grid Dictionary, 6th edition: “Transactive energy is a business model 
that enables market participation for distributed energy resources (DER) supplying 
negawatts or kilowatts to an interconnected grid to support the delivery of safe, 
clean, resilient, reliable and cost-effective electricity.” 
† 	An early pilot or demonstration is occurring in the U.S. Pacific Northwest. The
Pacific Northwest Smart Grid Demonstration Project publishes an annual report
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energy resources (DERs) assets like solar panels, wind generators, 
or energy storage. In other words, the current market that exists at
the wholesale electricity level for large-scale energy transactions will
be mirrored at the distribution grid for smaller-scale transactions. 
Transactive energy democratizes the currently closed electricity mar­
ket. However, this market will have to be much more flexible, robust,
and scalable to support millions of participants instead of hundreds
to thousands of participants. It is a challenge, but Wall Street has 
managed stock markets with participation by large funds as well as
individual investors. 
We’ll briefly examine the three main drivers before exploring the
privacy considerations in the evolution from today’s grid to a Smart 
Grid that includes transactive energy. 
Technology 
The Smart Grid technologies of remote monitoring and control,
advanced analytics, and robust communications networks enable the 
transition to transactive energy at every point in the value chain from
generation to consumption and prosumption. The growth of competi­
tive, cost-effective solutions for co-generation, energy storage, and 
microgrids will accelerate partial to full self-sufficiency on the part
of critical infrastructure (i.e., first responder command centers and 
stations) at state, city, and county levels. Such initiatives are already 
under way in some states spurred by the experiences of Superstorm
Sandy.* However, private enterprise, particularly commercial entities
that place a high valuation on “uptime” of grids, can’t tolerate the
service disruptions that cost the American economy billions of dol­
lars annually, as noted in Chapter 2. Businesses will invest in DERs
and include sales of excess energy back to the grid in their return 
on investment (ROI) calculations. This practice already occurs when 
businesses consider the value of payments offered by utilities or energy
services providers (ESPs) for demand response (DR) participation.
Many buildings may already participate in utility or third-party 
DR programs and voluntarily reduce electricity (or gas) consumption
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during peak times of demand. Transactive markets envision the 
expansion of DR programs through automated demand response
(ADR) technologies. We’ll discuss an initiative called OpenADR 
later in this chapter.
Some large commercial buildings already deploy various build­
ing automation systems* (BASs) and energy management systems† 
(EMSs). These systems remotely monitor and control HVAC, light­
ing, and other significant usages of electricity in buildings and may 
collect and conduct data analysis to identify potential reductions in
energy use. The most sophisticated EMS solutions engage in continu­
ous commissioning‡ through data accumulated from heating, ventila­
tion, air conditioning (HVAC) sensors, occupant activities, and other 
sources, like weather reports.
EMS and ADR technologies help infuse buildings with much
more intelligence—also known as smart buildings. These technolo­
gies help position buildings as participants in transactive energy. For 
example, buildings can now automatically respond to price signals or
utility grid management requests to alter consumption for specific 
time durations. Transactive energy extends this functionality to kilo­
watt production or generation, so that buildings can automatically
respond to grid requests for energy. 
* 	 From the Smart Grid Dictionary: “Software and hardware deployed in buildings 
to automatically manage refrigeration, HVAC, lighting and other building energy
usage on a continuous basis. These control systems are the integrating components
to fans, pumps, heating/cooling equipment, dampers, mixing boxes, and thermo­
stats. Monitoring and optimizing temperature, pressure, humidity, and flow rates 
are key functions of modern building control systems. Many are designed to operate 
a single system, like refrigeration or HVAC. Sometimes known as EMCS (Energy 
Management and Control Systems) or Energy Management Systems (EMS), these 
systems integrate more control functions such as lighting as well as HVAC.” 
† 	From the Smart Grid Dictionary: “These control systems integrate HVAC, light­
ing, and other high-energy uses to effectively manage commercial and multifamily 
building energy consumption. The objective is to deliver optimal occupant comfort 
while minimizing energy use. Also known as EMCS (Energy Management and 
Control Systems).” 
‡ 	From the Smart Grid Dictionary: “A combination of processes, hardware, and soft­
ware to ensure that buildings are operating at peak energy efficiency to reduce
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Buildings can also become “hardened” nodes in the grid—meaning 
they can provide some or all of their own energy as more renewable 
generation, co-generation, and energy storage options are introduced 
to the market. It’s a small but growing trend to use Smart Grid tech­
nologies for generation of kilowatts and not just negawatts. 
Microgrids 
One of the most disruptive technologies in terms of altering today’s 
power grids will be microgrids. A microgrid is a small power sys­
tem that integrates self-contained generation, distribution, sensors,
energy storage, and energy management software with a seamless
and synchronized connection to a utility power system, and can oper­
ate independently as an island from that system. Generation includes
renewable energy sources and the ability to sell back excess capacity
to a utility. On-site microgrid management software includes controls
for the power generation, utility connect/disconnect, distribution, and 
energy storage equipment along with building energy management
applications for commercial and industrial (C&I) or home use.* 
Microgrids reduce the reliance on a utility to deliver electricity.
Industry research firms are optimistic about microgrid market 
potential, with market projections that include $6 billion in 2020
or $17 billion by 2017. In the United States, microgrids can provide 
energy surety for their owners.† Even when the surrounding grid is 
experiencing an outage, a microgrid can provide at least a percentage 
of power for the most important uses within its boundaries. For 
example, a college campus that operates a microgrid may prioritize
occupied dormitories and critical research facilities over unoccupied 
classroom buildings to receive power from a microgrid when utility-
supplied power is disrupted. Today, operational and safety standards 
require that any microgrid connected (or grid-tied) to the utility
grid has to shut down if the larger grid experiences an outage. There 
* From the Smart Grid Dictionary, 6th edition. 
† 	In developing economies, microgrids hold significant promise to eliminate energy
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are standards bodies working to change this without compromising 
worker safety, which is of paramount concern for everyone.
Microgrids will be attractive first to critical infrastructure and large
commercial customers with the highest utility bills to seek to reduce 
their operating costs and gain more control over their energy surety.
Over time, as more cost effective solutions are available, smaller com­
mercial customers and even residential customers will adopt microgrid 
technologies for some or all of their electricity. Smart Grid technolo­
gies are evolutionary drivers enabling transitions to transactive energy. 
Leveraging these technologies will help build grid resiliency and open
the electricity market participation by prosumers. 
Regulatory Policy 
Regulatory policy is a revolutionary driver for transactive energy. 
The increase in severe storms, ranging from Superstorm Sandy to the 
polar vortex, is the causative factor for legislative actions and regula­
tory policies that encourage utilities to invest in grid resiliency with
deployments of DERs and microgrids. This is one of the anticipated 
outcomes of the previously referenced “Reforming the Energy Vision” 
report from the New York Public Service Commission and the 
California Public Utilities Commission’s energy storage mandates to
its regulated investor-owned utilities (IOUs).
Historically, regulated utilities were encouraged to build reliable
grids with the expectations of downtime. The real costs of outages 
were not factored in to regulatory decisions, but that practice has lost
its luster and more utility commissions now encourage grid designs 
and deployments that build resiliency. However, there’s growing 
acknowledgment that utilities cannot create more resilient grids on
their own. The Interstate Renewable Energy Council (IREC) pub­
lished a white paper that should be read by every utility regulator 
and state legislator interested in grid modernization involving DER
deployments. “The Integrated Distribution Planning Concept Paper”* 
offers practical suggestions that help build the foundation for transac­
tive energy by leveraging private investments. 
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IREC focuses on regulatory policy innovations to enable deploy­
ment and interconnection of clean energy like solar in the distribution 
grid. Interconnection from the distribution grid perspective refers to
the utility processes that ensure that interconnection of DERs like
solar occur in a timely manner with safe, reliable, and high-quality
electricity flow. It’s sorely needed. Grid-connected solar photovol­
taic capacity jumped 4,000% from 2005 to 2012, according to IREC 
research. That’s a good indicator that DER deployments won’t wait
for state or local policies when and where investors and owners can 
make favorable business cases now. 
Interconnection requests might require utility upgrades of grid
equipment. Utility planners have to consider the local circuit design
and the type, size, and location of the DER asset on that circuit. 
Since distribution grids were designed for a one-way power flow 
from generators to consumers, not the new Smart Grid value chain 
that includes prosumers enabled to supplement/substitute/sell power,
there’s a good chance that some grid investment is required.
The paper described interconnection processes in California, 
Hawaii, Massachusetts, and PEPCO, a utility with a footprint in New 
Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland. These entities have demonstrated 
leadership in regulatory policies to address the explosive growth of
DER interconnection requests. Creative policies identified in the 
paper include development of new utility plans that incorporate DERs
into grid modernization initiatives. California’s policy requires utilities 
to consider how generation assets in the distribution grid can “defer
transformer and transmission line upgrades, extend equipment main­
tenance intervals, reduce electrical line, losses, and improve distribu­
tion system reliability, all with cost savings to utilities.” This policy
statement is significant because it determines that assets that are not 
owned by a utility can have a quantifiable value to the utility, and there­
fore helps create the policy foundation for a transactive energy market.
The paper’s approach, called integrated distribution planning
(IDP), determines the status (particularly capacity) of the exist­
ing distribution equipment and identifies potential upgrades that
may be needed to accommodate anticipated distributed generation
(DG) growth in a five-step process. With adoption of the poli­
cies and practices as promulgated in IREC’s paper, utilities can
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assets can engineer resiliency into the local grid or defer expensive
capacity upgrades. Potential DER asset owners—commercial and
residential—could be financially motivated to take on these types
of projects with reduced risks because utilities could think about
these assets in newly useful ways.
These regulatory policies are significant and new, making policy
a revolutionary driver in building an electricity value chain based on
transactive energy concepts. 
Finance 
There is growing innovation in the types of financial tools available for 
utility and nonutility investments in generation, creating new sources
of capital that bring down the costs of funding. It’s a complicated topic 
because financing mechanisms for residential purposes are sometimes 
quite different than commercial or utility-scale funding options. On 
top of that, financing tools and considerations may differ for genera­
tion of kilowatts (such as solar production) versus generation of nega­
watts (like energy efficiency projects).
Finance drivers are often closely intertwined with policy drivers,
and those synergies are quite apparent here. We’ll start at the federal 
level and work down to local initiatives, and then briefly discuss pri­
vate enterprise activity in innovative financial mechanisms that have
ramifications for the Smart Grid and transactive energy.
A master limited partnership (MLP) is a publicly traded part­
nership for an energy asset. First launched in 1981, today’s MLPs
are traded on public stock exchanges, offering individual as well as
institutional investors the necessary structures to buy and sell shares
in gas/oil/coal extraction and pipeline projects. In 2008, Congress
expanded the definitions of MLP projects to include ethanol, biodie­
sel, and other alternative fuels projects. There are two primary benefits 
of MLPs. First, they operate on a pass-through tax structure,* which 
lowers the cost of capital. Second, they allow companies to build and 
operate energy-producing assets and offer a sufficient rate of return 
that is appealing to investors. 
* 	 A pass-through means that the MLP does not pay tax, just the shareholders (typi­
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In 2012, traditional MLPs attracted $23 billion for projects, for 
a total of about $325 billion in market capital. Imagine what a simi­
lar pool of money could do for investments in clean generation from
solar, wind, and geothermal as well as energy storage. This amount of 
capital dwarfs the $4 billion spent on the Smart Grid in the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) or Stimulus Fund of 2009. 
Were a similar pool of capital available for renewable energy and 
energy storage projects, it would give investors opportunities to be 
green with their money and make a steady income return on their 
investments. MLPs could be a game changer for utilities and corpora­
tions seeking sources of capital for large-scale renewables and energy
storage projects. There’s a proposed bipartisan U.S. Senate bill* to
extend MLP structures to renewables and energy storage, but as this
book was written, it faces an uncertain future. 
Residential and commercial property assessed clean energy (PACE)
programs are another promising strategy to finance DER projects. 
To date, 28 states and Washington, D.C., have approved PACE pro­
grams for residential use. Two states, California and Colorado, have 
approved commercial PACE programs. These programs rely on bonds 
whose proceeds are used by borrowers (building owners) to fund
renewable or energy efficiency projects. PACE loans remove the sub­
stantial up-front costs of projects and enable owners to save on energy 
costs and create local jobs during the deployment phases of those proj­
ects. By some industry estimates, the market for commercial PACE
projects could exceed $180 billion.
There are other interesting state initiatives to encourage invest­
ment in DER assets. Voter initiatives like California’s Proposition 39, 
enacted in 2013, closed a corporate tax loophole and mandated that
50% of the newly recovered tax revenues for the next 5 years ($500 
million/year) be spent on renewable and energy efficiency projects in
California public schools. The California Energy Commission calcu­
lates that the state’s schools (excluding colleges and universities) spend 
$132 in energy costs per student each year. That’s an annual bill of
$700 million. A projected average of 30% savings for energy efficiency
* 	 The Master Limited Partnerships Parity Act (S. 795) introduced by Sen. Chris
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initiatives alone would result in $240 million per year that could go to
textbooks and teacher salaries. 
Green Bank initiatives are another innovative funding mechanism 
for grid modernization. New York is the third state to launch a Green 
Bank to fund clean energy projects. Seeded with $210 million to start,
it intends to attract enough private capital to fund $1 billion in proj­
ects. The Green Bank addresses significant barriers for development
and deployment of clean energy and DER projects. These are the lack
of funding for cost-effective loans and for loan loss reserves, and the 
lack of securitization for such projects. Investment criteria will be 
aligned with the state’s Public Service Commission’s clean energy and 
system resiliency program goals. While the state of Connecticut gets 
the distinction for having the first Green Bank, New York has the 
largest fund to date.* 
At the private enterprise level, one of the most intriguing finan­
cial innovations uses crowd-sourced funds to encourage retail inves­
tors to participate in renewable energy-generation projects—not just
large institutional investors. As the Smart Grid enables consumers of
electricity to become producers of electricity (prosumers), the Internet 
democratizes the investment marketplace—much as transactive
energy democratizes the electricity marketplace.
One of these services is offered by a company called Mosaic.† The 
company finds and qualifies solar projects and connects investors to
them. Investment minimums are $25, opening the market to moti­
vated investors eager to join renewable energy markets. Residents of
New York and California can participate by virtue of their location. 
People in other states must be accredited investors. Every solar project 
is fully subscribed—some in as little as 24 hours. It is an innovative
approach that addresses a significant unmet need for investors who 
wish to participate in DER deployments but lack opportunities. Some
of those reasons include tenants who cannot put solar on the rooftops 
of their rental homes or apartments, and their landlords who derive 
no financial benefits from deploying such systems on their rental
* 	 Hawaii is the third Green Bank state, and California is organizing a similar initia­
tive. New Jersey has proposed creation of an Energy Resilience Bank, which also
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properties. It will be interesting to see if this same program can be 
applied to energy storage projects in the future.
From a landlord’s perspective, real estate values are often higher for 
green buildings with Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design
(LEED) recognition. Tenants are willing to pay a premium for the status
of living or working in energy-efficient and carbon-reduced buildings.
In the future, buildings that are grid hardened or energy self-sufficient
may also command premium prices because they preserve comfort and
safety of occupants regardless of utility grid status. It is a compelling
new variable in value propositions for property owners as they seek com­
petitive differentiators from other rental properties. It is also a sign of
the times about how financial motivations can serve as drivers for DER
investments, and create more participants in transactive energy markets.
These innovative financing mechanisms drive grid transformation
investments along the entire value chain, from generation to consump­
tion. In the process, we increase grid resiliency through distributed 
renewables generation, reduce our carbon footprints, and allocate prof­
its and cost savings into local economies. Financial innovations also 
open up energy markets for prosumers and small investors. As a Smart 
Grid driver, finance is revolutionary and can accelerate investments 
in DERs and microgrids, help democratize the market, and deliver a 
broader range of Smart Grid benefits to a wider pool of participants.
As noted earlier, these transactive energy drivers portend signifi­
cant changes from today’s electricity markets, which are only avail­
able to qualified suppliers able to trade in large quantities (megawatts 
and negawatts) of electricity. The U.S. stock market offers some good 
analogies. The large institutional traders like pension funds would be 
the equivalent of qualified suppliers of electricity, buying or selling
huge blocks of stock. Prosumers at the distribution grid level would be 
the equivalent of individuals managing their 401(k) stock portfolios 
and buying or selling electricity at preferred price points.
So what does this chapter have to do with privacy? Most of our
discussion about privacy has so far focused on energy usage data. 
Transactive energy expands the discussion to energy production data. 
Transactive energy means new varieties of data coming from many
market participants and sector players, with data velocities that rival
those of existing stock markets. It will also mean new volumes of
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networks. And finally, the need for absolute confidence in the data to
accurately settle, buy, and sell transactions based on dynamic pricing 
will put an emphasis on data veracity.
The transactive energy market will evolve over time, and we’ll 
examine the initial steps with commentary on the energy production 
data that is created. Let’s first define energy production data and its 
value. Energy production data is data that identifies the flow of elec­
tricity for a device that generates or discharges electricity.* Energy
production data describes how much energy is produced by a genera­
tion device so it can be used for operational or financial purposes. If
it’s a smart device (and most of them are), it will have communication
capabilities and could be enabled for remote monitoring and control.
Various stakeholders will have different interests in this data, and we 
group them into four categories: prosumers, governments, utilities, 
and vendors. 
Prosumers are the owners of DER assets. They can be individuals 
or businesses. Prosumers will want data that details the performance 
of their assets. This data would help answer questions such as: 
• How much electricity is the asset producing? 
• Is the device operating at optimal levels? 
• How much electricity is used on-site versus sold back to the grid? 
• What is the price of electricity at buy/sell transaction points? 
• How much money has been saved, offset, or earned? 
Obviously, there is other data that is combined with energy pro­
duction data to answer these questions. As noted before, the accurate
measurement of the electricity sold back to the grid would come from
a utility-supplied meter—the ultimate cash register for buying and 
selling. Pricing data would not reside in a generation device, but an
energy management system that controls it would most likely have 
programmed instructions regarding the price points for buy and sell
transactions. Prosumers may not want others to know how much
energy they are producing from their solar panels or wind generators, 
or how much electricity their EV sells back to the grid. The bottom
line is that financial information is sensitive information, and there­
fore establishing privacy controls for this data is important. 
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Governments range from local to federal entities and regulatory
agencies. They may want to track overall production from DER assets 
and microgrids to measure the success of policies that encourage these 
investments to build grid resiliency. Given that this is a new area with
many research interests and more questions than answers, we could 
see similar pilot programs like the ChargeAmerica project, with vol­
unteers who consent to provide energy production data. Governments 
would be interested in data that answered the same questions prosum­
ers would have, but at an aggregated scale. This data could be anony­
mized to protect asset owner privacy. From another perspective, there 
may also be interest in identifying electricity production that seems
oversized to site needs. 
Utilities need energy production data to appropriately plan for
ongoing or backstop load requirements for interconnected DERs and 
microgrids. By virtue of their meter ownership, they already have an
established “primary purpose” right to energy usage data for billing 
and operational purposes. Without a doubt, they would want the same
arrangement for energy production data. In a transactive energy sce­
nario, they may manage DER assets on behalf of the asset owners (pri­
vate individuals or businesses) and would need all performance data, 
along with remote monitoring and control capabilities of those DER 
assets. This data would be necessary to provide safe grid operations 
and accurate settlement reports (think of stock sales and purchases).
Utility treatment of energy production data should be governed by
the same privacy policies in place for energy usage data, but special 
consideration needs to be given to situations where third parties are 
involved. The scenarios previously discussed for Green Button data—
in which some vendors are covered entities and bound by utility poli­
cies, while others are not—would need to be documented in use cases 
to fully understand the chain of data custody.
Vendors have a number of interests in energy production data. 
For example, if solar panel vendors and installers have access to
energy production data for the solar panels on your roof, perhaps 
they could determine if your selected product produced the solar 
efficiency claimed by a competitor. They could certainly use produc­
tion data to spot trends in performance degradation and pitch their
upgrade or maintenance services. Interesting distinctions arise around 
the relationship that an ESP or product vendor has with the asset 
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owner—presumably the owner of the energy production data. This is 
similar to the distinctions made between third parties that are cov­
ered entities or have some affiliation with the utility or with the asset 
owner and those that do not have a relationship. A comprehensive 
portfolio of use cases can fully detail the data ownership and resulting 
privacy risk mitigation strategies.
Now that we’ve described energy production data and some of its 
potential values, let’s explore the evolutionary transition to transac­
tive energy and the role of energy production data. Net metering isn’t 
often thought of in transactive energy terms, but it is an illuminating 
first evolutionary step.
Net metering is the capability for residential and commercial and 
industrial (C&I) customers to generate electricity and sell back excess
power to the utility.* Net metering uses either a single, bidirectional
electric meter or two meters to separately measure production and 
consumption electricity flows at a prosumer’s location. Net metering 
is currently implemented on a state-by-state basis with significant
variation between states and utilities. Some net metering setups use 
smart meters; others rely on traditional electromechanical meters. Net 
metering has experienced significant growth in the United States, as
tracked by the Energy Information Administration in Figure 9.1.
Note: The chart counts the number of net metering custom­
ers and does not indicate the generator size or amount of genera­
tion. Nonresidential includes the commercial and industrial sectors;
Figure 9.1 Growth of net metering in the USA. (Courtesy of the U.S. Energy Information 










178 DATA PRIVACY FOR THE SMART GRID 
net-metered generators in these sectors are typically larger than resi­
dential generators.
Net metering essentially is self-generation structured in organized 
transactions with a utility. Pricing is fixed by utility tariffs, so unlike a 
true transactive energy market, there’s no dynamism in prices. It does
serve as the first step to transactive energy, since many utilities have 
long-term plans to switch from fixed pricing to time of use pricing 
or dynamic pricing. In today’s net metering scenarios, the utility still 
owns the meters, and all the existing meter data privacy guidelines
apply to the energy production data. Could this change in transac­
tive energy? Possibly. We see similarities to the scenario for energy
usage data. If the state or utility policy holds that the prosumer owns 
his or her meter data, then production data should be handled just 
like usage data. If the status of ownership of meter data is not well 
defined, or if the position is the utility owns the data, that would trig­
ger real concerns about the privacy of energy production data. From a 
future transactive energy perspective, if an ESP is aggregating power 
generated from a number of locations and selling it back to utilities
(much like they do with DR aggregation today), then the situation
is even more complicated. It will be important to consider the entire 
data chain of custody through use cases to develop appropriate privacy
policies and practices. 
OpenADR 
The OpenADR* initiative is focused on standardizing, automating,
and simplifying DR programs and technologies. It’s the most compre­
hensive and widely used Internet Protocol (IP)-based communications 
standard for electricity providers and system operators to exchange 
DR signals with buildings and equipment within buildings. Existing 
ADR technologies are based on competing standards and incompat­
ible protocols, and when coupled with a similar variety in building 
energy management systems, they create difficult and expensive inte­
gration challenges. OpenADR aims to resolve much of that overhead
complexity, and thus accelerate the participation rates of buildings 
into DR programs and negawatt production. OpenADR is the de facto 
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standard for the state of California’s building code,* which mandates
that all new buildings must support a standards-based DR signal.
As described before, for building owners and managers, participa­
tion delivers payments for reductions in electricity use or lower rates
throughout the year—nice impacts to their operating costs. The
OpenADR Alliance is currently piloting an offer of LEED credits for
participation in ADR, which means that buildings will receive sustain-
ability recognition too. That reinforces the premium value that prop­
erty owners can charge to tenants in buildings participating in ADR.
However, the alliance has a very ambitious goal—to be the “last mile”
of transactive energy. In fact, there is a profile held in reserve (2.0c) that
will have features supportive of the transactive energy model.
From a privacy perspective, there are important distinctions to note
between commercial buildings and residential buildings, which can be
subcategorized into multifamily and single-family dwellings. There is
an incredible amount of energy usage data that is created, transmitted,
and analyzed to manage commercial buildings. In the future, this data
would include energy production data regarding measured electricity
from devices, performance alarms and status updates for those devices,
as well as financial transaction data such as buy and sell details. This data
may have significant value in delivering detailed knowledge of building
operations, but it may not reveal any useful personal information since the
meter may be assigned to a corporation rather than an individual.
For residential scenarios, energy production data would have the same
sensitivities as energy usage data, or the data produced in net metering sce­
narios. However, with the exception of multifamily residential properties, 
many residential OpenADR participants may have a relationship with
an ESP who serves as an intermediary to the local utility. Multifamily
residential properties may have a similar arrangement, or be large enough
to have a facilities manager who coordinates directly with a utility. 
Going Forward 
The Pacific Northwest Smart Grid Demonstration Project† is a 
multiyear initiative that is now testing transactive controls as key 
* Title 24 of the California Energy Code went into effect January 1, 2014. 














Figure 9.2 The Pacific Northwest Smart Grid Demonstration Project territory. (From http://www. 
pnwsmartgrid.org.) 
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components to transactive energy markets. The project defines trans-
active control as a distributed system that uses signals communicating 
the current and expected state of the grid, so that electricity users
and energy resources can adapt to time-granular changes in grid
supply and demand. DER assets such as solar panels, smart appli­
ances, energy storage units, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs),
and backup generators are participating in this demonstration. The 
project is collecting data from 60,000 metered customers who have 
a variety of voluntary participation options through the 11 utilities
throughout five states, shown in Figure 9.2, that are also part of the 
demonstration. 
These customers cover residential and C&I categories, and are
engaged in programs through the utilities that make up this pilot.
Participation for the most part consists of negawatt production,
although two utilities installed solar panels for distributed genera­
tion with volunteers from their customer base, and one utility had
a commercial enterprise with an existing solar installation share
its energy production data. There is no single overarching privacy
policy that covers all participants of this pilot, although this simply
reflects the fragmented nature of our electricity sector as well as our
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collection is extremely important to gain knowledge and insights
to apply to future transactive energy operations and market models.
All pilot participants’ privacy needs must be carefully documented
to ensure that the appropriate policies and procedures are in place to
protect privacy.
Transactive energy creates new data—energy production data. In 
many scenarios, its treatment should not vary from the privacy protec­
tions for energy usage data. However, if energy usage data has weak
privacy protections, the expansion into energy production data offers
an excellent opportunity to update and enhance privacy protections 
for all data. Development of scenarios or use cases that reflect the
coming transactive energy changes and identify the data chain of cus­
tody can help prepare regulators and legislators, utilities, vendors, and 

















PRIVACY  CLAIMS 
There are many individuals and groups that are taking bits of truth 
with regard to Smart Grid privacy risks and blowing them up into
unsubstantiated, and often completely fictional, claims to spread fear, 
uncertainty, and doubt (FUD). Such alarmists are found quickly via 
an Internet search. Many are using scare tactics to encourage indi­
viduals to remove smart meters themselves from their homes, a very
physically dangerous thing to do!
Here are some facts, pointing out what is possible and what is not,
to address some of the most common unsubstantiated claims made by 
groups or individuals with regard to Smart Grid privacy. 
Claim 1: Data from smart meters goes directly to government
agencies through the Smart Grid transmission lines.
No, in the United States, data from smart meters does not 
go directly to government agencies. Smart meter data goes to
the utilities that use them for billing purposes. If a govern­
ment agency wants smart meter data, it must bring a subpoena 
or other appropriate documentation to the utility, and list the 
specific types of data it needs (e.g., from a specific address for 
a specific range of time). The utility will then give it only the 
specified data, as required by law and energy standards. This 
process has been in place for decades, and is not becoming less
strenuous because of smart meters. 
There may be some types of smart meters that homeowners 
have connected directly to their home area networks (HANs)
or home energy management systems (HEMSs). In this case,
it would be possible for the homeowner to purposefully and 
knowingly send his or her energy usage data to others. And, if
he or she did not set up his or her HAN or HEMS securely, 
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he or she may leave it vulnerable for unauthorized access. 
However, those situations are under the control of the resi­
dents, are not made from the smart meter, and are not some­
thing the utility can control. 
Claim 2: The utilities share all smart meter data with third 
parties, including mail houses, debt collectors, and data 
processing analysts.
  No, in the United States the utilities are not sharing energy 
usage data with third parties without consumer consent with 
two exceptions:
 1.	  Data may be shared with a company under contract to 
a utility to provide a service necessary to the delivery of 
electricity, such as meter repairs. 
 2.	  Data may be shared if there is a state-level legal reason to 
do so. For instance, a public utility commission may order 
data to be shared for energy efficiency studies.
  Most U.S. utilities are regulated at the state level, by pub­
lic utilities commissions or public service commissions. These 
state regulations govern when, why, and with whom data may 
be shared. There are typically fines for breaking these regula­
tions. These regulations have been in place for decades, and 
are not becoming more lenient because of smart meters.
  Municipal utilities and rural electric member cooperatives 
(coops) answer to their city governments or utility boards and 
their electricity customers serving as owners and voters. These 
categories of utilities are governed by existing state and local 
privacy laws and often follow the policy lead of the regulated, 
investor-owned utilities (IOUs). In some states, the commis­
sions that regulate IOUs also have jurisdiction over munici­
pals and cooperatives.
  At the time of this writing, outside the United States, there 
was a wide range of protections, and often no protections, 
governing energy usage data. Possibly the most guidance and 
rules have been established within the European Union.* 
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Claim 3: Smart meters are not optional. The U.S. government
is forcing them on the public to spy on them!
The U.S. government does not govern the use of smart 
meters, or any other hardware components used at the energy
consumers’ residence, to provision the delivery of energy ser­
vices. Requirements for consumer hardware necessary for 
energy delivery services are governed at the state level. Many
states have begun offering an opt-out capability with regard
to smart meters. However, this opt-out option often comes 
with an extra fee to cover the additional work of reading an
analog meter. This also means a customer would not gain any 
benefits of a smart meter, such as faster repair times following 
a service disruption. 
Claim 4: The utilities and U.S. government will now be able
to control every appliance within each consumer’s home, 
shutting off energy supply without warning.
  U.S. regulations* do not allow utilities to modify the work­
ing of any appliance or electronics within a customer’s home
without first gaining customer approval. Also, an energy-con­
suming device has to be correctly enabled, usually by setting a
special device on appliances or electronics, in order to be con­
trolled by a utility. This function, commonly known as demand
response, has been around for many years. Regulations are not
becoming less stringent because of smart meters.
Related to this, it is important for energy consumers to be 
aware of the access they are providing directly to third parties 
as a result of using smart appliances, HANs, and HEMSs. 
Energy consumers must perform their own due diligence to
ensure these third parties have appropriate privacy protec­
tions and security controls implemented. 
Claim 5: Utilities will be able to use smart meters to know
your in-home activities based upon detailed energy usage,
down to the appliance level. 
* 	 See the primary U.S. federal regulations governing utilities at http://energy.gov/
NODE/11611. 
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Using nonintrusive appliance load monitoring (NALM)
techniques,* interval energy usage at different time periods 
can be used to infer individual appliances’ portions of energy
usage by comparison to libraries of known patterns matched 
to individual appliances. However, studies have shown that
individual appliance inference or patterns of appliance usage 
are not truly possible unless the usage data is gathered more 
frequently than every 15 minutes. Many utilities in the United
States are only gathering usage data once per hour or less fre­
quently.† It is important to keep in mind that such analysis
has already been shown to be possible with an analog meter‡ 
as well, so this capability is not new with smart meters.
  Disaggregation technologies§ can provide this level of
detail, but require consumer consent and active participation
in order to develop it. 
Claim 6: Smart meters transmit personal information.
In the United States, at the time of this writing, no tradi­
tional personal information (e.g., name, address, phone num­
ber, etc.) was being transmitted by smart meters. There is a 
unique code associated with each smart meter to ensure billing 
accuracy that is part of the ANSI C12.19 standards for meter 
data that is sent with the energy usage data transmission. 
* 	 From NISTIR 7628 Rev.  1: “Using nonintrusive appliance load monitoring
(NALM) techniques, interval energy usage at different time periods can be used
to infer individual appliances’ portions of energy usage by comparison to librar­
ies of known patterns matched to individual appliances. NALM techniques have
many beneficial uses for managing energy usage and demand, including pinpointing 
loads for purposes of load balancing or increasing energy efficiency. However, such
detailed information about appliance use has the potential to indicate whether a 
building is occupied or vacant, show residency patterns over time, and potentially 
reflect intimate details of people’s lives and activities inside their homes.” 
† 	Per information gathered from utilities during NIST Smart Grid CSWG Working 
Group research, which occurred between July 2009 and the publication of this book.
Also per a representative from the Utility Analytics Institute. 
‡ 	This is demonstrated in the famous research study by Elias Leake Quinn, Smart 
Metering and Privacy: Existing Law and Competing Policies, Spring 2009, p. 3,
http://www.dora.state.co.us/puc/DocketsDecisions/DocketFilings/09I-593EG/
09I-593EG_Spring2009Report-Smart GridPrivacy.pdf. Note: A hob heater is a 
top-of-stove cooking surface. 
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This unique identifier for the smart meter does not explicitly 
indicate name, address, or other traditional types of personal
information. It is important to establish safeguards for those 
smart meter codes used for billing to ensure they cannot be 
accessed by others who are not authorized. 
Claim 7: Smart meters can tell when people are at home or 
when the home is empty, so burglars will have an easy time
finding targets.
The answer depends upon the security controls imple­
mented within the smart meter. This claim is most likely cor­
rect if, for example, everyone is away from a home and if a 
burglar had access to this smart meter information. The abil­
ity for bad guys to have access to smart meter data is deter­
mined by the security and encryption of data at the meter,
during transmissions, and in utility networks and computer
systems. Utilities do need to ensure that they exercise appro­
priate security precautions.
When considering the actions that energy customers take
related to this, it is important to point out that energy custom­
ers using HANs and HEMSs need to also have the appropri­
ate security controls established to keep such burglars, or any 
others for that matter, from being able to access this data to
determine whether or not the home is empty.
And, outside of the Smart Grid, everyone must ensure they
do not communicate on online social media sites or other places
when they are away from their homes. Growing numbers of
burglars are finding targets by reading Facebook pages.* 
Claim 8: Smart meters can determine how you spend your 
time. 
This is a true statement about your use of electrically 
run devices if the smart meter is used with technology that
* 	 Many news stories over the years support this. For example, see Most Burglars Using 
Facebook and Twitter to Target Victims, Survey Suggests, http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/technology/news/8789538/Most-burglars-using-Facebook-and-Twitter-to­
target-victims-survey-suggests.html and Going on Summer Vacation? Don’t Tip 
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disaggregates* electricity signatures, or if the data is subse­
quently obtained and analyzed with a disaggregation method. 
However, without disaggregation, a meter transmission on an
hourly basis would not be able to distinguish any difference 
in kWh consumed plus the other measurements, like voltage 
and current, that would be able to provide a clear picture of
how time was being spent within the home. 
Claim 9: Smart meters can be used to identify medical equip­
ment and give insurance companies information that 
affects your premiums.
This is possible only if the electricity usage data is disag­
gregated and unique signatures of electricity used by devices 
and appliances are identified, and if the data is subsequently 
provided to insurance companies. At the time of this writing,
within the United States, and possibly in other countries as
well, there are no laws, regulations, or agreements giving any 
other entity beyond the utility and its contracted third parties 
access to smart meter data. 
This points to the need for any entity with legitimate and 
authorized access to or possession of the data to have strong
security controls to protect the energy usage data, in addition
to having defined organizational privacy policies governing
the use and sharing of the data.
It is important to note that other methods exist for insur­
ance companies to suss this out, such as buying your credit
card history to examine purchases of medical services, or buy­
ing search history data from Google. 
* See the Chapters 5 and 7 for more thorough discussions of disaggregation technolo­











BEYOND THE  SMART  GRID: 
THE  MONETIZATION OF  DATA 
The Smart Grid sector made and continues to make significant invest­
ments in machine-to-machine (M2M) communications and appli­
cations that rely on sensors to collect data from connected devices. 
Depending on sensor functionalities, data collection can include: 
• 	Measurements of flow: Voltage, current, phase angle, watts 
produced or used. 
•	 Performance: Parameters like temperature, vibration, or pressure. 
• 	 Date and time stamps. 
• 	 Geographic information: Latitude and longitude. 
•	 Identification/authentication of user. 
Smart Grid technologies create greater volumes of data and new 
sources of data—almost exclusively structured data* since it is obtained
from devices like smart meters or other sensored machines and com­
ponents. But the electricity sector is not the only sector to confront
challenges and opportunities with this new data. The transformations 
that are occurring now in the electricity sector are also causing disrup­
tions in other sectors, such as transportation and the growth of vehicle 
telematics,† as well as healthcare medical devices and the adoption of
personal monitoring devices.‡ Data has significant promise to change 
* 	 Structured data is data that is organized according to a consistent standard. Much
of it is generated by devices in the form of events (such as a change in a temperature 
measurement or a detection of motion), but it also includes data input by humans, 
such as name, address, gender, age, etc. 
† 	Telematics is the equivalent of Smart Grid technologies embedded in a car—it
includes sensors, communications technologies, and onboard and remote analytics 
applications, and it can improve operational performance as well as human interac­
tions with a vehicle. 
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how we do business, how we conduct our lives, and how we see the 
world. It is important to remember, though, that with more data and 
more capabilities to make such changes also come more privacy risks 
that must be addressed and appropriately mitigated.
The Internet of Things (IOT) includes the Smart Grid plus a grow­
ing array of M2M applications that leverage sophisticated sensors. The 
newest buzzword, the Internet of Everything (IOE), converges human
interactions with device networks. The IOE correlates machine-gen­
erated data with human-generated data for action and insights. 
Sensor Proliferation 
A quick digression is needed about sensors, because sensors have been
around for a long time, but now are rapidly proliferating in both tradi­
tional and innovative new applications. Sensors require power to operate,
and in many cases, these sensors require batteries for power. Batteries
expire, making it impractical to consider replacing power supplies in
mass quantities of sensors on a periodic basis. Technology advances on
many fronts, ranging from materials science discoveries to continued
improvements in microprocessors, and has led to a veritable explosion
of much more flexible sensors that require much less power to function,
or now have embedded capabilities to produce their own power.* For
instance, it is now not only technically but also practically feasible to
deploy sensors for applications that would benefit from remote moni­
toring capabilities. For instance, a solution called Waspmote† can be 
deployed in forests for early fire detection. Researchers in South Korea
announced the development of a prototype sensor the size of a post­
age stamp that detects goose bumps on skin to monitor physical and
emotional responses in humans.‡ Sensors will continue to proliferate
in every imaginable business sector and generate new varieties of data.
* 	 Energy harvesting advances are announced with some regularity, eliminating the 
need for batteries in many sensors, and thus dramatically increasing the possibilities 
for what can be monitored. See http://electronicdesign.com/power/energy-harvest­
ing-and-wireless-sensor-networks-drive-industrial-applications and http://newsof­
fice.mit.edu/2010/energy-harvesting for some examples. 
† http://www.libelium.com/products/waspmote/. 
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Social media participation and electronic production and consumption
of content are increasing too—and creating daily terabytes and pet­
abytes* and more of unstructured data. Sensors create big data.
The ability to digest this big data as its variety, volume, velocity, and 
veracity grow presents significant challenges. Data analytics, leverag­
ing impressive computing power, is the main tool to make sense of all 
this data. Data analytics has a sense of time and function. Analytics 
can be descriptive, predictive, or prescriptive. Descriptive is by far 
the most common. The energy management systems described ear­
lier typically use descriptive analytics to provide a summary of what
happened or what is happening, usually directed to a smart phone 
or computer. A car’s dashboard reflects descriptive data analytics as
well as some predictive analytics, such as messages regarding main­
tenance. At the time of this writing, utilities were in the early stages
of deploying more sophisticated analytics for predictive purposes, 
particularly to model anticipated electricity demand or the condition
of grid components to determine best repair or replacement times.† 
Predictive analytics combines historical and real-time data from any
number of sources to forecast the probabilities of an outcome, such as
a malfunctioning transformer. For many retailers, predictive analytics 
create suggestions for purchases to shoppers visiting their websites.‡ 
Prescriptive analytics is the latest evolution of data analytics, and it
narrows down multiple probabilities to one action, which may be 
automatically enacted. Google’s self-driving or autonomous car§ is an
example of an application that relies on prescriptive analytics. 
* 	 A Terabyte is 1000 Gigabytes, a Petabyte is 1000 Terabytes, using the simpler des­
ignation that identifies a Kilobyte as 1000 bytes. For the purists out there, it’s 1024
Gigabytes to a Terabyte and 1024 Terabytes to a Petabyte. The successive designa­
tions are Exa, Zetta, Yotta, and Bronto. Bronto! Dinosaurs are extinct, but they still 
live on. 
† 	Traditional utility practice was to run to failure or when the equipment failed, but 
the advent of sensors for remote monitoring and control enables a transition to more 
proactive grid management. 
‡ 	For example, see Amazon Knows What You Want Before You Buy It, January 27, 2014, 
http://www.predictiveanalyticsworld.com/patimes/amazon-knows-what-you­
want-before-you-buy-it/. 
§ For example, see A Self-Driving Car Will Create 1 Gigabyte of Data per Second: 















Figure 11.1 The value of data. 
Applications of advanced analytics are the value multiplier for 
data—big or otherwise. The ads that you see on the side of a search 
engine screen are based on your search history plus demographic 
data and countless other variables from multiple data brokers melded 
together to detect patterns and predict your probabilities of interest in
products and services. Figure 11.1 illustrates the foundational value of
data, and how analytics begets information, information coupled with
human insights produces knowledge, and knowledge coupled with
thoughtful human experience leads to wisdom. (This is not to say that
if you have a lot of data you are wise.)
There are important privacy questions regarding the treatment of
all these new sources of data, but there are also very serious questions 
about the monetary value of data. Monetization of the data can create
privacy issues.
For instance, an appliance manufacturer may be interested in col­
lecting data about how many times the cold water wash setting is used 
versus a hot water wash setting for a smart clothes washer. That data 
has value if it aids a diagnosis of a performance issue like a failing 
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owner of that asset, while the manufacturer would enjoy improved 
productivity on the part of its service resources and have evidence 
of malfunctioning components. The benefits of this data are shared 
between the appliance owner and manufacturer or service center. 
Similarly, if your refrigerator could alert you to a water leak or pend­
ing failure that would defrost all the contents in the freezer, getting an
urgent text message on your smart phone would be timely actionable
information. Maybe the refrigerator would automatically schedule a 
repair request with your designated maintenance center. You might be 
willing to pay extra for that data and service.
But advertisers want this data too, and as we already know, they
are willing to pay handsomely for it.* They might send mobile ads pro­
moting a replacement refrigerator or telemarket repair services. Is this 
really valuable for consumers? Maybe, maybe not. Did the refrigerator
owner derive any financial benefit from the sales of the data created 
by his or her refrigerator that was collected by the manufacturer and 
sold by the said manufacturer to the advertiser? There is no universal 
“the consumer owns his or her data” statement applicable to this data 
in the United States. To date we are unaware of this type of statement 
anywhere in the world.
CVS pharmacy, a nationwide retailer, created a program where 
shoppers can opt in to receive a loyalty card. Their ExtraCare pro­
gram has 70 million active members.† In exchange for some personal
information like name, contact details, gender, age, and household
data, this company rewards cardholders with discounts on purchases 
that are not available to noncardholders buying the same items. Of 
course, loyalty cards track purchase details for future use and cre­
ate more personalized experiences‡ in the form of targeted offers and 
coupons. However, consumers can choose to share their purchase data 
in exchange for price reductions—an exchange of value for this volun­
tary sharing of data.
In some cases, lawmakers have legislated privacy protections for 
data. For instance, health data has federal-level privacy protections 
* 	 Ninety-five percent of Google’s revenue is attributed to advertising as reported here:
https://investor.google.com/financial/tables.html. 
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defined in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA). The same is true for financial data via the Gramm–Leach–
Bliley federal law. Energy usage, consumption, and production data 
has some laws and regulations at the state level, but they are not con­
sistently protected in the same fashion across all 50 states. Vehicle 
telematics did not have any existing federal protections when this 
book was written. 
Wearable technology data is in an ambiguous situation with debates
about the agencies responsible for privacy protection of the associated 
health data. Under HIPAA, if that health data is collected on behalf
of a healthcare covered entity (healthcare provider, healthcare insurer,
or healthcare clearinghouse) and used for treatment, payment, or
operations, then that data would be subject to HIPAA requirements. 
However, if that data is collected and used on one of the growing 
types of personal health information data vaults, then the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) would generally have oversight of it under 
the HITECH Act. In yet a third scenario, if the data being generated 
is being collected and used solely by the individual with the device, 
or being shared with or sent to a cloud service or social media site
that does not meet the definition of a health vault, then there is much
argument about whether or not that data is protected by any existing 
law or regulation. Laws and regulations generally lag new technology, 
leaving the individuals using those technologies, and the technology
manufacturers, with no clear guidance about what they must do to
protect or use new varieties of data.
Vehicle telematics serves as an interesting example of how new data 
is monetized and can be used for shared benefit or not. The quid pro 
quo structure that exists with card loyalty programs seems to be the
basis for the initial auto insurance industry’s introduction of usage-
based insurance* (UBI) programs. The first programs† had only been 
operating for a couple of years at the time this book was written, so 
we suspend any judgments until we have more data. The initial results 
and feedback from consumers may be encouraging, since insurance 
* 	 Usage-based insurance leverages in-vehicle or mobile apps to collect driving data to 
determine insurance premiums. In the United States, existing programs are opt-in
and offer discounts for participation. 
† 	Progressive, State Farm Insurance, and American Family are three insurance com­
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companies are now bundling additional services to increase the 
incentives, as well as increase their revenue streams beyond insur­
ance payments. These services include roadside assistance and vehicle 
diagnostic reports. These arrangements provide value back to the 
consumer for the data that they agree to share on a voluntary or opt-
in basis. However, other stakeholders* are focused on the value that
vehicle telematics provides to car manufacturers and their original
equipment manufacturers (OEMs). Reading between the lines, it
seems that while auto insurance companies recognize the importance 
of socializing the value of data with the vehicle data creators (drivers
as owners or operators), other stakeholders believe they have a right to
the data whether or not the driver of the vehicle consents to share it. 
What does your structured and unstructured data reveal about you? 
Much more than you may realize, and chances are you are not sharing 
in the monetization of most of that data. The Smart Grid has received 
lots of attention, but as our chapter illuminates, there are other busi­
ness sectors that may have as many or more privacy concerns, as well 
as more issues about who owns the data and what entities have the 
right to access or sell it. What are the privacy and security responsi­
bilities assigned to all this new data being generated? What are the 
penalties for misuse or abuse of data that results in a loss of privacy? 
There are more questions than answers. We’re overdue for a serious 
discussion of how we want to treat the growth of new types of data
as we continue to transition to the Smart Grid and other sectors also 
transform to the IOT and the IOE. One encouraging sign is that the 
leading newspaper for Silicon Valley, home to Google and Facebook,
published an editorial calling for a Bill of Rights on data and personal
information.† The White House published a Consumer Privacy Bill of
Rights in February 2012,‡ so perhaps the consciousness is raised on
the value of data in the IOT and the IOE. 
What should be the future for all the data generated? We look for­
ward to continuing that conversation with you. 
* 	 Telematics Update, September 2013 and October 2013 issues: http://analysis.tele­
maticsupdate.com/infotainment/telematics-and-value-big-data-part-i and http://
analysis.telematicsupdate.com/infotainment/telematics-and-value-big-data-part-ii. 
† 	Editorial in reaction to Facebook’s 2012 psychological experiment on almost 
700,000 users, San Jose Mercury News, July 3, 2014. 





Smart Grid Categories and 
Associated Privacy Risks 
This spreadsheet was created in 2010 by a subteam, led by Rebecca
Herold, of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
Smart Grid Cyber Security Working Group (CSWG) Privacy Group.* 
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Example of One State’s Actions 
for Smart Grid Privacy 
There were many states that were considering rules to establish for 
Smart Grid privacy at the time this book was written. California 
is also frequently cited in this book for its privacy laws and poli­
cies regarding energy usage data since one of the authors, Christine 
Hertzog, resides in that state.
The actions of California could provide a good overview of the 
types of laws and rulings that other states may subsequently imple­
ment as a result of these precedents.
Here is a brief compilation of the most important California pri­
vacy rulings and laws impacting not only energy usage and produc­
tion data, but also general privacy protections for all types of personal
information, at the time of this writing. 
California State Constitution. Article 1, Declaration of
Rights, Section 1. “All people are by nature free and inde­
pendent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoy­












204	 APPENDIX B 
and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, 
happiness, and privacy.” (Note: Nine other state constitutions 
explicitly mention privacy.*)
Assembly Bill (AB) 1274. Privacy: customer electrical or natural 
gas usage data. This California law was approved on October 
5, 2013, to address the role of businesses such as energy
service providers (ESPs) as data managers. The bill aims to
“prohibit a business from sharing, disclosing, or otherwise 
making accessible to any 3rd party a customer’s electrical or
natural gas usage data without obtaining the express consent 
of the customer and conspicuously disclosing to whom the 
disclosure will be made and how the data will be used. The 
bill would require a business and a nonaffiliated 3rd party,
pursuant to a contract, to implement and maintain reason­
able security procedures and practices to protect the data from
unauthorized disclosure.”† It also provides for a civil penalty 
for violations. 
Senate Bill (SB) 1476. Public utilities: customer privacy:
advanced metering infrastructure. This law was approved on
September 29, 2010, and addresses consumer rights to their 
electricity usage data, and applies this law to IOUs and pub­
licly owned utilities such as municipal and rural cooperatives.‡ 
Assembly Bill 1103. Nonresidential Building Energy Use  
Disclosure Program. This California law was approved on
October 12, 2007, to provide whole building information
about energy use.§ The California Energy Commission was 
conducting hearings at the time this book was written about 
how to implement this legislation, including guidance for 
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Assembly Bill 531. This law was approved on October 11, 2009, 
to clarify the role of the State Energy Resources Conservation
and Development Commission in setting a schedule for 
compliance in supplying the required building benchmark­
ing data.* 
Senate Bill 1386. Personal information: Privacy. This law was 
approved on September 25, 2002, and required businesses to
disclose any breach of personal information (name) in com­
bination with a variety of other data elements, such as social 
security number, credit card number, or driver’s license or 
California ID number.† It also identifies that any breaches are 
civil code violations and can result in penalties.
D14-05-016. This CPUC decision issued rules regarding access
to energy usage and usage-related data with safeguards for 
privacy of personal data. It provides for the availability of
aggregated and anonymized data for research purposes to
academic institutions and local governments.‡ 
D12-08-045. This CPUC decision extended the privacy and 
security directives for electricity usage data to natural gas data.§ 
D11-07-056. This CPUC decision issued directives regarding 
privacy and security of customer electricity usage data.¶ It
aligned its privacy rules with the Fair Information Practice 
Principles (FIPPs), and defined approval mechanisms for
utilities to share this data with third parties. 
* 	 http://www.energy.ca.gov/ab1103/documents/2011-09-12_workshop/2011-09-12_
Assembly_Bill_531.pdf. 
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